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In the 1990s, physicists started looking beyond their disciplinary boundaries by using their 
methods to study various problems usually thrown up by financial economics. This 
dissertation deals with this extension of physics outside its disciplinary borders. It seeks to 
determine what sort of discipline econophysics is in relation to physics and to economics, 
how its emergence was made possible, and what sort of knowledge it produces. Using a 
variety of evidence including bibliometric analysis Chapter 1 explores the field’s 
disciplinary identity as a branch of physics even though its intellectual heart is better seen 
as the re-emergence of a 1960s research programme initiated in economics. Chapter 2 is 
historical: it identifies the key role played by the Santa Fe Institute and its pioneering 
complexity research in the shaping of methodological horizons of econophysics. These are 
in turn investigated in Chapter 3, which argues that there are in fact three methodological 
strands: statistical econophysics, bottom-up agent-based econophysics, and top-down 
agent-based econophysics. Viewed from a Lakatosian perspective they all share a 
conceptual hard-core but articulate the protective belt in distinctly different ways. The last 
and final chapter is devoted to the way econophysicists produce and justify their 
knowledge. It shows that econophysics operates by proposing empirically adequate 
analogies between physical and other systems in exactly the ways emphasised by Pierre 
Duhem. The contrast between such use of analogy in econophysics and modeling practices 
implemented by financial economics explains why econophysics remains so controversial 
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Scientific practices are sometimes messy. Physics is considered to be a branch of 
science dealing with the nature and properties of matter and energy. However, such 
a perception has recently been challenged. For the last three decades, physicists 
have been moving beyond the boundaries of their discipline, using their methods to 
study various problems instigated by social sciences. This movement was initiated in 
the 1970s, when certain physicists began publishing articles devoted to the study of 
social phenomena. While some authors extended what is called “catastrophe theory” 
to social sciences, others created a new field labelled “sociophysics”.1 In the 1990s 
physicists turned their attention to economics, particularly financial economics, giving 
rise to econophysics. Mantegna and Stanley (1999, p.2) defined this new field as “a 
quantitative approach using ideas, models, conceptual and computational methods 
of physics”. Although the name suggests interdisciplinary research, its foundations 
are in fact still ill-defined. There is no clear description of the methodological and 
scientific scope of the field, and its definition remains wide. In this thesis 
econophysics will be studied through different lenses to clarify its current situation 
and identify its scientific/methodological foundations. This task is quite difficult, 
simply because the methods come from physics while the studied phenomena are 
usually investigated by economists. Furthermore, the advent of econophysics 
echoes several methodological debates that have appeared in the history of 
economics and finance. Econophysics generates various questions: is econophysics 
an extension of financial economics or rather an additional step in the naturalization 
of modelling in economics? What are the origins of econophysics? How is this new 
field evolving in the current literature? What is the scientific justification for such an 
extension of physics in finance? These are, roughly speaking, the questions that 
structure this research, since they will be investigated individually in the chapters of 
this dissertation. The literature devoted to econophysics is scattered, and this in-
                                                          
1
 The number of physicists publishing papers devoted to the analysis of social phenomena and the 
number of themes studied are increasing nowadays, examples being the formation of social groups 
(Weidlich, 1971), social mimetism (Callen et al., 1974), industrial strikes (Galam, 1982; Galam et al., 
1982), democratic structures (Galam, 1986) and elections (Ferreira et al., 2008). 
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between situation echoes a number of debates that deserve specific philosophical 
attention. The aim of this thesis is to instigate this philosophical analysis further. 
 
Econophysics was created outside financial economics by statistical physicists, who 
study economic phenomena, more specifically financial markets. Indeed, despite this 
thematic diversification of the literature, the vast majority of the works published by 
econophysicists have dealt with the dynamics of financial markets.2 In other words, 
there are several ways to do econophysics but this dissertation only investigates the 
one focused on financial markets. Over the past two decades, econophysics has 
carved out a place in the scientific analysis of financial markets, providing new 
theoretical models, methods and results. The framework that econophysicists have 
developed describes the evolution of financial markets in a way that is very different 
from the current standard approach in finance. Today, although less visible than 
financial economics, econophysics influences financial markets by proposing new 
ways of dealing with financial data and therefore with financial management 
(Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017).  
 
In contrast to economists who use statistical tests, econophysicists are driven by a 
more phenomenological method in which visual tests are used to identify the 
probability distribution that fits the observations. Interestingly, what defines 
recognition in one community is often without interest in another one, and most 
econophysicists are unaware that such visual tests are considered to be unscientific 
in financial economics. Furthermore, the econophysics literature has largely 
remained silent on the crucial issues of the validation by existing tests of statistical 
distributions and their use. However, financial economists have developed 
econometric models, the validation of which required a significant statistical analysis. 
Such a methodological approach is very different from the one implemented by 
econophysicists, explaining why the two communities do not interact. This lack of 
dialogue can be traced to three main causes. The first is reciprocal ignorance, 
strengthened by some differences in disciplinary language. The second cause is 
                                                          
2
 Mantegna and Stanley (1999) and Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017) explained that this specific 
situation is mainly due to the computerization of the financial sphere, which literally offered billions of 
data (therefore facilitating the identification of macro-patterns). See Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017) 
or Schinckus (2017) for further information. 
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rooted in the way in which each discipline deals with its own scientific knowledge. 
The third reason is the lack of a framework that could allow comparisons between 
the results provided by the models developed in the two disciplines. 
 
Few philosophers of science work on econophysics - one can mention Weatherall 
(2013), Thebault et al. (2017) or Jhun et al. (2017) – however, these studies either 
deal with a very specific topic (Thebault et al., 20017 and Jhun et al. 2017) or with a 
biographic analysis of physicists working in finance (Weatherall, 2013). Rickles 
(2007, 2008) proposed a disciplinary analysis of econophysics and he paved the way 
for a deeper philosophical investigation of the field as a new issue in philosophy of 
science. This thesis aims at following this way and it seeks to make a contribution to 
the history and philosophy of science by clarifying the methodology and the 
epistemology of this field in comparison with financial economics. This is a deliberate 
choice of the author, who is also an economist and therefore cannot discuss the 
development of econophysics without situating this field in the existing knowledge of 
financial dynamics. This is a particular feature of this research, which offers a 
conceptual analysis to gain a better understanding of the disciplinary barriers that 
currently limit the dialogue between econophysics and financial economics. 
 
The second task of this dissertation is to investigate the distinctive philosophical 
problems of this very new field. Such contemporary history of a moving, hybrid area 
of knowledge is challenging but interesting for a philosopher of science. Precisely, 
the emergence of this in-between field forces us to confront the nature of 
disciplinarity, methodological disunity, the justification for the emergence of new 
knowledge, complexity and the nature of asymptotic reasoning. In this thesis, I will 
discuss the emergence of econophysics by situating this field in the existing 
knowledge (financial economics) dealing with the phenomena studied by 
econophysicists.  
 
In terms of methods, econophysics will be analysed from four different perspectives. 
The first chapter will investigate the disciplinary nature of econophysics using a 
bibliometric analysis to understand the complex situation of econophysics in the 
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scientific landscape. The second chapter will propose a historical analysis of the 
context that favoured the emergence of econophysics. Such an approach will clarify 
the key role played by the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) in the development of 
econophysics. Precisely, I will present the major computational approaches 
developed by the SFI members in their works on complexity to emphasize how today 
econophysics can be seen as a field dealing with agent-modelling (i.e. computerized 
simulation of systems composed by a large number of interacting components) and 
statistical patterns (i.e. identification of macro-laws in data). The third chapter will 
show that the contemporary evolution of econophysics is best understood as 
progressive methodological diversification. Through an analysis inspired by Imre 
Lakatos’s vision of science, this chapter shows how this fragmented evolution of 
econophysics actually corresponds to the coherent evolution of the research 
programme. Finally the fourth chapter will study the modelling practices implemented 
by econophysicists. By mobilizing the notion of Duhemian analogy, this last chapter 
will clarify how econophysicists justify their approach and how this contrasts with the 
modelling practices implemented by economists. Finally, in the light of my analysis, I 
will conclude by discussing the potential future of econophysics. The following 
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Chapter 1: When physicists became 




I. Introduction  
 
Econophysics is a new hybrid discipline (its name resulting from the contraction of 
“economics” and “physics”) finding its methodological origins in statistical physics. 
The term econophysics was coined in 1996 by Eugene Stanley 3  to describe a 
specific way of thinking about economic and financial systems by using physical 
concepts such as statistical regularities, scaling laws, self-organization and 
emergence. Although econophysics focuses on economic phenomena, there are 
many methodological and conceptual dissimilarities between the theoretical 
framework used by economists and the one used by econophysicists. Indeed, these 
communities employ very different scientific practices and their epistemological 
foundations are opposed. From this perspective, econophysics is sometimes 
presented as an autonomous, emerging field that has its own annual conferences4, 
its own code (89.65Gh) in the “Physics and Astrophysics Classification Scheme” 
(PACS under the code) and its own academic education and PhD5 (Gingras and 
Schinckus, 2012). Other works (Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2013 or Mandelbrot et al., 
2004) emphasize the historical connections between this field and financial 
economics by tracing the roots of the former in the emergence of the latter (in the 
1960s); and more precisely, in the papers written by Benoît Mandelbrot (1963a, 
1966) in financial economics. All these works are enhanced by controversial writings 
of econophysicists who often tend to exaggerate their contribution to economics and 
                                                          
3
 Eugene Stanley (born in 1941) is an American physicist and professor at Boston University who is 
well known for his works on statistical physics and on interdisciplinary studies in physics. He coined 
the name “econophysics”, the discipline of which he is said to be the father. He is also the author (with 
Rosario Mantegna) of the first textbook on econophysics, which was published in 1999 by Cambridge 
University Press. Eugene Stanley has also been the editor of Physica A, a journal that was originally 
dedicated to condensed-matter physics and which appears to be today the first journal in 
econophysics. 
4
 See <PhysicsWorld.com>. 
5
New PhD programs in econophysics have recently appeared. See 
<phys.uh.edu/research/econophysics/index.php> and R. Kutner and D. Grech (2008). 
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finance by claiming they deal with new concepts (such as invariance or power law 
(see McCauley, 2006)) or stable Lévy processes (Rosser, 2008), which would not be 
studied in economics 6 . In the light of these debates, the disciplinary nature of 
econophysics is very difficult to identify and therefore, this chapter aims at further 
discussion of this dimension. Beyond this discussion, another objective of this 
chapter is also to introduce econophysics by situating it in a disciplinary space. Is 
econophysics a subfield of physics or a recent extension of previous works in 
financial economics? This is the question at the centre of this first chapter. 
 
In Section II, I will use bibliometrics in order to examine the disciplinary space of 
econophysics, which clearly shows that it can be seen a sub-field of physics, since 
the vast majority of articles are published in physics journals. Moreover, all 
conditions related to the perpetuation of knowledge are also controlled by physicists. 
Therefore, from an institutional perspective, econophysics can be considered as a 
“unidisciplinary field” (i.e. related to only one scientific discipline). 
 
Section III will propose a detailed historical inquiry showing that this “unidisciplinary” 
dimension is not totally justified. In particular, many historical similarities (in terms of 
concepts and practices) will be emphasized between financial economics and 
econophysics. This historical inquiry is the cornerstone of this first chapter because it 
calls into question the unidisciplinary dimension of econophysics through the 
exploration of:  
  
 How this field could be considered as the re-emergence of an old research 
programme introduced in the 1960s and, 
 How actors involved in the emergence of econophysics and that of financial 
economics adopted the same strategy in order to justify the development in 
their field. 
 
The re-emergence of this old research programme in the 1990s was favoured, on 
the one hand by the evolution of knowledge in statistics, and on the other hand by 
                                                          
6




the increasing computerization of financial data7. Interestingly, this re-emergence 
arose in a different discipline (physics) from where the original programme 
appeared (financial economics). This specific situation will give me the opportunity 
to see how the advent of econophysics echoed a dead-end situation that financial 
economists faced some decades ago. 
 
In the 1960s, financial economics was an emerging field based on a Brownian 
(and then Gaussian) characterization of uncertainty in which statistical parameters, 
such as mean and variances, become key concepts. The theoretical foundations of 
finance were laid by Harry Markowitz8 (1952) in his portfolio theory, which formally 
defined the relationship between mean and variance: the first is associated with 
the expected return, while the latter usually described the financial risk9. Although 
this mean-variance analysis provided an operational framework for financial 
management, the following sections will review the collection of empirical evidence 
that shows the occurrence of extreme values that cannot be explained within a 
Gaussian framework. These empirical contradictions led financial economists to 
improve their description of empirical data.  
 
The first statistical alternative that financial economists studied is what is called 
stable Lévy processes. However, despite the existence of empirical evidence that 
confirms the descriptive power of these processes, their implementation in financial 
economics generated a problematic issue for three reasons: there is a 
methodological difficulty in identifying stable Lévy distribution, there is an absence of 
consensus about the parameterization of stable Lévy processes and, last but not 
least, the mathematical properties of these processes generate an infinite variance. 
Many researchers (Godfrey et al., 1964; Officer, 1972) considered the infinite-
variance hypothesis unacceptable because it is meaningless within the financial 
                                                          
7
 I will explain in detail the factors that favoured the re-emergence of this research programme in the 
second chapter of this PhD. 
8
 Harry Markowitz (born in 1927) is an economist who won the Nobel Memorial Prize winner in 1990. 
He is often presented as the founder of financial economics because of his pioneering portfolio theory 
that was developed in 1952. By offering a statistical translation of risk, return and interaction between 
securities and diversification, his works laid the foundation for the emergence of today’s finance. 
9
 This relationship is still the cornerstone of contemporary finance (Bernstein, 1992). 
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economics framework. In other words, the properties of stable Lévy processes 
seemed, at that time, to be in opposition with the disciplinary knowledge that ruled 
finance, which, in the 1960s and 1970s was an emerging field. At that time, 
theoreticians were focused on the development of a statistical framework10 that was 
in line with pre-existing, codified knowledge, which would therefore avoid creating 
potential puzzles (a potential infinite risk) that could discredit their emerging field.  
 
Surprisingly, econophysics emerged three decades later as the result of studying 
financial phenomena through stable Lévy processes. Simply said, the evolution of 
statistics used in physics11 led physicists to develop analytical solutions for having a 
finite variance for stable Lévy processes. Afterwards, they decided to apply their 
solutions to finance. From that perspective, the development of econophysics in the 
1990s can be seen as the re-emergence of an old research programme that financial 
economists had abandoned in the 1970s because at that time it generated puzzles 
that challenged the codified knowledge in the emerging discipline of finance.  
 
In this PhD I will study the historical, theoretical and contextual reasons for why the 
field of econophysics emerged in physics and not in economics. Moreover, historical 
similarities paved the way to an investigation of the disciplinary nature of 
econophysics, which I discuss in more detail in the last section of this chapter. 
 
As previously mentioned, econophysics is often presented as “an approach 
somewhere in between economics and physics” (Rosser, 2008). What is the 
disciplinary nature of econophysics? Is it a new sub-field of physics or perhaps a 
new interdisciplinary field? The answer is unclear, and these questions still generate 
many debates in the literature (Sinha et al., 2010). This chapter aims to clarify the 
situation of econophysics in relation to this issue. 
 
                                                          
10
 This will be detailed later in this chapter. 
11
 As I will explain, this evolution is specific to physics and has no link with the first attempt made by 
financial economists in the 1960s to describe financial leptokurticity. 
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II. Disciplinary perspectives on econophysics 
 
As a hybrid field, econophysics involves two areas of knowledge, physics and 
economics. The disciplinary nature of econophysics therefore appears as a 
challenging issue. This section further analyses the institutional space in which 
econophysics emerged by identifying the most important journals that publish papers 
dedicated to econophysics and by presenting the increasing institutionalization of 
this new field. 
 
II.1. The Position of Econophysics in the Disciplinary Space12 
 
Given that econophysics is based on different fundamental assumptions than 
mainstream economics, an analysis of the publication venues can give us a good 
idea of the position of this new field in the space of scientific disciplines. 
Econophysics is an “outsider” to the discipline of economics, which is well known to 
have a strong tendency to refer essentially to itself13. In this context, one can expect 
econophysicists to have difficulty publishing their results in the major economics 
journals. 
  
In order to reconstruct the subfield of econophysics, I started with the group of the 
most influential authors in econophysics and tracked their papers in the literature 
using the Web of Science database of Thomson-Reuters (The sample is composed 
of: Eugene Stanley, Rosario Mantegna, Joseph McCauley, Jean-Pierre Bouchaud, 
Mauro Gallegati, Benoît Mandelbrot, Didier Sornette, Thomas Lux, Bikas Chakrabarti 
and Doyne Farmer)14. These key authors are often presented as the fathers of 
econophysics simply because they contributed significantly to its early definition and 
development. Because of their influential and seminal works, these scholars are 
actually the most quoted authors in econophysics. Having the 10 highest quoted 
                                                          
12
 This section is broadly based on a paper I published in the Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought (see Gingras and Schinckus, 2012). 
13
 Pieters and Baumgartner (2002). 
14
 We could have added other names but the objective of this research is to identify the main 
bibliographic trends in econophysics. Moreover, given the usual practice of citations, we would 
retrieve other important authors through the analysis of the cited references in these papers as well 
as in the papers citing those source papers. 
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fathers of econophysics as a sample sounds an acceptable approach to define 
bibliometrically the core of econophysics. 
 
I thus identified a group of 242 source papers covering the domain of econophysics 
and the papers that cite them over the period 1980–2008 to analyse the emergence 
and early evolution of the field. I started the empirical analysis in the 1980 when the 
first works combining economics and physics have been published (mainly by the 
Santa Fe Institute as I will detail it in the second chapter). The objective of this study 
was to identify the disciplinary origin of econophysics. With this purpose, I fixed 2008 
as an endpoint for two reasons: 1) as detailed in Schinckus (2016) econophysics 
literature gradually became very diversified after 2009 making the identification of the 
original disciplinary core difficult; and, 2) starting from 2007 econophysicists created 
new journals in economics (I will discuss this point later in this chapter) leading to a 
situation that makes difficult a disciplinary analysis. 
 
Starting with these key authors and their papers as the population of analysis, I then 
identified 1,817 other papers that cited the source articles. The core papers being 
central to econophysics, I estimated that papers citing them would in all probability 
also be discussing econophysics. Analyzing all the cited authors in those papers 
show that indeed, all the usual figures associated with econophysics are well cited15.  
 
As shown in Table 1, more than 70 percent of the key papers that have been 
published since 1996 appear in physics journals, while only 21.6% found their place 
in either economics or finance journals. For the previous period (1980–1995) there 
were very few papers written by the source authors. They were mainly written by 
economists and were not really based on a physics approach16.  
 
                                                          
15
 I found that the core of the econophysics is essentially composed of five authors: Mantegna, 
Bouchaud, Mandelbrot, Sornette and Lux, who are by far the most cited authors in our 1,817 papers. 
All the others are also cited, albeit on a lesser scale. 
16
 These papers were mainly written by Thomas Lux and Mauro Gallegati and dealt with 
macroeconomics (Lux, 1992a, 1992b; Gallegati, 1990, 1994) or history of economics (Gallegati and 
Dardi, 1992). Let us remember that economists who are interested in econophysics (Lux or Gallegati 
for example) do not write only papers about econophysics. They have been trained as economists 
and thus they also write papers about economics (mainly macroeconomics). This shows that the 
papers about extreme value in finance written by Mandelbrot and Fama in the sixties (I will deal with 
these papers in the next section) are not the only connection between economics and econophysics. 
There are also contemporary economists who make connections between these two fields. 
17 
 
The data shown in Table 1 point to a specific trend: papers promoting a physics 
approach to economics did not find a place in the mainstream of the discipline and 
moved in the shadow of physics. A reliable measure of rejected submissions is 
difficult to obtain; however, I will explain that the main actors of econophysics did try 
to publish in those mainstream economics journals but without much success. This 
situation is not simply the effect of self-exclusion of econophysicists, but it also 





2008 % Total % 
Physics 8 32.0% 153 70.5% 161  66.5% 
Economics & 
Finance 13 52.0% 47 21.6% 60 24.2% 
Economics 13 52.0% 35 16.1% 48  19.8% 
Finance 0 0.0% 12 5.5% 12  5.0% 
Mathematics 0 0.0% 9 4.1% 9  3.7% 
Other fields  1 16.0% 3 3.8% 4  5% 
Total  25 100% 217 100% 242  100% 
Table 1: Disciplines in which the source papers have been published (Web of Science) 
 
Table 2 shows that one single physics journal, Physica A, which is devoted to 
“statistical mechanics and its applications”, published by far the largest number of 
econophysics papers, publishing 41% of the total number of papers of the second 
period (1996–2008). It has thus become the leading journal of this new field, the 
second being another physics journal, the European Physical Journal B, which is 
devoted to Condensed Matter and Complex Systems.  
 
In Table 2, we see that only 4% of the key papers were published in Physica A 
between 1980 and 1996, when a majority of the papers were still published in 
economics journals. Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the resistance to 
the ideas of econophysics was such that after 1995, the promoters of econophysics 
created their own niche outside of economics and finance in order to publish their 
results. This is consistent with Whitley’s observation that “research which ignores 
current priorities and approaches and challenges current standards and ideals is 
18 
 







2008 % Total % 
PHYSICA A 1 4.0% 90 41.5% 91 37.6% 
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL 
JOURNAL B 0 0.0% 27 12.4% 27 11.2% 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 2 8.0% 9 4.1% 11 4.5% 
QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 0 0.0% 10 4.6% 10 4.1% 
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 0 0.0% 8 3.7% 8 3.3% 
Table 2: Journals where the source papers have been published (Web of Science) 
 
Since the appointment of J.B Rosser17 as editor-in-chief in 2002, the Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization has begun publishing regular articles on the 
issue of complexity in economics, allowing econophysicists to publish their work in 
that journal. The third journal on the list, Quantitative Finance is a relatively new one. 
As explained below, it was created in 2001 and can be considered one of the first 
non-physics journals specifically devoted to the new field, as its editorial board 
includes many econophysicists and the editors include econophysicists (Jean-
Philippe Bouchaud and Doyne Farmer) and a mathematician (Michael Dempster).  
                                                          
17
 His research focuses partly on complexity in economics, a topic that may allow him to be more 
open to the approach proposed by econophysicists. 
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Figure 1: Most co-cited journals (and manuals) in papers citing our 242 source articles in 
econophysics (100 co-citations +) 
 
The centrality of physics for econophysics is clearly visible in Figure 1, which maps 
the network of co-citations between journals cited in papers that cite our 242 source 
papers in econophysics. The dense core of the network is composed of physics 
journals, while economics and finance journals are peripheral (north-west of the 
map) and Quantitative Finance is in between. 
 
Another way to look at the centrality of physics journals is provided in Table 3, which 
shows that between 1996 and 2008 only 12% of the citations came from economics 
or finance journals, even if the explicit topics of the econophysics papers were 
economic and financial phenomena. Interestingly, this trend was similar in the 
previous period (1980–1995), even as more than a half of the papers were published 
in economics and finance journals. Econophysics is thus essentially discussed in 
physics journals, a result confirmed by Table 4, which shows that, for both periods, 
about three-quarters of the citations come from papers published in physics journals 
that are usually devoted to condensed matter and statistical mechanics.  
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2008 % Total % 
Physics 16 76.2% 2,489 76.1% 2,505 76.1% 
Economics 2 9.5% 256 7.8% 258 7.8% 
Finance 0 0.0% 143 4.4% 143 4.4% 
Mathematics 1 4.8% 112 3.4% 113 3.4% 
Other fields 1 9.5% 63 8.3% 64 8.3% 
Total 21 100% 3,272 100% 3,293 100% 






2008 % Total % 
PHYSICA A 3 14.3% 1,213 37.1% 1,216 36.9% 
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL 
JOURNAL B 0 0.0% 326 10.0% 326 9.9% 
PHYSICAL REVIEW E 2 9.5% 279 8.5% 281 8.5% 
INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MODERN 
PHYSICS C 1 4.8% 143 4.4% 144 4.4% 
QUANTITATIVE 
FINANCE 0 0.0% 110 3.4% 110 3.3% 
JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
& CONTROL 0 0.0% 68 2.1% 68 2.1% 
JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
& ORGANIZATION 1 4.8% 60 1.8% 61 1.9% 
ACTA PHYSICA 
POLONICA B 0 0.0% 42 1.3% 42 1.3% 
PHYSICAL REVIEW 
LETTERS 1 4.8% 36 1.1% 37 1.1% 




JOURNAL OF PHYSICS 
A-MATHEMATICAL 
AND GENERAL 1 4.8% 33 1.0% 34 1.0% 
MACROECONOMIC 
DYNAMICS 0 0.0% 33 1.0% 33 1.0% 
JOURNAL OF THE 
KOREAN PHYSICAL 
SOCIETY 0 0.0% 30 0.9% 30 0.9% 
EUROPHYSICS 




SCIENCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 0 0.0% 25 0.8% 25 0.8% 
ADVANCES IN 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 0 0.0% 24 0.7% 24 0.7% 
PHYSICS REPORTS-
REVIEW SECTION OF 
PHYSICS LETTERS 0 0.0% 24 0.7% 24 0.7% 
COMPUTER PHYSICS 
COMMUNICATIONS 0 0.0% 20 0.6% 20 0.6% 




CHAOS 0 0.0% 20 0.6% 20 0.6% 
REPORTS ON 
PROGRESS IN 
PHYSICS 0 0.0% 19 0.6% 19 0.6% 
INTERNATIONAL 0 0.0% 18 0.6% 18 0.5% 
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AND EXPERIMENT 0 0.0% 15 0.5% 15 0.5% 
Table 4: Main Journals citing the source papers (Web of Science) 
 
In addition to the two journals already identified as being at the “core” of 
econophysics, we find Physical Review E, the major American physics journal that is 
devoted to research on “statistical, nonlinear and soft-matter physics”. The only 
economic-related journals citing econophysics are Quantitative Finance, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization and 
Macroeconomic Dynamics. While the first is managed by econophysicists, the macro 
dimension of the latter leads its editors to be more open to an econophysics 
perspective. A special issue entitled “Applications of Statistical Physics in Economics 
and Finance” published in 2008 by the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 
explicitly proposed to “overcome the lack of communication between economists and 
econophysicists” (Farmer and Lux, 2008, p. 3). Doyne Farmer and Thomas Lux18 
were the guest editors for this special issue in which articles were written by 
economists and physicists. In order to overcome the gap between the two camps, 
this special issue offered 12 articles dedicated to econophysics, which were written 
by authors from economics as well as from physics. 
 
Another journal, Quantitative Finance, appears to be the main economics journal that 
has published many papers devoted to econophysics. Interestingly, in 2008, the 
most cited journal is Physica A, followed by Quantitative Finance itself, the Journal of 
Economics dynamics & Control and then by two physics journals (European Physical 
Journal B and Physical Review E)19. It is worth emphasizing that economics-related 
journals that cite econophysics cannot really be considered as mainstream journals 
in economics, but rather as what Backhouse (2004, p. 265) called “orthodox 
                                                          
18
 The first is physicist and the second is economist and both were in our source authors. 
19
 The data on the cited journals come from the “Journal of Citation Report 2008” published by 
Thomson Reuters and part of the Web of knowledge. 
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dissenter” journals, that is journals that are still rooted in mainstream theory but that 
are open to other approaches 20 . All this suggests that the really “mainstream” 
journals are not very open or interested in publishing papers dedicated to 
econophysics. 
 
The complete absence of mainstream economic journals shown in Table 4 again 
confirms that, between 1996 and 2008 this discipline was not very influenced by 
econophysics and did not really acknowledge its existence. In contrast, Table 5 
shows that econophysics does depend on economic and finance journals, since 
nearly half of the total of its citations (46.5%) goes to these disciplines, although 
physics still remains as an important reference with about a third of the citations 
going to papers published in physics journals, followed by mathematics journals for 
about 7% and a tail consisting of many different science journals (13%). During the 
first period (1980–1995), more than 56 percent of the references cited were from 
economics or finance journals. We thus observe a decreasing dependence of 
econophysics on the economics literature and a growing presence of physics 
journals as a source of knowledge for econophysics, up from 19.2% to 32.6%, which 
again is consistent with the idea that this field developed essentially outside of the 






2008 % Total % 
Economics 148 50.7% 1,559 26.7% 1,707 27.9% 
Finance  20 6.8% 1,162 19.8% 1,182 19.4% 
Physics 56 19.2% 1,943 33.3% 1,999 32.6% 
Mathematics 21 7.2% 419 7.2% 440 7.2% 
Other fields 47 15.9% 752 13% 799 12.9% 
Total  292 100% 5,835 100% 6,127 100% 
Table 5: Disciplines cited in the source papers (two citations or more) (Web of Science) 
 
                                                          
20
 Following Backhouse (2004, p.265), I distinguish “orthodox dissenters” from “heterodox dissenters”; 
the latter reject the mainstream theory and aim at deeply changing conventional ideas, while the 
former are critical but work within mainstream economics. 
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This trend can also be observed in Table 6, which lists the main journals cited in the 
source papers. While economics journals (American Economic Review) were often 
cited in the key papers written between 1980 and 1995, physics journals became the 







2008 % Total % 
Physica A 3 1.0% 551 9.4% 554 9.0% 
The European Physical Journal B 0 0.0% 260 4.5% 260 4.2% 
Physical Review E 0 0.0% 196 3.4% 196 3.2% 
Quantitative Finance 0 0.0% 179 3.1% 179 2.9% 
Physical Review Letter 5 1.7% 162 2.8% 167 2.7% 
Nature 2 0.7% 147 2.5% 149 2.4% 
Journal of Finance 2 0.7% 128 2.2% 130 2.1% 
American Economic Review 18 6.2% 107 1.8% 125 2.0% 
International Journal of 
Theoretical and Applied Finance  0 0.0% 113 1.9% 113 1.8% 
Econometrica 7 2.4% 101 1.7% 108 1.8% 
International Journal of Modern 
Physics C 0 0.0% 107 1.8% 107 1.7% 
Journal de Physique I 2 0.7% 93 1.6% 95 1.6% 
Journal of Business  6 2.1% 85 1.5% 91 1.5% 
Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organisation 5 1.7% 84 1.4% 89 1.5% 
Journal of Political Economy 5 1.7% 73 1.3% 78 1.3% 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 10 3.4% 62 1.1% 72 1.2% 
Economic Journal 10 3.4% 58 1.0% 68 1.1% 
 
Table 6: Main Journals cited in the source papers (two citations or more) (Web of Science) 
 
Taken together, these data confirm that as a field, econophysics is building on the 
existing institutional structures of physics instead of trying to impose itself onto the 
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existing field of economics. A measure of the rapid growth of that field within physics 
is provided in Table 7, which shows the evolution of the annual number and 













1996 1 486 0.2 
1997 9 627 1.4 
1998 7 582 1.2 
1999 29 608 4.7 
2000 53 636 8.3 
2001 74 646 11.4 
2002 44 674 6.5 
2003 118 770 15.3 
2004 162 853 18.9 
2005 112 713 15.7 
2006 115 848 13.5 
2007 209 1,028 20.3 
2008 131 715 18.3 
2009 84 558 15 
Table 7: Number of papers dedicated to econophysics published in the Physica A journal 
 (Web of Science) 
 
The trend is clear despite an exceptional year in 2007 when two special issues of the 
journal were devoted to econophysics. A similar trend (not shown here) is observed 
in the European Journal of Physics B. The growing presence of econophysics in the 
pages of physics journals has probably contributed to the official recognition of the 
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field by the Physics and Astrophysics Classification Scheme (PACS) and, since 
2003, econophysics is an official subcategory of physics under the code 89.65 Gh. 
 
The openness of physics journals to topics like econophysics contrasts widely with 
the closure of mainstream economics journals to that topic. Although more 
research will have to be done on that question, it is probable that this openness of 
physics to non-physical topics is not unrelated to the fact that model building has 
become a self-conscious and important part of the practice of physics as compared 
with the search for new laws21. As a consequence, there may have been more 
sensitivity on the part of physicists to search for new phenomena to be modelled 
using their tools, in order that such a wide view of their field could open up new job 
avenues for physicists at a time when the job market was difficult. While many 
physicists turned towards biology, some, especially statistical and condensed 
matter physicists, turned to social phenomena under the rubric of “sociophysics” 
and “econophysics” either in full-time or part-time research programmes, as many 
were, in fact, working in physics-related departments. It was thus easier to present 
their work to physics journals as examples of modelling exercises analogous to 
those found in physics than to try to pass through the gate keepers of economic 
and financial journals. The difficulty was compounded by the fact, which was 
already mentioned, that the conceptual foundations behind the mathematical 
techniques are very different than the ones found in mainstream economics.  
 
In fact, the conceptual and methodological specificity of econophysics is closely 
linked to the different disciplinary origins of the authors who promote econophysics, 
as most of them have been trained as physicists and not as economists. This 
remark is important because although scientific papers appear contextless, they 
are social constructions that refer to a disciplinary culture whose knowledge is 
founded on the production, reception and use of texts. In their organization, these 
texts share assumptions about the types of persuasion that readers will expect 
                                                          
21
 We observe the same phenomenon with economic methodology that has been applied to 
numerous non-economic situations (related to politics, to military problems, to psychology, etc). 
However, this extension (sometimes called “economism”) does not mean that economists are more 
open-minded for the importation of a non-economic perspective into economics. In a sense, 
econophysicists and economists share the same methodological attitude when they mainly work on 
the export of their knowledge out of their disciplinary borders by staying opposed to a potential 
importation of concepts from another disciplines (Pieters and Baumgartner, 2002). 
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(Bazerman, 1988). Economists and econophysicists do not share the same 
assumptions about readers’ expectations: although the empirical dimension is 
emphasized in both communities, economists focus on an a priori approach 
(axiomatically justified argumentation), while the latter rather develop an a 
posteriori perspective (phenomenological data-driven models) 22 . The two 
communities have also different practices in terms of editing knowledge: while 
economists usually wait several months (sometimes several years!) for the 
finalization of editorial process, physicists consider that, once a paper is accepted 
for publication, it must be published because its analysis and the data it uses are 
significant only at the time the research is done and not several months or years 
after. Eugene Stanley told me, face to face23, that after more than six years (!) he 
decided to cancel his submission to the American Economic Review (a key journal 
in economics). He also told me that this significantly long editorial process is one of 
the reasons why physicists do not want to submit papers in economic journals. 
 
The codified knowledge relating to writing about science also involves conventions 
used in the organization of publications, allowing for a convenient and intelligible 
communication. Beyond the different stylistic conventions between economists and 
econophysicists24, Bazerman (1988) noticed that economists and physicists tend to 
present their scientific writing in different way. A common practice in economics is 
to write an important literature review “demonstrating the incrementalism of this 
literature” (Bazerman, 1988, p. 274) in order to emphasize the accumulation of 
knowledge and the ability of authors to work within a pre-existing body of codified 
knowledge. At the opposite end of the spectrum, physicists focus rather on 
references that deal with their topic and some potential applications. According to 
Bazerman (1988), this difference results from cultural beliefs that rule both 
                                                          
22
 I will deal with the role of models in econophysics in Chapter 4.  
23
 He invited me to participate to conference he organized about “Complex Systems in Physics” 
NATO Conference, Samarkand, Uzbekistan, 20–24 May 2013. 
24
 Both communities use their own classification scheme: while economists use the JEL (Journal of 
Economic Literature) classification, physicists organize their knowledge through their PACS (“Physics 
and Astrophysics Classification Scheme”) where econophysics has its own code (89.65Gh). Another 
stylistic difference between these two communities involves the use of reference style: economists 
usually use the stylistic conventions defined by the University of Chicago Press or the Harvard citation 
style where references are listed by alphabetical order, while physicists use the conventions used by 




communities: while physicists do not doubt the “scientificity” of their approach, 
economists feel compelled to justify it by making links with existing knowledge. 
 
These dissimilarities between the norms of publication used in economics and 
those used physics can also explain the reasons why economics journals are less 
open to the publication of papers related to econophysics, which are mainly 
formatted using the publication norms used in physics.  
 
This section suggests that econophysics emerged as a sub-field of physics in terms 
of publications. A complete disciplinary perspective of this new field also requires 
an analysis of the other ways of crystallizing knowledge, such as conferences, 
textbooks, or degrees. That is the aim of the following section. 
 
II.2. The Institutionalization of Econophysics 
 
If the nineties saw the emergence and growth of econophysics as a research 
programme, the next decade witnessed the growing institutionalization of this field. 
Although papers could be published in existing physics outlets, the specialty needed 
to develop further through having its own specialized conferences, journals, training 
programmes and textbooks. Though they do not necessarily appear in that order, I 
will now consider each of these in turn.  
 
A simple and practical way to spread knowledge relating to econophysics as a new 
paradigm is to organize workshops and colloquiums. The first conference devoted to 
econophysics took place in Budapest in 1997 and, unsurprisingly, it was organized 
by the department of physics of the university. Two years later, the European 
Association of Physicists officially endorsed the first conference on the Application of 
Physics in Financial Analysis (APFA), which was organized in Dublin. The APFA 
colloquium was entirely dedicated to econophysics and it was organized annually 
until 2007. There are now several annual conferences in existence that are 
dedicated to econophysics, like the Nikkei Econophysics Research Workshop and 
Symposium and the Econophysics Colloquium. Combined with publications of 
papers in specialized journals devoted to the field and textbooks, these events 
contribute to the stabilization and spread of a common scientific culture among 
29 
 
econophysicists. As for scientific societies, one can point to the creation in 2006 of 
the Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents (ESHIA), 
which aims at promoting interdisciplinary exchanges between economists, physicists 
and computer scientists (essentially in artificial intelligence), an objective consistent 
with econophysics. The absence of the label in the name of the organization may be 
a way of bringing more economists on board by letting their discipline keep its own 
name instead of being swallowed up by the new term, a gesture that would surely be 
perceived as hostile and imperialistic. 
 
One can consider Quantitative Finance, created in 2001, to be a journal essentially 
devoted to questions of econophysics (as their editorial boards include many 
econophysicists) followed by the Journal of Economic Interaction & Coordination 
(JEIC), which started in 2005. As mentioned above, the Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control is also open to papers related to econophysics, since they 
recently published a special issue devoted to this theme. 
 
The first textbook entitled Introduction to Econophysics was published in 2000 by 
Mantegna and Stanley, although several have appeared since (Roehner, 2002 and 
McCauley, 2004 for example). The publication of textbooks is very important step in 
the development of a new field because, they “contain highly elaborated models of 
linguistic forms for students to follow” (Bazerman, 1988, p. 155). Textbooks play a 
sociological and educational role for neophytes by defining the way of learning and 
formulating statements appropriate to the community they wish to join. As Figure 1 
shows, this first textbook remains the most central to the field. The aim of such 
textbooks is to define and stabilize the contour of the field as well as its methods, 
thus helping create a shared culture uniting the members of the new specialty. As 
such, they constitute an important step in the process of institutionalization of the 
field. As Jovanovic notes (2008, p. 219):  
“Given that collections of articles are published before textbooks, the interval 
between the moment when the former were published and the moment when 





The swiftness of the development of econophysics can be gauged by noting that it 
took twice as long (two decades) for the first textbooks to be written that are devoted 
to another recent specialty: behavioural finance (Schinckus, 2009b). 
  
A last important component of a truly institutionalized research field is the creation of 
new academic courses and the organization of training for MA and PhD programmes 
that are uniquely devoted to that field. Here again, the physics discipline serves as 
the institutional basis and several physics departments have offered courses in 
econophysics since 2002 (universities of Ulm in Sweden, Fribourg in Switzerland, 
Munster in Germany, Wroclaw in Poland and Dublin in Ireland). Most of the time, 
these courses are framed for physicists and focus on statistical physics that are 
applied to finance. An additional step in the institutionalization of econophysics has 
been the creation of full academic programmes totally dedicated to econophysics. 
The first universities to offer complete programmes leading to a diploma were Polish 
ones; Warsaw proposes a Bachelor and Wroclaw a Master. In 2006, the University 
of Houston (the US) was the first to coordinate a PhD in econophysics25 and in 2009, 
the University of Melbourne (Australia) planned to launch a similar programme26. All 
are situated within physics departments and are therefore physics-orientated. In 
order to familiarize students with the economic reality they are supposed to describe, 
these programmes also provide courses on the financial and macroeconomic reality, 
but they are not based on the theoretical basis of finance and macroeconomics27. 
 
All these new academic programmes show that econophysics is developing outside 
of the disciplines of social sciences economics and is emerging as a new scientific 
community with its own journals, conferences and training programmes. Since the 
middle of the 2000s, the conditions for the production of knowledge and the long-
term reproduction of the group of econophysicists are thus in place and provide the 
basis for a sustained growth in the annual number of publications. 
 
From a sociological point of view, econophysics clearly appears to be a sub-field of 
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 For further information on these programs, see Kutner and Grech (2008, p. 644) and the website of 
these universities See University of Houston (http://phys.uh.edu/research/econophysics/index.php); 
on the organization of BSc and Master’s degrees in econophysics at the university of Warsaw, see 
Kutner and Grech (2008).  
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physics, since the production of knowledge and the professionalization processes 
are controlled by physicists. It is interesting to observe that the development of 
econophysics in the 1990s coincides with what Kaiser (2012) called the “second 
bubble of Physics PhDs”, which resulted from the 1980 defence policy under the 
Reagan Administration, which was combined at that time with increasing fears of 
economic competition with Japan, thereby justifying higher expenditures in bio-tech, 
engineering and physical sciences. Kaiser (2012) clearly showed this second bubble 
in the following graph, 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of physics PhDs granted by US institutions, 1900–2005. From Kaiser 2012, p. 299) 
 
This rapid rise in funding for young physicists generated a form of “déjà vu” since it 
looked like the first bubble28 (which also appears in Fig. 2) that was observed during 
the “Sputnik era” (in the 1960s), which was justified, at that time, by Cold War 
rhetoric (Kaiser, 2008). Cassidy (2011) also confirmed this trend, emphasizing that 
the second bubble was mainly favourable to physicists involved in condensed-matter 
physics because they “argued that in their field of research the line between 
fundamental physics and its practical applications was so close that it was often 
blurred” (Cassidy, 2011, p. 131). This rhetoric was directly in line with the political 
community’s expectations in the 1990s, leading to a higher number of funding 
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 According to Standler (2009), the end of this kind of bubble can partly be explained by a 
generational shift in the administration: almost retired senior officers who were favourable toward 




opportunities for projects developed in this area of knowledge. Actually, the author 
explained that this trend was already observed in the first bubble (25% of physicists 
at that time worked in condensed-matter physics) but it has been strengthened in the 
1990s with the second bubble, during which this area of research became the first 
choice for the new PhD physicists (in 2000, 41% of doctorates in physics were in 
condensed-matter physics).  
 
This precision is important from an institutional point of view, not only because 
econophysics emerged in the 1990s, but also because all founders of this field were 
involved in condensed-matter physics. It is worth mentioning that it was two big 
names in condensed-matter physics (Eugene Stanley and Joseph McCauley, based 
in the US29), who promoted the development of econophysics. More precisely, these 
two founders of econophysics were, at one time or another, head of their department 
(of physics) and, in the 1990s (and continuing today), they promoted projects related 
to econophysics30. To sum up, the emergence of econophysics can be seen as a 
side effect of an institutional strategy of funding scientific research. 
 
III. Econophysics and the origins of financial economics31  
 
The bibliometric analysis developed in the previous section showed that this new 
field is controlled by physicists, with its own conferences, textbooks, education, etc. 
In a sense, econophysics can then be seen as mature sub-field that is able to define 
institutional norms and pre-given roles that perpetuate the reproduction of 
knowledge. However, a historical inquiry about concepts used by econophysicists 
will show that this disciplinary map is not so well defined. As suggested in the first 
part of this chapter, the disciplinary dimension of econophysics is more complex than 
it looks because it deals with specific knowledge that was already studied in financial 
economics in the 1960s. While the previous section showed what econophysics is in 
terms of existing scientific discipline (i.e. a sub-field of physics), this section will 
instead study where the concepts used by econophysicists come from. This 
historical inquiry will focus on a historical analysis of the main concepts used in 
                                                          
published at Cambridge University Press in (2004).  
30
 Many econophysicists currently work or have worked in the past with the department of physics of 
the University of Houston or the Center for Polymer Studies of Boston University. 
31
 This section is adapted from Chapter 2 of the book by Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017). 
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econophysics and see the extent to which these concepts were common in finance 
in the 1970s.  
 
Since my major argument here will be to show that the advent of econophysics 
echoed the dead-end situation that financial economists were facing in the 1960s, it 
is convenient to focus on the history of financial economics that is closely linked with 
the history of modern probability theory. Moreover, one specific probability 
distribution plays a key role in the history of the discipline: Gaussian distribution (also 
known as normal distribution). This distribution underlies the creation of the majority 
of theories and models from the mainstream: Efficient Market Hypothesis, Modern 
Portfolio Theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Black-Scholes model. One can 
therefore consider this distribution as a constituent of financial economics. But 
econophysics rejects the fact that financial distributions must only be described with 
a Gaussian distribution32 and, as I will explain in the third part, this rejection even 
characterizes the key argument of econophysicists. In this context, this section will 
first explain the origin of Gaussian distribution in financial economics, what problems 
financial economists were faced with and how they solved these problems by trying 
to use stable Lévy processes. I will then explain the reasons why financial 
economists stopped using these stable Lévy processes. This historical perspective 
on financial economics will give me the opportunity to question the (uni) disciplinary 
perspective of econophysics.  
 
III.1. The origins of the Gaussian approach in financial economics 
 
Financial economics is mainly characterized by a high level of mathematization in 
the modelling of stock-market returns. Modelling stock-market returns or stock-
market price variations is the first step in the development of financial models. This is 
why financial economists have always focused their attention and research on such 
problems. Stock-price variations and stock-market returns have been successively 
modelled using a random walk, Brownian motion and a martingale (Stabile, 2005; 
Poitras, 2006; Poitras et al., 2007; Jovanovic, 2009). Because these mathematical 
models require a statistical characterization of changes in price or returns, the work 
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 A Gaussian distribution refers to a symmetric statistical distribution characterized by a mean and a 
standard deviation.  
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of determining the statistical distribution of returns is a key problem in financial 
economics and, more generally, in the work of modern financial theory. Indeed, all 
models in finance assume specific parameters that can be valued through 
descriptive statistics of historical data supposing to describe the basic statistical 
coefficients and properties of the data in the study. Basically, the modern financial 
theory is mainly based on the first (mean) and the second (variance) statistical 
moments of financial returns; while the mean is usually associated with the expected 
return, the variance is rather presented as the financial risk33. 
 
The first statistical representations of variations in the price of financial assets were 
made on the basis of a Gaussian framework34 in the 1860s when Jules Regnault 
(1863), directly influenced by Adolphe Quételet, worked on the application of normal 
distribution to social phenomena (Jovanovic, 2001, 2006b). Bachelier (1900), whose 
work was clearly influenced by Regnault’s (Jovanovic, 2000, 2012), retained a 
Gaussian description of the evolution of variation in asset prices35. Similarly, all the 
empirical work that emerged from the 1930s onward (Cowles, 1933; Working, 1934; 
Cover  1937; Kendall, 1953) used this Gaussian framework because at the time it 
was difficult to use other kinds of statistical distribution36. Indeed, all non-Gaussian 
observations and “white noise” were characterized through a Gaussian 
standardization. 
 
                                                          
33
 By associating the future expected return with the past mean, and by doing the same with the 
variance, modern financial theory implicitly assumes that the future will be the statistical reflection of 
the past. 
34
 A Gaussian perspective is the framework most used in science to describe random phenomena 
(Stewart 1992). Two arguments can explain this observation: the simplicity of Gaussian distribution 
(only two statistical moments, the mean and the variance, are needed in order to describe a random 
phenomenon) and the statistical foundations of this Gaussian framework, which are directly rooted 
within the central-limit theorem (Belkacem 1996). 
35
 Bachelier needed normal law to demonstrate the equivalence between the results obtained in 
discrete time and in continuous time. 
36
 Although some non-Gaussian distributions (Cauchy or Lévy distributions) existed, no author, except 
Amoroso (Tusset 2010), used them in a dynamic approach. And we had to wait for developments in 
modern probability theory in order to be able to use these statistical tools in finance. 
35 
 
This Gaussian description of financial reality progressively crystallized and was 
reinforced when Paul Samuelson37 (1965) introduced geometric Brownian motion to 
describe the continuity of trajectories38. Since then, Gaussian distribution of returns 
on assets has strongly contributed to the development of modern financial theory. 
Indeed, Markowitz (1952) introduced the portfolio theory, which assumed that 
individuals will optimize a “mean-variance” strategy for their wealth. Markowitz 
(1952) showed that this “mean-variance” strategy is directly derived from the 
expected utility theory which is still a key conceptual framework in economics. 
Concretely, agents are assumed to maximize the expected return (mean) by 
minimizing the potential financial risk (variance). This portfolio theory represents the 
beginning of modern financial economics39  in which all key models refer to this 
mean-variance optimization using the Gaussian framework (where the estimation of 
mean and variance is very convenient).  
 
From Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Black-Scholes model, through to 
the recent development of Value at Risk (VaR), the Gaussian distribution of return on 
assets has played a central role in the construction of financial economics (Géman, 
2002). However, from the time the first statistical databases of prices were 
constituted in the early 20th century, some authors 40  noted the occurrence of 
extreme values in empirical data that cannot be explained within a Gaussian 
framework. From a statistical point of view, the occurrence of these extreme values 
is associated with what statisticians call the leptokurticity of empirical distribution. 
Schematically, leptokurtic distributions (such as the distribution on the dotted line in 
the figure below) have higher peaks (characterized by long tails on both sides of the 
mean) around the mean in comparison to the normal distribution (i.e. distribution in 
plain line on the figure below), which has short statistical tails, as shown below. 
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 Paul Samuelson (1915-2009) was a famous American economist. He was the winner of the first 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (1970). He contributed to several areas of economics, 
including finance, where he published some key articles about the pricing of warrants in the 1960s. 
He spent a large part of his career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
38
 One of the principal characteristics of Brownian motion is precisely its normal distribution. 
39
 See Bernstein (1992, 2007) or Jovanovic (2008) for further details about the beginning of financial 
economics.  
40
 Mitchell (1915) and Mills (1927, chap. 3), who were among the first to collect financial data, stressed 
this leptokurtic character (i.e. presence of extreme value). Later, starting with the initial work in 
econometrics, this character was frequently mentioned, as in Kendall (1953) and Cootner (1962). 




Figure 3: Visual comparison between Gaussian distribution (plain line) and a more 
leptokurtic distribution (dotted line) for an infinity of observations—Source: Jovanovic and 
Schinckus (2017, p. 27). 
 
The long tails observed for the leptokurtic distribution (dotted line) refer to the portion 
of the distribution that has a large number of occurrences that are far from the mean. 
In other words, a long tail means that we can have more extreme variations. The real 
challenge is therefore to find the most appropriate statistical framework to describe 
the leptokurtic dimension of empirical distributions. Although the Gaussian 
framework has interesting statistical properties, it does not permit a full description of 
leptokurticity. Indeed, a leptokurtic distribution implies that small changes are less 
frequent than in a Gaussian distribution, but extreme price moves are more likely to 
happen and are potentially much larger than in a Gaussian distribution. 
Consequently, using a stochastic process with a Gaussian distribution does not allow 
for the reproduction of extreme variations of stock prices. Obviously, it is an 
important limitation of the Gaussian framework for reproducing stock price variations, 




At that time (in the 1960s), leptokurtic distributions were well known41 and specialists 
were able to identify a non-Gaussian phenomenon, but they had no statistical tools 
for dynamic analysis of observations of this kind (some statistical moments can be 
undetermined, for example). Non-Gaussian distribution was then only a matter of 
observation and it was not modelled by a specific statistical framework. This 
apparent falsification of Gaussian distribution therefore required an improvement of 
the existing Gaussian framework. I introduce this topic in the following section. 
 
III.2. The first attempt to generalize the Gaussian framework  
 
In the 1960s, Benoît Mandelbrot42 (1962, 1963, 1965), Paul Samuelson (1965) and 
Eugene Fama43 (1965a) proposed studying financial markets using a non-Gaussian 
statistical framework that was directly inspired by Lévy’s work (1924) on the stability 
of probability distributions and the generalization of the central-limit theorem 
proposed by Gnedenko and Kolmogorov (1954) 44 . Mandelbrot was the first to 
attempt to use an extended Gaussian framework in finance. Using two models that 
he called M1963 and M1965, he paved two new ways of describing empirical 
observations by focusing on the stationary character of these observations45. The 
first makes it possible to take into account observable and apparent cycles on 
markets, and the second makes apparent the discontinuity of the price of assets on 
the markets.  
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 The leptokurtic nature of distribution tails was studied by Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) at the 
beginning of the 20th century when he analyzed the distribution of wealth in Italy. His study informed 
subsequent research throughout the 20th century (Barbut 2003). See also Tusset (2010). 
42
 Benoit Mandelbrot (1924-2010) was a Polish-born, French mathematician who became well known 
for the development of fractal geometry that he tried to apply to a large variety of phenomena 
(including finance). In the 1960s, he was the first to use stable Lévy processes to describe the 
evolution of financial distributions (his doctoral advisor was Paul Lévy). He worked for IBM for more 
than 35 years and he had many visiting academic positions. 
43
 Eugene Fama (born in 1939) is an American economist known for his Efficient Market Theory 
developed while he was doing his PhD in the 1960s. Fama mainly worked in financial economics and 
today he is considered a key author in this field. He had a position in finance at the University of 
Chicago after completing his PhD at the same university. 
44
 In accordance with this generalization, the sum of random variables, according to Lévy laws, 
distributed independently and identically, converge towards a stable Lévy law having the same 
parameters. This generalization of the central-limit theorem is important because it represents a 
justification and a strong statistical foundation for the use of Lévy laws to characterize complex 
phenomena.  
45
 Stationary means that variations in price remain the same over time and independent means that 




Because it directly refers to the statistical framework used by econophysics three 
decades later, the first model (M1963) proposed by Mandelbrot is very important for 
my historical inquiry. Basically, Mandelbrot demonstrated how stable Lévy 
processes46 can be perceived as a generalization of the Gaussian framework due to 
a statistical property called stability. This stability feature means that the statistical 
characteristics do not change with the time horizon47. Lévy’s stable movements are 
processes whose accretions are independent and stationary and follow a α-stable 
law of type   -    P X x x    in which it is possible to observe constancy of the 
parameter α (between 0 and 2). These laws are usually labelled “power laws” in the 
scientific literature and they can be visually illustrated as followed: 
 
Figure 4: Different values of the characteristic exponent for power laws 




Figure 4 clearly shows that Gaussian distribution (α = 2) is a specific case of stable 
Lévy processes. Basically, the parameter  is called the “characteristic exponent”: it 
is an indicator of the leptokurticity of the distribution and it also shows its level of 
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 A Lévy process, named after the French mathematician Paul Lévy, is a time stochastic process with 
stationary and independent increments, càdlàg paths. In mathematics, a càdlàg (French “continu à 
droite, limite à gauche”), RCLL (“right continuous with left limits”), or corlol (“continuous on (the) right, 
limit on (the) left”) function is a function defined by the real numbers (or a subset of them) that are 
right-continuous everywhere and that have left limits everywhere. Càdlàg functions are important in 
the study of stochastic processes that admit (or even require) jumps, unlike Brownian motion, which 
has continuous sample paths. 
47
 This stability feature can be very important in finance because it suggests that a statistical 
evaluation of annual data can also be applied to another time horizon such as monthly or weekly. 
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statistical stability. The value of this exponent determines the shape of the 
distribution: the lower this exponent, the fatter the tails (extreme events then have a 
higher probability of occurring). In other words, the lower  is, the more often 
extreme events are observed. Depending on the value of this parameter, we can find 
some well-known statistical distributions: with α = 1 it is a Cauchy distribution48 and 
with α = 3/2 it is a Pareto distribution49. If we have a α = 2 then we find our way back 
to the famous Gaussian distribution50. This statistical parameter is very important 
because it can be shown that the variance does not exist when  < 2 and that the 
mean does not exist when  ≤ 1. More generally, the pth moment exists if and only if 
p <  (Nolan, 2005). Lévy processes, which have α > 2, are said to be non-stable 
(meaning that their statistical characteristics can change with the time horizon).  
 
Over several years, Mandelbrot (1963, 1966) and Fama (1963, 1965) gave empirical 
evidence of the leptokurticity of financial distributions, thereby justifying the use of 
stable Lévy processes. Fama (1965) also gave a mathematical reinterpretation of the 
modern portfolio theory by Markowitz (1952), evoked above, in a Paretian (α = 3/2) 
statistical framework, but he was unable to provide a theoretical interpretation of his 
work because the parameter of risk (variance) was infinite (Fama, 1965, p. 414)51. 
When Mandelbrot (1962, 1963, 1966) and Fama (1963, 1965) proposed 
characterizing the uncertainty of the evolution of financial returns by using stable 
Lévy processes (in their Paretian form), they explicitly proposed to use stable Lévy 
processes in order to favour the development of more power laws-based finance. In 
other words, Mandelbrot and Fama promoted the use of stable processes to improve 
the phenomenological capture of empirical data; however, economists did not further 
investigate this research path that, interestingly, gave birth to econophysics. Why 
didn’t financial economists work on this way of characterizing data? This is a key 
question in the historical analysis of concepts related to econophysics, since these 
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 Cauchy distributions are not really used in practical applications because they have an 
undetermined first statistical moment (mean). 
49
 More generally, all Lévy processes with α <2 are said Paretian. Paretian distributions have a finite 
first statistical moment but an undefined second moment (variance). For a detailed presentation of 
Paretian distributions, see Schoutens (2003). 
50
 For the stable Lévy processes in their Gaussian form, we can have a finite value for mean and 
variance making possible the mean-variance optimization developed by Markowitz (1952).  
51
 As mentioned previously, Paretian distributions have a finite first statistical moment but an 
undefined second moment (variance), making the mean-variance optimization very complex. 
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stable Lévy processes play a central role in the emergence of econophysics. The 
following section will explain the technical and conceptual reasons for why financial 
economists reject the use of stable Lévy process. 
 
III.3. The rejection of stable Lévy processes in financial economics  
 
Although Mandelbrot (1962, 1963, 1966) and Fama (1963, 1965) showed that stable 
Lévy processes, in their Paretian form, seem to provide a better empirical description 
of the evolution of financial prices, these processes have not been used in financial 
economics52. To understand why, we must go back to the 1960s and specifically to 
the writings of Mandelbrot and Fama on stable processes.  
 
Stable Lévy processes (see the dotted line in Figure 3) have thick tails, which allow 
them to take into account price variations that are very large in relation to average 
variations. This essential property enables them to integrate the possibility of price 
“jumps”, but this characteristic, together with the stability of the distribution, means 
that variance can vary considerably depending on the size of the sample and the 
observation scale. Consequently, this variance does not tend towards a limit value. 
The variation is said, therefore, to be infinite because it does not tend towards a fixed 
value 53 . This infinite variance appears to be one of the major reasons for the 
difficulties of using stable processes in financial economics. Indeed, the infinite-
variance hypothesis was meaningless within the financial economics framework. As 
explained previously, variance and mean are the two major statistical parameters 
used in modern financial theory, since the first is usually associated with the financial 
risk while the second is assumed to give the expected return. From this perspective, 
if variance were infinite (as it is in a stable Lévy process), it would become 
impossible to understand the notion of risk as Markowitz had defined it and as it was 
(and is still) used in the key financial models. 
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 There are some timid attempts in the literature. See Geman (2002) for further information about this 
topic. 
53
 See Schoutens (2003) for a technical demonstration. The adjective “indeterminate” would be more 
accurately employed, but the literature uses “infinite”. 
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In addition to this indeterminacy of variance, financial economists faced another 
problem: the absence of computational definition (at that time) for evaluating all 
parameters of stable Lévy processes: the second statistical moments of stable Lévy 
processes were known to be infinite but no alternative solution for estimating the 
variability of data existed, meaning that financial economists were at a standoff since 
they could not use parameters other than the traditional variance. Fama (1965) 
himself regretted this point, he wrote:  
“Although the model discussed in the previous sections provides a complete 
theoretical structure for a portfolio model in a stable Paretian market, there are 
several difficulties involved in applying the model in practical situations” (Fama, 
1965, p. 414). 
 
In the conclusion of his article, Fama explained that the next step in the acceptability 
of stable Lévy processes in financial economics would be “to develop more 
adequate statistical tools for dealing with stable Paretian distributions” (Fama, 1965, 
p. 419). A reminder of this statistical problem is found in several essays dedicated to 
the study of potential alternatives to replace the variance as variability estimator in 
stable distributions (Fama and Roll, 1968, 1971). In addition, some authors 
expressed their scepticism about the opportunity to use stable Lévy processes. 
Officer (1972, p. 811), for example, explained that financial data “have some but not 
all properties of a stable process” and that several “inconsistencies with the stable 
hypothesis were also observed”. He concluded that the evolution of financial markets 
could not be described through a stable Lévy process (I will show in the fourth 
chapter that these debates on the statistical significance of stable Lévy processes 
are still important today for a potential rapprochement between econophysics and 
financial economics). 
 
The indetermination of the variance combined with the absence of an established 
computational alternative for estimating statistical variability led financial economists 
to stop the development of a stable Lévy processes-based finance. The use of these 
processes was then progressively abandoned and this point has not been really 
discussed in the literature, since it implied a new measure of risk (Fama, 1965). Few 
economists tried to find a solution to this puzzle: Fama and Roll (1968, 1971), 
Blattberg and Sargent (1971) and Clark (1973) provided some alternative measures 
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of risk but all these potential solutions were not really applicable (Fama, 1976) and 
their works did not generate further theoretical development. Even Fama (1976) 
himself preferred to use normal distribution to describe monthly variations, thereby 
abandoning stable distributions: 
“Statistical tools for handling data from nonnormal stable distributions are 
primitive relative to the tools that are available to handle data from normal 
distribution. Moreover, although most of the models of the theory of finance 
can be developed from the assumption of stable nonnormal return 
distributions, the exposition is simpler when models are based on the 
assumption that return distributions are normal. Thus, the cost of rejecting 
normality for securities returns in favor of stable nonnormal distributions are 
substantial and it behooves us to investigate the stable nonnormal 
hypothesis further” (Fama, 1976, p. 26). 
 
In other words, the opportunity costs of using stable Lévy processes were too 
great at that time. In a sense, this lack of enthusiasm for finding alternative 
measures of risk was understandable because at that time (i.e. in the beginning of 
the 1970s), financial economics was a young, emerging field and it was very 
important for actors to emphasize their ability to provide scientific development 
about financial reality. Therefore, financial economists did not necessarily want to 
deal with scientific puzzles that could discredit the scientific reputation of their 
emerging field. This is what Fama (1976) implicitly meant when he wrote that there 
was a “substantial cost” (in terms of scientificity) for the field to deal with this 
puzzle. In a Kuhnian perspective, one could say that the discipline of financial 
economics was not mature enough to solve the problem of infinite variance. At the 
opposite end, financial economists were focused on what appeared to be 
theoretically accepted and well established: the mean-variance optimization 
developed by Markowitz (1952). Basically, the objective of financial economics in 
its early time was to develop a theoretical framework related to an area of business 
(investment) that was totally embedded in complex practices. The portfolio theory 
(and its mean-variance optimization) was the first theoretical formulation of a very 
old practice (financial diversification). This theory (and its Gaussian framework) 
was the bedrock of financial economics54. A few years later, the Capital Asset 
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 “Markowitz came along and there was light” (Bernstein, 2007, p. 6). See Frankfurter and McGoun 
(1996) for the seminal dimension of Markowitz’s theory in finance.     
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Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964) generalized Markowitz’s approach55 and the Black-
Scholes model (1973) contributed to the extension of this mean-variance approach 
to the pricing of options56.  
Interestingly, discussions about the relevance of stable Lévy processes in finance 
re-emerged 30 years later. From a historical point of view, econophysics could 
therefore be looked on as the re-emergence of an old and forgotten research 
programme developed by Mandelbrot and Fama in the 1960s. This research 
programme existed in the 1960s and became degenerative in the 1970s due to a 
decreasing interest caused by a scientific context in which financial economists 
were not able to give meaning to the infinite variance implied by the use of stable 
Lévy processes. However, as explained in the previous section, economists 
acknowledged the high variability of financial data. In this context, a new potential 
conceptual framework needed to be expressed in terms of this approach which 
requires the possibility of valuing the mean and the variance (at least the 
variability) of empirical data. However, stable Lévy processes cannot meet the 
condition of finite variance, which was even worse, since there was no potential 
solution (at that time) for evaluating the variability of these processes. In absence 
of tools to deal with such statistical processes, financial economists simply 
abandoned research on this topic in the 1970s to focus on processes that met the 
necessary condition of having a finite variance. Research on extreme values in 
finance (i.e. leptokurticity of financial distributions) has progressively been 
transformed and studied through Gaussian compatible approaches. Empirical 
evidence 57  led financial economists to recognize that the mere Gaussian 
framework was not sufficient for describing the empirical data. However, the 
scientific context (emergence of their field) in which these financial economists 
operated invited them to avoid to work on anomalies to focus rather on an 
improvement of the existing Gaussian framework, which was (and is still) at the 
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 See McGoun (2004) about the epistemic role played by the CAPM model in the development of 
financial economics.  
56
 See Haug and Taleb (2011) and Millo and Schinckus (2016) about the epistemic role played by 
the Black-Scholes model in financial economics.      
57
 This empirical evidence was provided by Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1963, 1965), Fama and Roll 
(1968, 1971), Sargent (1971) and Clark (1973). 
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core of the field58. In this specific situation, financial economists developed two 
categories of models that are called “jump-diffusion models” and “ARCH-types 
models”. On the one hand, the jump models (Press, 1967; Merton, 1976; Cox and 
Ross, 1976) describe the leptokurticity of empirical data through a combination of 
two statistical processes: a Gaussian regime (in order to describe the main trend) 
and another (not necessarily Gaussian) process that characterizes the occurrence 
of extreme values (jumps)59. On the other hand, the ARCH-types models (Engle, 
1982; Bollerslev and Engle, 1986) describe the leptokurticity of empirical data 
through a Gaussian distribution that is considered as an “unconditional distribution” 
whose variability can be described with a “conditional distribution” that is derived 
from historical values of the variance60. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that these statistical solutions can be looked upon as 
“corrective tools” or “ad-hoc solutions” to save the Gaussian framework. 
Econophysicists usually rejected these corrective methods promoting an analysis 
of data as they are (or appear). In this context, econophysicists do not necessary 
reject the Gaussian framework (i.e. which is a specific case of stable Levy 
processes) but they rather consider that this statistical framework cannot 
characterize the complex reality (the occurrence of extreme value) of economic 
systems. As the chapter 2 will detail it later, power laws (i.e. stable Levy processes 
with an exponent higher than 2) became a very common statistical tool in physics 
to deal with complex systems. In other words, econophysicists do not reject the 
Gaussian framework but, in line with their background, they rather use a more 
general formulation to characterize the dynamics of complex economic systems. 
This alternative path taken by econophysicists will be detailed in the following 
chapters. This chapter emphasized the historical links between econophysics and 
financial economics call into question the uni-disciplinary nature of the former. The 
emergence of econophysics is not totally independent from old research debates 
that appeared in the 1970s finance. Furthermore, the following section will 
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 The previous section explained why this Gaussian framework was so important to early financial 
economics. In this scientific context, the improvement of this framework can be seen as a positive 
heuristic of the field, according to McGoun and Frankfurter (1996). 
59
 For further information on this literature, see Cont and Tankov, 2004. 
60
 Chapter 4 will return to this in detail and discuss this way of modelling where Gaussian distribution 
plays the role of an idealization and the ARCH models can be seen as a de-idealization methodology. 
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emphasize some common practices between economists and econophysicists in 
the scientific justification of their field. 
 
IV. For a constructivist history of econophysics 
  
The previous section provided a history of concepts, showing that econophysics 
could be looked on as the re-emergence of an old research programme that deals 
with a particular statistical framework. This historical inquiry of concepts must be 
completed with a history of practices related to the emergence of econophysics. This 
section will present a more constructivist history by explaining how actors involved 
with the development of econophysics justified the apparition of this field and, related 
to the previous section, how this justification echoes the emergence of financial 
economics itself. 
 
Although they can be considered as an institution dedicated to the production of a 
specific knowledge, emerging approaches must be studied in the light of disciplinary 
boundaries from which these fields derived. While the first part of this section will 
emphasize that econophysics seems to follow a classical model of disciplinary 
emergence in physics, the second section will show the historical similarities 
between the emergence of econophysics and the emergence of financial economics. 
Consequently, the topic (financial data) and the concepts (stable Lévy processes) 
presented in the previous section are not the only common points shared by 
econophysicists and the first financial economists. 
  
IV.1. Foundational elements of econophysics 
 
When Morrell (1990) studied the emergence of contemporary disciplines in the first 
half of the nineteenth century (in Europe and the US), he suggested six significant 
features of change: 1) an increased number of paid posts for scientific specialists; 2) 
the rise of specialist qualifications; 3) an increasing number of programmes or 
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training for students; 4) increased specialization of publications; 5) the rise of 
institutions; 6) the creation of an autonomous reward system for career scientists. 
Basically, in order for an emerging field to become an autonomous, it would have to 
meet all these disciplinary requirements. 
 
The section dedicated to the disciplinary analysis of econophysics (section II) 
showed points 2) (specialization of publications) and 3) (the growing number of 
programmes for students) through the increasing institutionalization of this field. The 
others elements were also observed: econophysics can now easily be studied in 
several prestigious institutes all around the world. The Institute of Theoretical 
Physics in Zurich, for example, has an important area of research dedicated to 
econophysics and it regularly enrols PhD and postdoc students in econophysics. In 
collaboration with the University of Fribourg, this institute launched a virtual interface 
that regroups all news related to econophysics (http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/). 
The Santa Fe Institute (SFI) also dedicated some of its academic resources to the 
development of econophysics by offering annual fellowships for talented 
econophysicists61. In the same vein as the SFI, the Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Lucca (Italy) is a new research institution that promotes a multidisciplinary research 
approach between physics, economics and computer sciences. The prestigious Max 
Planck Institute (for physics of complex systems) annually offers grants for research 
proposals in econophysics, while the German Physical Society has introduced the 
“young scientist award for socio and econophysics” for more than a decade now 
(starting in 2001). Finally, the new Econophysics Network62 recently created at the 
University of Leicester (but moved to King’s College) also offers research 
opportunities for PhD students and postdocs whose research deals with 
econophysics. 
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 The Santa Fe Institute is famous for its research on complexity. It played a key role in the 
combination of econophysics and agent-based modelling. I will deal with this specific point in the 
second chapter of this PhD.  
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These institutes and networks are only a few examples related to the increasing 
importance of econophysics in the physical sciences. Indeed, in addition to these 
specific research institutions, several universities provide a specific graduation in 
econophysics. It is also worth mentioning that all national research funding schemes 
(in physical sciences) also welcome proposals related to econophysics (see 
http://www.eps.org/, the website of the European Physical Society). Although all 
these elements confirm the institutional autonomy of econophysics, I showed in the 
previous section that this field has several historical links (in terms of concepts) with 
financial economics. The following sub-sections will complete this historical inquiry 
by emphasizing the historical similarities between the two fields in terms of practices 
(i.e. behaviours adapted by actors to justify the emergence of their field). 
IV.2 Similarities between the emergence of econophysics and financial 
economics 
 
Financial economics was born in the 1960s. It took less than one decade for the new 
discipline’s main theoretical results (efficient market theory, option pricing model, 
CAPM, and modern portfolio theory) to become established, creating what is 
considered today to be mainstream financial economics63. And although several later 
theoretical movements in financial economics (for example, behavioural finance and 
microstructure of financial markets) have tried to challenge its pre-eminence, the 
mainstream approach remains dominant in financial economics64. Thirty years later, 
econophysics was created outside financial economics by physicists coming from 
statistical physics. Using statistical models (stable Lévy processes) that financial 
economists did not or could not develop when their discipline was taking shape in 
the 1960s, econophysicists propose an alternative way of describing financial data 
(Roehner, 2002; McCauley, 2004).  
 
This section presents the historical similarities in terms of practices between the 
emergence of financial economics in the 1960s and that of econophysics in the 
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 On the history of mainstream financial economics, see Bernstein (1992), Jovanovic (2008), 
Melhring (2005), Poitras and Jovanovic (2007, 2010), or Whitley (1986a). 
64
 In line with Frickel and Gross (2005, p. 208), the adjective “dominant” is used here to signify a 
progressive movement that urges a revival of past ideas to push the field forwards in new directions. 
Dominance must not be associated with the idea of truth but rather with the ability to provide a 
progressive evolution of knowledge. In our view, econophysics is not truer than financial economics, 
but interestingly, it offers a specific solution to an old problem in financial economics.  
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1990s. By means of a comparative analysis, I will then show that the actors involved 
in the emergence of these two fields used the same methodological arguments to 
justify the development of their works. 
 
IV.2.a) The same institutionalization strategy 
 
Regarding its institutionalization, econophysics followed a pattern observed during 
the emergence of financial economics: in both cases, a recognized discipline 
expanded towards a new field of research whose study had been hitherto dominated 
by another framework. In the 1960s, economics expanded to the study of financial 
markets, which at the time was dominated by a practical framework called 
“chartism”65 ; in the 1990s, statistical physics expanded to the study of financial 
markets, which at the time were dominated by financial economics. In both cases, 
the new community was made up of scientists trained outside the discipline, and 
hence outside the mainstream. A kind of colonization of finance has occurred. This 
colonization can also be detected in the new arrivals’ publication strategy. As shown 
in section II of this chapter, econophysicists began by publishing in journals of their 
discipline of origin to make themselves known and disseminate their results—a sort 
of takeover of recognized scientific journals in the discipline of origin. 
 
In the 1960s, the newcomers took control of the two main journals specializing in 
finance at the time, the Journal of Business and the Journal of Finance. The aim was 
to modify the content of published articles by imposing a more strongly mathematical 
content and by using a particular structure: presenting the mathematical model and 
then empirical tests. To reinforce the new orientation, these two journals also 
published several special issues. Once control over these journals had been 
established, the newcomers developed their own journals, such as the Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, which was created in 1965.  
 
Similarly, econophysicists chose to publish and gain acceptance in journals devoted 
to an existing theoretical field in physics (statistical physics) rather than create new 
journals outside an existing scientific space and hence structure. These journals are 
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 Chartism is a financial practice based on the visual observation of the historical evolution of assets' 
prices. See Schinckus and Christiansen (2012) for an epistemological analysis of this approach. 
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among the most prestigious in physics (they took control of editorial boards (as in the 
case of Physica A and The European Journal of Physics B). This editorial strategy is 
a result not only of the methodology used by econophysicists (deriving from 
statistical physics) but also of this new community’s hope of gaining recognition from 
the existing scientific community quickly on the one hand, and to reach a larger 
audience on the other hand.  
 
The new approaches had no alternative to this “colonization strategy” because 
partisans of the dominant approach (and hence of the so-called mainstream 
journals) rejected these new theoretical developments in which they were not yet 
proficient. Gradual recognition of the new discipline subsequently allowed new 
specialist journals to be created, such as the Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis (1965), Quantitative Finance (2001) and the Journal of Economic 
Interaction & Coordination (2006), which are officially indexed under human 
sciences, making it possible to reach a wider readership (especially in economics). 
 
IV.2.b) Same arguments on scientific status 
 
A final similarity between the two fields is the use of the same discourse to justify the 
scientificity of the new approach. The emergence of both financial economics and 
econophysics was accompanied by particularly virulent criticism of the existing 
framework.  
 
In each case, proponents of the new approach challenged the traditional approach 
by asking its adepts to prove that it was scientific. This “confrontational” attitude is 
founded upon the challengers’ contention that the empirical studies, the new 
mathematics and methodology they use guarantee a scientific status absent from the 
traditional approach66. The challengers maintain that the scientificity of a theory or a 
model should determine whether it is adopted or rejected. Consider Fama’s three 
articles (Fama, 1965b, 1965c, 1970). All used the same structure: the first part dealt 
with theoretical implications of the random walk model and its links with the efficient 
market hypothesis, while the second part presented empirical results that validate 
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 See, for instance, Lorie (1966, p. 107). 
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the random walk model. This sequence—theory then empirical results—is today very 
familiar. It constitutes the hypothetico-deductive method, the scientific method 
defended in economics since the middle of the twentieth century. Basically, financial 
economists criticized the existing chartists for their inabilities to present their works 
with “scientific” arguments, accusing them of using instead a purely rhetorical 
justification rather than a strong theoretical demonstration of their findings67.  
 
Financial economists underlined the importance of the empirical dimension of their 
research from their very first publications (Lorie, 1965, p. 3). They saw the testability 
of their models and theories as a guarantee of scientificity, and concluded that “The 
empirical evidence to date provides strong support for the random-walk model” 
(Fama, 1965c, p. 59). Financial economists then developed a confrontational 
approach in their opposition to the chartists. As an example, James Lorie (1965, p. 
17) taxed the chartists with not taking into account the tools used in a scientific 
discipline such as economics. Similarly, Fama (1965c, p. 59), Fisher and Lorie 
(1965, p. 1–2) and Archer (1968, p. 231–232) presented their results as a 
“challenge” to chartists. In this debate, financial economists argued that their 
approach was based on scientific criteria, while chartism was based on folklore and 
had no scientific foundation. Consequently, they believed that financial economics 
should supplant previous folkloric practices. Cootner’s book (1964) was one of the 
first publications used by the proponents of financial economics to define the 
discipline. In his introduction, Cootner asserted that:  
“Academic studies have proven to be more sceptical about the folklore of 
the market place than those of the professional practitioners. To several 
of the authors represented in this volume the ‘patterns’ described by some 
market analysis are mere superstitions” (Cootner, 1964, p. 1). 
 
Cootner (1964) presented the first studies of the financial economists he discussed 
as the first scientific approach to stock-market variations, which would supplant 
previous practices, which were judged to be groundless. The method employed and 
the empirical tests of hypotheses were also presented as a guarantee of the 
scientificity of the results. 
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 In epistemological terms, this opposition between early financial economists and chartists shaded 
the classical opposition between deduction (used by financial economists) and induction (used by 
chartists) (Jovanovic, 2008). 
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Fama (1965c, p. 59) and James Lorie (Lorie, 1966, p. 110), two other emblematic 
figures in financial economics, denigrated traditional approaches in a similar manner. 
Hoffland (1967, p. 85–88) provided a good summary of the situation: 
“Folklore is a body of knowledge incorporating the superstitions, beliefs 
and practices of the unsophisticated portion of a society […]. Folklore is 
distinguished from scientific knowledge by its lack of rigor […]. The Dow 
Theory is often used as an example of a crudely formulated stock market 
‘theory’ […]”. 
 
What is interesting with the emergence of econophysics is that its scholars have 
proceeded in a similar fashion. In their work, they belittle the methodological 
framework of financial economics using similar vocabulary. They describe the 
theoretical developments of financial economics as “inconsistent […] and appalling” 
(Stanley, et al., 1999, p. 288). Despite his being an economist68, Keen (2003, p. 109) 
discredits financial economics by highlighting the “superficially appealing” character 
of its key concepts or by comparing it to any “tapestry of beliefs” (Keen, 2003, p. 
108). Marsili and Zhang (1998, p. 51) describe financial economics as “anti-
empirical”, while McCauley does not shrink from comparing the scientific value of the 
models of financial economics to that of cartoons:  
“The multitude of graphs presented without error bars in current economics 
texts are not better than cartoons, because they are not based on real 
empirical data, only on falsified neo-classical expectations”. (McCauley, 
2006, p. 17) 
 
The vocabulary used is designed to leave the reader with no doubt: “scientific”, 
“folklore”, “deplorable”, “superficial”, “sceptical”, “superstition”, “mystic” and 
“challenge.” All these wrangling words seem to dramatize the situation in which 
actors simply hold divergent positions. Econophysicists claim that their approach is 
more neutral (i.e. not based on an a priori model) with regard to the study of chance. 
They explicitly demonstrate a willingness to develop models that are, on the one 
hand, more coherent from a physics point of view, and on the other hand based on 
“raw observations” 69  of economic systems (Stanley, Gabaix, et al., 2008). By 
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 With Rosser (2006, 2008a), Keen is one of the rare breed of economists who have engaged with 
econophysicists.  
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 By “raw observations”, econophysicists mean non-normalized data. Economics (and econometrics) 
is mainly based on a Gaussian framework and when economists (econometricians) observe abnormal 
data (by abnormal data, I mean statistically unusual from a Gaussian point of view), they normalize 
these data. They use data mining in order to consider that all abnormal data have an expected mean 
equal to zero. Econophysicists consider this normalization as a priori reasoning about the economic 
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“physically realistic models”, the authors mean that econophysicists need to be able 
to give a physical meaning to the statistical parameters they use70.  
 
The approach used by econophysicists is then presented as more robust and more 
scientific than the empirical studies carried out in financial economics (Stanley, et al., 
2008, p. 3) and, in addition, “a claim often made by econophysicists is that their 
models are more realistic than those offered up by economists and econometricians” 
(Stanley et al., 2008, p. 3) whose fundamental concepts are “empirically and 
logically” (Keen, 2003, p. 108) erroneous, implying that a new, more “realistic” form 
of modelling needs to be developed. Here, the term realistic must be understood, 
according to econophysicists, as a way of describing the “true relationship governing 
changes in financial quotations”71. This empiricist perspective is very marked for 
econophysicists, who regularly point out that the empirical dimension is central to 
their work. Thus, although the “empirical data” are the same for financial economists 
and for physicists (financial quotations in the form of temporal series), physicists are 
quick to point to their “direct use of raw data,” thereby criticizing the use of statistical 
transformations performed by financial economists to “normalize” data. Here is 
Mandelbrot on this point: 
“The Gaussian framework being a statistician’s best friend, often, when he 
must process data that are obviously not normal, he begins by “normalizing” 
them […] in the same way, it has been very seriously suggested to me that I 
normalize price changes. I believe, quite to the contrary, that the long tails of 
histograms of price changes contain considerable amounts of information, 
and that there are a number of cogent reasons for tackling them head-on.” 
(Mandelbrot, 1997, p. 142).  
 
McCauley directly attacks this practice used by financial economists, explaining: 
 
“We [econophysicists] have no mathematical model in mind a priori. We do 
not ‘massage’ the data. Data massaging is both dangerous and misleading 
[...] Economists assume a preconceived model with several unknown 
parameters and then try to force-fit the model to a nonstationary time series 
by a ‘best choice of parameters’ ” (McCauley, 2006, p. 8). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
phenomena that they study. Econophysicists claim there is no “abnormal data” but only data about 
the reality. See Schinckus (2010b) for further information about this point. 
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 That is, that accord with the theoretical principles of modelling in statistical physics—the fact, for 
example, that in the analysis of stationary physical systems, variance must always be finite, in 
accordance with the thermodynamic hypotheses (concerning the concept of heat). 
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This methodological position is widespread among econophysicists, who work in the 
spirit of experimental physics rather than with the standard methods of economics. 
This empirical perspective is also justified, in the view of econophysicists, by the 
evolution of financial reality. The computerization of financial markets has led to 
better quantification of the financial reality, which should now be studied as an 
“empirical science” (Bouchaud, 2002; McCauley, 2004). This radical viewpoint 
espoused by some econophysicists has an element of naivety. Indeed, in a sense, 
any sampling method is a massaging of data. Nevertheless, this viewpoint has led 
econophysicists to a better consideration of extreme values, while such values are 
considered as errors by the majority of financial economists72.  
 
These historical similarities between econophysics and financial economics suggest 
challenge the idea that econophysics is a mere sub-field of physics. However, 
despite the existence of historical similarities between the two fields in terms of 
practices, one can observe a clear difference: while financial economists in the 
1960s took over the business schools by marginalizing the rival groups (Jovanovic, 
2008); econophysicists do not try to take the place of financial economics; rather 
they have tried to carve out a place for themselves in finance from outside. In their 
attempts, econophysicists emphasize their potential contributions to finance mainly 




An institutional analysis of econophysics showed which specialists control the 
production of knowledge and presented econophysics as a sub-field of physics with 
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its own channels to reproduce knowledge. This well-defined disciplinary perspective 
has then been nuanced through a more conceptual inquiry that emphasizes the 
great number of historical similarities between econophysics and financial 
economics. Precisely, the emergence of this first echoes the historical/conceptual 
debates that emerged in the financial economics of the 1970s. In the light of the two 
perspectives presented in the previous sections, the disciplinary nature of 
econophysics requires a deeper analysis. We know that econophysics is more than 
a mere sub-field of physics, but what kind of approach is it then? Is econophysics a 
telling example of interdisciplinarity? The purpose of this section is to further discuss 
this question. 
 
Econophysics is an in-between field that deals with tools that come from one area of 
knowledge and topics that belong to another one. In this context, this field that 
appears can be looked on as a form of “pidgin”, a “trading zone” or even as a new 
microcosm between two scientific tribes (financial economists and physicists). The 
anthropological notion of pidgin usually refers to an interim language, based on 
partial agreement on the meaning of shared terms. This concept of pidgin was 
introduced in science by Galison (1997), who called the Kuhnian incommensurability 
into question by explaining how people from different social groups can 
communicate74. Pidgin can be seen as a means of communication between two (or 
more) groups that do not have a shared language75. Galison (1997, p. 783) also 
used the metaphor of “trading zone” (because in situations of trade, groups speak 
languages other than that of their home country) to characterize this process of 
communication between people who do not share the same language. More 
specifically, “two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly 
different significance to the objects being exchanged” (Galison 1997, p. 783). The 
concept of pidgin shows the moving boundaries of scientific discipline by opening the 
way to the emergence of a new scientific community, which anthropologists call a 
microcosm.  
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 Galison (1997) explained how engineers collaborated with physicists in order to develop particle 
detectors and radar. 
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 The Creole language is often presented as an example of pidgin because it results from a mix of 
regional languages (Chavacano from the Philippines, Krio from Sierra Leone and Tok from Papua 
New Guinea); see Todd (1990). 
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The idea of econophysics as a “microcosm” that emerged between two different 
scientific communities is particularly interesting because physics and economics 
appear to be two self-referential disciplines. Indeed, according to the Science & 
Engineering Indicators (2000, tables 6–54, p. 103), economics is the most hermetic 
field of the social sciences76, with more than 87 percent of references being intra-
disciplinary, compared to 50 percent in sociology. It is even more self-contained than 
physics, in which authors cite physics journals in about 80 percent of their 
references. On this point, Shumway and Messer-Davidow (1991, p. 209) wrote:  
“Physics and economics serve as instances of internally convergent fields 
that maintain uniform ideas, methods, and standards while geography and 
literary studies are often cited as examples of internally divergent fields that 
readily absorb ideas and techniques from neighboring intellectual territories”.  
 
This scientific homogeneity associated with economics and physics is very often 
emphasized in the literature, which makes the emergence of econophysics both 
troubling and very interesting from a historical and philosophical point of view. 
Econophysicists consider themselves as physicists, the disciplinary identity of which 
can be found in the first definition given to this new field: econophysics is a “field […] 
that denotes the activities of physicists who are working on economic problems to 
test a variety of new conceptual approaches from the physical sciences” (Mantegna 
and Stanley, 1999, viii-ix). However, from anthropological point of view, this definition 
appears to be tribal because it implicitly implies a “knowledge territory” that is 
defended by physicists. If physics can legitimately be considered as the purview of 
physicists, why should econophysics be seen as a “reserved area” for physicists? At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, economists also tend “to protect their territory”: I 
showed in the section dedicated to the institutionalization of econophysics that 
economic journals are really not open to the publication of articles on econophysics. 
This analysis is directly in line with Whitley’s (1986) characterization of economics as 
a “partitioned bureaucracy” that has strong control over its theoretical core.  
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In this well-defined disciplinary context, how can the emergence of a boundary field 
between economics and physics be explained? Beyond the institutional frontiers and 
protective strategies developed by actors, a historical inquiry of concepts and 
practices shows that econophysics is not such a well-defined disciplinary field. 
Basically, econophysics, by definition, requires a multidisciplinary approach since it 
refers to a carrying over of words that come from physics to a new object of 
reference that belongs to financial economists. In other terms, econophysicists 
assume they can translate a specific reality usually studied by another scientific tribe 
into their own language. Consequently, econophysics implies the creation of 
meaning through translation between two linguistic communities77.  
The cultural dimension directly influences the cognitive aspects of disciplines (and 
therefore education and research) since culture is a set of mental constructs that 
may serve to tell people how to know and to use things (Bailey, 1992). However, this 
academic tribalism, which was emphasized in the previous sections, does not make 
impossible the exchanges between communities, as Bailey (1977) explained: 
“Each tribe has a name and a territory, settles it own affairs, goes to war with 
others, has a distinct language or at least a distinct dialect and a variety of 
symbolic ways of demonstrating its apartness from others. Nevertheless the 
whole set of tribes possess a common culture: their ways of constructing the 
world and the people who live in it are sufficiently similar for them to be able 
to understand, more or less, each other’s culture and even, when necessary, 
to communicate with members of other tribes. Universities possess a single 
culture which directs interaction between the many distinct and often mutually 
hostile groups” (Bailey, 1977, p. 35). 
 
This cultural possibility for scientists to interact often generates the development of 
subdisciplinary fields: “Below the level of the discipline, there remains the important 
category of subdisciplinary specialisms, with their own more closely-knit but 
constantly shifting communities” (Becher, 1994, p. 152). In a sense, econophysics 
(and the debates it generated) has resulted from this process evoked by Bailey 
(1977), which led to the development of this new subdisciplinary field located 
between two recognized disciplines (economics and physics). This in-between 
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situation is favourable to the emergence of what anthropologists call “pidgin”, which I 
defined earlier. The development of such an interim language can actually be 
favoured through the existing relationships that exist between econophysicists and 
economists: I mentioned earlier that collaborations are starting to arise between 
physicists and economists, which show that these two communities have a will to 
communicate with each other. As Farmer and Lux (2008, p. 6) wrote: 
“We hope that this selection of papers offers an impression of the scope and 
breadth of the growing literature in the interface between economics/finance 
and physics, that it will help readers to get acquainted with these new 
approaches and that it will stimulate further collaborations between scientists 
of both disciplines”.  
 
More recently, one can observe some room for additional collaboration between 
economists and econophysicists. For instance, the International Review of Financial 
Analysis (a good journal in financial economics) recently proposed two special 
issues devoted to econophysics (Li and Chen, 2012 and McCauley et al., 2016). It is 
also important to emphasize that at the next American Finance Association, the first 
session dedicated to econophysics has been organized78. 
 
In this respect, all the conditions seem to have been met for the emergence of a new 
pidgin language, since regular contact between the language communities involved 
and the will to communicate are the required conditions for the emergence of a 
pidgin language (Chrisman, 1999). Pidgin requires the emergence of a common 
(interim) language that is founded on a partial agreement between the involved 
factions (Klein, 1994). This language implies a common conceptual scheme that 
results from a double movement: models from physics must incorporate the 
theoretical framework from financial economics and, at the same time, theories and 
concepts from financial economics must be modified so that they encompass the 
richer models from physics. This double movement is a necessary step towards a 
more integrative econophysics. This adaptation also implies the integration of 
theoretical constraints observed in each discipline in such a way that the new shared 
conceptual framework would make sense in each discipline. This issue is not without 
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problems. As Morin (1994) explains, “the big problem is to find the difficult path of the 
inter-relationship [l’entre-articulation] between sciences that have not only their own 
language, but basic concepts that cannot move from one language to another”. A 
telling example of such a problem is the misunderstanding between economists and 
physicists about the use of stable Lévy processes: Both communities claim to be the 
first to have used these processes and they do not even consider what the other 
community is doing. However, economists and physicists use these processes in 
very different ways: the former use a combination of distributions (Gaussian 
combined with another one) to characterize the occurrence of extreme values in 
financial distributions, whereas the latter use only one distribution to describe the 
evolution of financial data. 
 
The creation of a pidgin discipline implies a more integrative approach in which 
econophysicists and financial economists would share a common conceptual 
scheme that transcends both disciplines. This “integrative dimension” refers to two 
kinds of integration: on the one hand, a methodological integration to produce a 
common conceptual framework and, on the other hand, a sociological integration—
meaning that theorists from the disciplines involved move beyond their cultural 
differences in order to work together on a common project. The sociological 
integration is a matter of “inter-professionality” related to the standardization of 
knowledge “through the background” (D'Amour and Oandasan, 2005) while the 
methodological integration refers to the knowledge itself. This sociological integration 
seems difficult given the strong disciplinary control observed in economics and 
physics (Pieters and Baumgartner, 2002). Although this trend is still in its infancy, we 
can observe an increasing number of collaborations between econophysicists and 
economists; these works take the form of special issues published in economic 
journals. 
 
This potential integrative situation is still very new in the literature79. Econophysicists 
and economists accept that communicating and collaborating with these types of 
interactions might lead to the creation of a new conceptual jargon that would be 
understood by both communities. Chrisman (1999, p. 5) explained how the 
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elaboration of new transdisciplinary jargon between two disciplines can be 
associated with the emergence of pidgin. Two examples can be mentioned here to 
illustrate the potential emergence of pidgin: the truncation technique for stable Lévy 
processes and the asymmetric treatment of random matrixes.  
 
In financial economics, the concept of risk is statistically associated with the variance 
of a distribution. In this context, statistical processes that have no defined variance 
(such as a stable Lévy process) are not appropriate for financial risk management. In 
the same vein, when statistical physicists use stable Lévy processes to describe the 
dynamic of a particular variable, they also require a finite variance in their analysis of 
the fluctuations that occur in finite physical systems. Because stable Lévy processes 
fit a high number of phenomena particularly well, physicists developed “truncation 
techniques” to make these processes “physically plausible” (i.e. applicable to 
physical systems). Precisely, these truncation methods refer to a mathematical 
treatment of a part of the distribution to ensure the finiteness variance. Such 
evolution for dealing with stable Lévy processes makes them appropriate for both 
communities (see Schinckus, 2013b for further details on this point).  
 
Another example refers to the use of random matrixes in the analysis of financial 
data. In physics, statistical physicists usually work with symmetric random matrixes 
whose elements refer to (physical, electrical, magnetic, etc.) signals that characterize 
a physical system at a specific moment. This description of a system a particular 
time makes the matrix's element temporally symmetrical. Financial economists deal 
with time series that describe the dynamics of economic variables at different periods 
in time. Consequently, economists use random matrixes by defining their elements 
as temporally asymmetric (i.e. referring to different moments in the past). 
Econophysicists who have discovered this way of using matrixes tend to 
progressively integrate it into their mathematical techniques, which are now shared 
by the two communities (see Jovanovic, Mantegna and Schinckus, 2018 for further 
information). These two examples show how tools can evolve when a trading zone 
emerges between two areas of knowledge. In particular, the interactions between 
economists and econophysicists generate in-between situations whose complexity 
requires an adaptation of tools that can be used by the two communities.   
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VI. Conclusion  
 
 
In this chapter, econophysics was introduced and analyzed through different lenses 
in order to better understand the disciplinary nature of this new field. 
 
Firstly, I used a bibliometric analysis to identify the disciplinary space of 
econophysics. This investigation showed that this field can be seen as a sub-field of 
physics, since the vast majority of articles are published in physical journals, which 
means that the conditions related to the perpetuation of knowledge are controlled by 
physicists. Although this section emphasized different publication conventions, it 
shows that, from an institutional point of view, econophysics can be looked at as a 
“unidisciplinary field” (i.e. related to only one scientific discipline) since the majority of 
papers founding econophysics were originally published in physics journals. 
 
However, a historical inquiry shows that this unidisciplinary dimension is not very well 
justified. Indeed, many historical similarities (in terms of concepts and practices) 
between econophysics and financial economics have been stressed in this chapter. 
This historical inquiry is the cornerstone of this chapter because it called the 
unidisciplinary dimension of econophysics into question by emphasizing two 
important points: 
 
 In terms of the history of concepts, this field can be considered as the re-
emergence (in physics) of an old research programme that was introduced 
(but abandoned) in the 1960s by financial economists. 
 In terms of the history of practices, actors involved in the emergence of 
econophysics (in the 1990s) and that of financial economics (in the 1960s) 
adopted the same strategy (despite their disciplinary differences) in order to 
justify the development of their field. 
 
This historical evidence paved the way for considering the possibility of creating a 
trading zone between econophysicists and financial economists. In particular I 
showed that the concept of pidgin is the most appropriate notion for describing the 
current epistemological status of econophysics; I discussed this point in the last part 
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of this chapter. In the following table, I propose to summarize the different 
disciplinary perspectives I dealt with in this chapter: 
 
 
Perspective Nature of econophysics 
Bibliometric Unidisciplinary: econophysics appears to be a 
sub-field of physics since the majority of 
articles founding econophysics have been 
published in physics journals. 
Historical The unidisciplinary dimension of 
econophysics is called into question since this 
field has many similarities, in terms of history 
of concepts and practices, with financial 
economics, suggesting that it can be looked 
on as a boundary field between financial 















Table 8: Summary of the disciplinary perspectives discussed in this chapter and its implications for 
econophysics 
 
In conclusion, at this point in time, econophysics is not a discipline. Specifically, the 
notion of discipline makes no sense in an epistemological analysis of econophysics. 
In this context, econophysics can be seen as a subfield of physics or it can be 
perceived as an intermediary zone (or a pidgin) between physics and economics. 
Implications The historical similarities of the concepts 
could suggest room for a more integrative 
movement between financial economics and 
physics. Although the collaborations between 
econophysicists and economists are still in 
their infancy, this direction is actually 





Although the bibliometric analysis developed in this chapter suggested that 
econophysics could originally be perceived as sub-area of physics, a more precise 
historical analysis rather suggests the later statement. Econophysics appears to be a 
boundary field that can be defined as “an agreement and an awareness between the 
groups involved through which each can understand that the other may not see 
things in the same way” (Chrisman, 1999, p. 6). The second chapter will investigate 
the scientific context in which this boundary field progressively emerged.  
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What Santa Fe did was to act as a gigantic catalyst for all that [research on 
complexity]. It was a place where very good people—people of the caliber of 
Frank Hahn and Ken Arrow—could come and interact with people like John 
Holland and can deal with inductive learning rather than deductive logic, we 
can cut the Gordian know of equilibrium and deal with open-ended evolution, 
because many of these problems have been dealt with by other disciplines. 
Santa Fe provided the jargon, the metaphors, and the expertise that you 
needed in order to get the techniques started in economics – Arthur (cited in 




By analyzing the disciplinary nature of econophysics, the first chapter showed why 
econophysics can be seen as a hybrid area of knowledge that exists between 
economics and physics. However, the first chapter did not really explain the context 
that favoured the emergence of such an in-between field. The application of 
statistical physics to economics is not necessarily an obvious research approach, 
and econophysics did not spring from nowhere. Furthermore, the importation of 
physics into economics is nothing new, since econometrics, for example, was  
mainly developed by scientists with a background in physics (Miroskwi, 2002). In this 
context, it is worth asking what the contextual elements were that promoted the 
emergence of econophysics as a hybrid branch of knowledge and what the 
differences (or similarities) were between that field and the previous importation of 
physics into economics. In addition to this relation to economics, econophysics is 
often presented as a part of complexity studies. Precisely, the few works dealing with 
philosophy of science and econophysics (Juhn et al. 2017; Thebault et al. 2017, 
Rosser 2010) explicitly emphasized the link between econophysics and complexity. 
Rickles (2007; 2008) who was, to my knowledge, the first to write on this topic 
explained that econophysics can be presented as the study of financial systems from 
the perspective of the physics of complex systems. This chapter, and more 
generally, this thesis is a step further in the investigation of the philosophical 
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questions, initiated by Rickles (2007, 2008), about the link between complexity and 
econophysics. Where does this association of econophysics with complexity come 
from? What is the link between complexity, econophysics and economics?  
 
This second chapter aims to detail the historical context that facilitated the 
development of econophysics in order to understand where this field comes from. 
Although the econophysics field has officially existed since the 1990s (Mantegna, 
1991; Mantegna and Stanley, 1994), my study will take the form of an analysis of 
works that created the environment in which econophysics emerged. This chapter 
will examine the roots of econophysics and show how these roots still influence the 
field today. This investigation will lead me to mention the historical importance of the 
Santa Fe Institute (SFI), which played a key role in the development of complexity 
studies and, therefore, of econophysics (Holt et al., 2011). The Santa Fe Institute is 
directly and explicitly associated with the notion of complexity, as is mentioned on 





The Santa Fe Institute contributed to the extension of complex studies to other areas 
of knowledge and this chapter will investigate how this institute influenced the 
emergence of econophysics and how this influence plays a key role in the 
differentiation between econophysics and econometrics. Actually, it is impossible to 
understand the contemporary evolution of econophysics without mentioning its 
methodological links to seminal studies developed by SFI, because this institution 
created a specific scientific context that promotes the hybridization of physics (Dillon, 
2001). The clarification of the role of the SFI will allow me to highlight on the one 
hand, the place of econophysics in economic complexity and, on the other hand, the 
origins of computational techniques used by econophysicists. The Santa Fe Institute 
is a well-known independent research centre based on Hyde Park Road (on 32 








The institute employs a small number of resident faculty (50) combined with around 
100 visiting/external faculty. The SFI offers a number of education programmes that 
take the form of “program camps”, workshops or summer schools that focus on 
complexity and the understanding of complex systems. In this chapter, I will show 
how this institution played a key role in the emergence of econophysics.  
 
This institute was created in the early 1980s by leading scientists who were directly 
involved in Cold War science. In this particular context, the first part of this chapter 
will trace the roots of the complexity issue in the balkanization (fragmentation) of the 
Cold War science, which was mainly characterized by physics-based research and 
an emerging of the behavioural sciences. Both perspectives had military purposes 
and they worked on the elaboration of an optimal problem solving framework in 
which rationality was seen as an optimizing process that provided the most 
appropriate decision in a given situation. This scientific culture led the vast majority 
of the post-war scientists to associate complex situation problem solving with a 
complex process (i.e. dynamic complexity). After having clarified this point about 
complexity, I will explain how the Santa Fe Institute emerged in this Cold War context 
and how it played an important role in the diffusion of this dynamic complexity 
outside of physics. Specifically, the following sections will explain how SFI scholars 
associated dynamic complexity either with the emergence of a spontaneous order 
(agent-based modelling) or with the emergence of a macro statistical regularity 
(statistical perspective that will be presented as the origins of econophysics) 80 . 
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 These two computational techniques that are associated with dynamic complexity are sometimes 
considered as two faces of the same complex reality (Langston, 1986, 1990,  Langston and Wootters, 
1990), as I will explain in the conclusion of the first part of this chapter. 
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Thanks to works developed by the SFI, these two forms of complexity have 
progressively been extended in economics. 
 
The second part of the chapter will present this development of complexity studies in 
economics by highlighting how (and why) the Santa Fe Institute initiated them. From 
this perspective, the identification of the computational approaches developed by the 
SFI is very important because it offers a conceptual framework for a better 
understanding of the historical links between econophysics and economics. It is 
worth mentioning that, except for Mirowski (2002), who notes in passing a parallel 
between the Santa Fe Institute and the Cowles Commission, the historical 
differences and similarities between the emergence of econophysics and the 
development of early econometrics have not been a subject of research. By 
identifying the kind of complexity (dynamical complexity) that econophysics deals 
with and by focusing on the history of the institution (SFI) that promoted this 
complexity, this chapter will investigate further this aspect and clarify the relationship 
between econophysics and economics. Interestingly, the presentation of the role 
played by the SFI in this history clarifies the reasons why econophysics failed to 
impress economists. 
 
Existing historical works on econophysics usually present the field as a 
contemporary development of the mathematical intuitions81 developed by Mandelbrot 
in the 1960s (Roehner, 2009; Mantegna and Stanley, 1999; Jovanovic and 
Schinckus, 2013); however none of them have clarified the scientific context that 
promoted the crystallization of these intuitions. Despite the fact that one can find 
several articles that associate econophysics with complexity, these works clarify the 
historical context in which these two words have been combined. This is the major 
contribution of this chapter: by proposing a historical explanation that favours the 
development of econophysics, this chapter offers a kind of pre-history (i.e. before the 
official) of the field for a better understanding of its relations, on the one hand, to the 
umbrella of complexity; and on the other hand, to debates that emerged in economic 
history regarding complexity. 
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 These intuitions were developed in the first chapter when I mentioned Mandelbrot’s works about the 
occurrence of extreme values on financial markets. 
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II. The Santa Fe Institute 
 
In the beginning of the 1980s, a physicist called George Cowan had a driving 
influence on the creation of the Santa Fe Institute. George Cowan was an American 
physicist who dedicated his career to the development of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (where he entered in 1951 as a nuclear physicist). In 1981, Cowan 
accepted an appointment to the White House Science Council (WHSC) under the 
Reagan administration. In his memoires, Cowan (2010) explained how the new 
administration relied on science for the development of their new Manhattan Project,  
the Strategic Defence Initiative also called the “Star Wars project” by the popular 
press, which was supposed to protect the US from potential nuclear attack. 
 
Cowan came back to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 1982 and his 
return “reawakened my [his] interest in finding common ground between the 
relatively simple world of natural science and the daily, messy world of human 
affairs” (Cowan, 2010, p. 142). However, the director of the LANL at that time, 
Donald Kerr, wanted to keep the research line that he initiated in the 1970s by 
dedicating resources to military projects in order “to protect our nation [the US] and 
promote world stability” (www.lanl.gov). Donald Kerr got his PhD in Plasma Physics 
in 1966 from Cornell University and he was appointed director of the LANL in 1979 
(until 1985). Prior to becoming director, Kerr conducted research on high altitude 
weapons and nuclear test detection at the LANL82. His nomination as director in 
1979 gave him the opportunity to support the research he initiated in the 1970s. In 
this specific context, in 1982, Cowan took the initiative to contact a group of his 
senior colleagues (David Pines, Stirling Colgate, Murray Gell-Mann, Nick Metropolis, 
Phil Anderson, Peter A. Carruthers and Richard Slansky) at LANL for weekly 
discussions about complexity in science. Two years later, these discussions led to 
the organization of a workshop on “Emerging Synthesis in Science”. These scientists 
were internationally recognized and well known for their interest in combining 
physics with other disciplines (Cowan, 2010). David Pines was a specialist in 
theoretical physics, a professor at the University of Illinois and founder of the Center 
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 Donald Kerr served as assistant director of the FBI (from 1997 to 2001), as director of research for 
the CIA (from 2001 to 2005) and as Principal Deputy Director of U.S. National Intelligence from 
October 2007 to January 2009. He is currently a member of the board of Iridium Communications. 
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for Advanced Study (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Urbana). He became 
an active actor of the Santa Fe Institute and a member of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in the 1980s. Stirling Colgate was an American nuclear physicist famous 
for his research on the hydrogen bomb. He was a professor at the New Mexico 
Institute of Mining and Technology while being a leading researcher at the LANL. 
Murray Gell-Mann won a Nobel Prize in physics in 1969 for his works on elementary 
particles. He was a professor at the University of New Mexico and well known for 
having a strong interest in history and historical linguistics83. Nick Metropolis was a 
Greek-American physicist, a professor at the University of Chicago and a member of 
the LANL. He mainly worked on the use of computers in physics (Monte Carlo 
simulation). Phil Anderson was the physicist I presented in the previous section. 
Peter A. Carruthers (1935–1997) was an American physicist who led the theoretical 
division of the LANL in the 1970s, where he remained scientist until 1986 when he 
joined the University of Arizona as head of the physics department. Richard Slansky 
(1940–1998) was an American theoretical physicist who worked for the LANL while 
being an adjunct professor at the University of California at Irvine.  
 
Two things connected these scientists: they were known to be interested/involved in 
interdisciplinary research and/or they were working for the LANL. All of them were 
invited to the meeting organized by Cowan in 1984, which became the founding 
event of the Santa Fe Institute84. The SFI was initially presented as an “educational 
institute” (Cowan, 2010, p. 142) whose campus had no intellectual territory at the 
interface between the conventional disciplines. The objective was explicitly to 
promote research that involved several disciplines: “These interdisciplinary subjects 
do not link together the whole of one traditional discipline with another; particular 
subfields are joined together to make a new subject” (Gell-Mann, 1984, p. 1). 
Although there were an increasing number of works promoting interdisciplinarity at 
that time, Cowan (2010) explained how this dimension of the SFI was a barrier to 
getting money from usual funding bodies (National Science Foundation, Atomic 
Energy Commission, etc.) because these institutions allocate funds to conventional 
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 In 2001, Murray Gell-Mann initiated the Evolution of Human Language Project at the Santa Fe 
Institute. 
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 The initial name of the SFI was the Rio Grande Institute because the label “Santa Fe Institute” 
belonged to an existing organization that helped alcoholics and drugs addicted people. When this 




disciplines. However, thanks to the excellence of the founding committee and thanks 
to the network he made when he was at the WHSC, Cowan85 was able to raise 
capital to launch the Santa Fe Institute. More precisely, he knew Al Trivelpiece, who 
was the head of research at the US Department of Energy and who agreed to 
provide $250,000 annual funding for four years to launch the institute (this financial 
support was not renewed, as I will explain it in the second part of this chapter). 
 
Despite his initial reluctance towards interdisciplinarity86, Phil Anderson accepted the 
invitation and thought his intervention as a good opportunity to present his paper, 
which was published in 1972, about the theory of broken symmetry as a description 
of emergent properties. This theory questioned the classical form of reductionism 
that was used in science and it generated debates because, for many scientists, 
“there is always a reductionist bridge between the phenomenological and the 
fundamental level of explanation” (Gell-Mann, 1984, p. 5). This theory raised deep 
questions in the philosophy of science about interactions between the macro level of 
a system and the behaviours of its micro elements. The scope of Anderson’s 
publication seemed to be in accordance with the objectives of the new SFI. Indeed, 
on that point, the founder of SFI explained that, beyond the will to “take into account 
the enormous and increasing complexity of our modern society” (Gell-Mann, 1984, p. 
8), the Santa Fe Institute was partly created for solving this puzzle between the 
micro and the macro levels. 
 
The objective was therefore clear: reforming the classical disciplinary reductionism in 
order to adapt it to the (apparently) increasing complexity of society. In a sense, the 
SFI was consistent with the critiques of the time since its members worked on a 
reductionist understanding of a moving and uncertain context (which has 
progressively been associated with a complex system). The first SFI workshop was 
the first of a series of monthly meetings dedicated to themes related to the “messy 
world of human affairs” (associated with complexity in the Cowan’s perspective). 
Several disciplines (physics, biology, mathematics, medicine, archaeology, 
psychology) were dealt with during this first meeting; however, the following 
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 In the chapter of his memoirs, Cowan commented on how he contacted people he met at WHSC. 
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 Waldrop (1992, p. 80). 
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meetings were mainly focused on biology and physics87. Articles presented in these 
workshops were then published in proceeding volumes that often presented a 
collection of heterogeneous papers about complexity and emergence, but which did 
not provide a coherent and unified framework interlinking these themes. Although 
these publications were called Proceeding Volume in the Sciences of Complexity, 
this term “sciences of complexity” stayed undefined, and the published papers 
mainly emphasized the conceptual similarities 88  that appeared between the 
disciplines involved. Monthly meetings progressively evolved towards questions 
related to the way of modelling complexity. From that perspective, computers 
became more and more important in the research on complexity, as I will detail 
hereafter. 
 
The progressive call for the development of interdisciplinary research was not the 
only factor that contributed to the emergence of complexity studies. Indeed, the 
eighties were also the decade during which computers began to be used widely 
(Johnson, 2007). Personal computers were booming and scientists learnt, at that 
time, how to integrate this new tool in their practices. Computers contributed to 
science in two ways: on the one hand, they were used as “bookkeeping machines” 
recording data related to phenomena and, on the other hand, they provided a higher 
power of computation paving the way to simulation. As Waldrop89 (1992, p. 63) 
explained, “properly programmed, computers could become entire, self-contained 
worlds, which scientists could explore in ways that vastly enriched their 
understanding of the real world”. Computers can be looked on as technical tools that 
enlarge our access to, on the one hand, the past phenomena (through recording of 
historical data); and on the other hand, the hypothetical future phenomena (through 
simulations). This high number of data was a necessary condition for dealing with 
complexity since a high number of data allows modellers to identify statistical 
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 The first four Proceeding Volumes summarizing these meetings were mainly (but not totally) 
dedicated to topics directly or indirectly related to biology and physics. It is worth mentioning that the 
fifth proceeding volume will be dedicated to economy.  
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 These first publications also aimed to clarify the difference between chaos theory and complexity 
era (see Mitchell, 2009). 
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 Waldrop (1992) wrote an interesting book about the history of complexity and the role played by the 
Santa Fe Institute in the popularisation of complexity issue—although this book is a well-written 
monograph, it is worth mentioning that it appears more as an elegant novel about people who 
contributed to the emergence of complexity. The book does not present detailed concepts and models 
developed in the SFI, and his historical perspective on economics is more narrative than detailed.  
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patterns. The development of computers therefore created a favourable environment 
for the emergence of the complexity paradigm since “scientists were beginning to 
think about more and more complex systems simply because they could think about 
them” (Waldrop, 1992, p. 63).  
 
These two ways of producing data (recording and simulating) provided by computers 
implicitly determined an epistemic classification in ways of studying dynamic 
complexity: some scientists tried to find a specific regularity or statistical patterns in 
the recorded data about past phenomena, while others tried to generate 
computerized future phenomena by using programming and simulation. The 
following section will introduce these two ways of characterizing the dynamic 
complexity. A detailed understanding of these two computerized tools is important 
because they directly contributed to the emergence (and the development) of 
econophysics. 
II.1. From cellular automata to computers and agent-based modelling  
 
Agent-based modelling is a computational technique that is based on a 
computerized simulation of interactions between a high number of agents whose 
plausible rules governing their behaviour are inspired from the real world. Basically, 
these agents form an artificial world in which commitments emerge from a great 
numbers of iterations/interactions (O’Sullivan and Haklay, 2000). Because this 
computational approach starts from simple atoms following simple local rules from 
which a complex behaviour can emerge, it finds its origins in cellular automata, 
which was initially developed by Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann (1951) who 
worked on self-replication of systems by using a universal Turing machine90. It is 
worth mentioning that in the 1940s and 1950s, these two scientists were both 
members of the Los Alamos National Laboratory when they developed this new 
computational framework. Because the Santa Fe Institute was founded by seven 
physicists, of whom five were based at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Nick 
Metropolis was a close friend of von Neumann), the SFI was a natural place for 
investigating the potential contribution of computers outside of physics (Erickson, 
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2014). Except for a few research projects in the sixties91, cellular automata were not 
really studied until the seventies when Conway introduced them into biology 
(Gardner, 1970) and Toffoli (1977) used them to model physical laws. 
 
Since the mid-1960s, computers have become important in physics for data 
acquisition and analysis (Galison, 1987). However, Cassidy (2011, p. 161) explained 
that the purchase of these “heavy number crunching machines” was often 
associated with the generous funds for promoting military research (Department of 
Defence, Atomic Energy Commission) or engineering research (Department of 
Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science 
Foundation); both promoting a mechanizing approach of problems solving. Starting 
in the 1980s, the advent of smaller, personal computers provided a huge impetus for 
the use of computers by individual researchers or small teams of researchers; the 
use of computers became the norm in scientific research. 
 
The increasing importance played by computers in physics led to the common view 
that computation can be used to describe physics processes. Of course, the use of 
computers in physics was nothing new (see Pang, 2006 for a history of computers in 
physics). Two elements contributed to the emergence of a real “digital physics” 
(Fredkin, 2003) in the 1980s: 1) the generalization (democratization) of personal 
computers in the beginning of the 1980s and, 2) the works of some scientists 
(Jaynes, 1957; Zuse, 1969; Levin, 1973) that showed that physical systems can be 
described by computational simulations on the condition that they are compatible 
with principles of information theory, statistical thermodynamics and quantum 
mechanics. Progressively, physicists associated physical systems with 
computational processes founded on an information structure in which “classical 
matter/energy is replaced by information, while the dynamics are identified as 
computational processes” (Muller, 2010, p. 5). The basic metaphor was quite simple: 
physical particles (or spins) can be seen as simple bits—every switch from one 
quantum state to another can therefore be described through a binary change (0 to 1 
or 1 to 0) for a bit (the same reasoning can be used for the magnetization of a spin in 
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magnetic field). With the gradual improvement of computers, the metaphor became 
more and more complex—some physicists began to believe that the physical 
universe could be described through computational processes92.  
 
Steven Wolfram was an important actor in this computerization of physics since he 
explicitly associated modelling in this field with the use of cellular automata in order 
to compute all possible computable solutions. Roughly, cellular automata can be 
looked on as a specific way of using the computational power offered by computers. 
Research on this theme witnessed a boost in the 1980s at the Santa Fe Institute93, 
which acted as a real catalyst for computerized complexity (he already used this 
word in the early 1980s).  
 
Because cellular automata can easily be developed through simple rules from which 
can emerge a very complicated behaviour, they were an ideal starting point for 
studying complexity in accordance with the conceptual framework initiated by Simon. 
Indeed, by defining simple constraining rules that govern interactions between micro 
elements (individuals), the use of computers can characterize the agents’ limited 
rationality by providing computerized rules for characterizing their macro behaviours. 
Cellular automata are unquestionably the computational origins of agent-based 
modelling. In terms of implementations, these cellular automata require a particular 
methodology that takes the form of an adaptive agent-based behaviour. Two 
important works contributed to the emergence of such approach: 1) the famous 
Schelling’s (1969, 1971, 1978) model of racial segregation and, 2) the adaptive 
methodology promoted by Arthur (1986) and Holland (1986). While the first model is 
now renowned for explaining (in a limited rationality framework) that segregationist 
residential structures can emerge from local behaviour of non-segregationist 
people94, Arthur and Holland introduced the notion of a “complex adaptive system” 
that is implicitly based on adaptive individual components (i.e. agents). As Holland 
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 This idea that the physical universe is a computer is called “pancomputationalism”, see Muller 
(2010) or Milkowski (2007) for a presentation of debates related to this view. 
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 Wolfram attended the first meeting where the Institute was founded and he has always been an 
active member of this community. 
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 Without a priori segregationist structure (such as ghettos, for example), agents generate a global 
segregation by behaving in line with their local preferences relating their neighbourhood—See 
Schelling (1969, 1971, 1978).  
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explained, “a complex adaptive system has many levels of organization, with 
bounded rational agents at any one level serving as the building blocks for agents at 
a higher level” (Waldrop, 1992, p. 148). By agent, Holland meant an entity whose 
initial configuration (which can be associated with beliefs, preferences or capabilities) 
allows it to change or adapt its behaviour in an evolving system. The adapting 
behaviour implied that decision makers are ruled by a bounded rationality that leads 
them to adapt their behaviour (Lee, 2010). 
 
In the 1980s, the Santa Fe Institute appears to be a natural place for the gradual 
emergence of agent-based modelling. Indeed the computational perspective 
associated with cellular automata promoted by physicists such as Wolfram (1984)or 
Kauffman (1984) combined with the adaptive agent-based modelling enhanced by 
economists (Arthur and Arrow) and Holland (1986) progressively led to the 
emergence of what we now call agent-based modelling (Waldrop, 1992; Mitchell, 
2007). On the website of the SFI, Arthur (2014) explained that in the 1980s, the 
institute had the computational power at its disposal to develop the agent-based 
approach: “instead of reducing all situations to a simple set of equations, we decided 
to study them by creating artificial worlds within the computers”. O’Sullivan and 
Haklay (2000, p. 4) explained that the success of agent-based modelling is “closely 
related to a view of the economy as an evolving complex system promoted by the 
Santa Fe Institute”95. This computational approach has mainly been extended to 
other disciplinary contexts in the 1990s: voting behaviours (Lindgren and Nordahl, 
1994), military tactics (Ilachinski, 1997), organizational behaviours (Prietula, Carley 
and Gasser, 1998), epidemics (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), traffic congestion patterns 
(Nagel and Rasmussen, 1994), etc. Agent-based modelling has been used in so 
many fields that it is not possible to number them in this section in which the 
objective was to present this technique as a privileged way of modelling dynamic 
complexity.  
 
This section explained how the SFI contributed to the development of agent-based 
modelling. I will come back to this technique and its implementation in economics 
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 “The economy as an evolving complex system” was the title of all proceeding volumes related to 
the workshops that Santa Fe Institute organized about economics.  
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later in this chapter. In the meantime, the following section will further discuss 
another important computational method (also initiated at the SFI) to deal with 
dynamic complexity: power laws and their scaling properties.  
 
II.2. From power laws to dynamic complexity 
 
The increasing computational power of computers in the 1980s was accompanied by 
a growing expansion of storage capacities. Scientists quickly understood that 
computers offered an important source of knowledge in terms of simulation but also 
in terms identifying patterns in historical data. Indeed, the growing storage capacities 
of computers allowed modellers to deal with large databases, which paved the way 
for better statistical analysis. It is worth mentioning that this computerization of 
science (Waldrop, 1992; Hughes, 1999) contributed to the “re-emergence” in physics 
of an old statistical framework that describes the statistical dynamics of a system 
through a power law. These statistical processes were already evoked in Chapter 1 
when I explained how the emergence of econophysics echoes the old 
methodological debates in financial economics. Interestingly, power laws also 
generated debates in physics, where they were progressively associated with 
dynamic complexity by members of the SFI. This section aims to explain this point. 
 
In the 1980s, SFI scientists wanted to use the maximum potential of computer 
power. Regarding their storage capacities, the question was simple: is it possible to 
extract a macro pattern from historical (computer-recorded) data related to complex 
phenomenon? That question made sense for physicists who “look for patterns in 
things or events and construct snapshots” (Cowan, 2010, p. 129). Actually this 
question already existed in the scientists’ minds before the computerization of 
science, since one of the most famous macro patterns identified in data was 
probably the one identified by Pareto (1897), more than a century ago, where he 
observed a strange linearity in the repartition of wealth in the population (many 
people seem to have a low amount of wealth, while the richest are not so commonly 





Figure 1: Linearity in the repartition of wealth (log-log plot). X-axis refers to wealth while the Y-axis 
indicates the number of people. This graph shows that a small number of people have large amounts 
of money—Source: Newman (2005, p. 6). 
 
This pattern has a long story, since several scientists in different disciplinary contexts 
observed that linearity in their observations. Kleiber (1932) and Brody (1945), for 
example, also identified this linear relationship in their biological data: they found that 
the metabolic rate of various animals had a linear function of their body mass, 
 
 
Figure 2: A log-log plot showing the link between metabolism  
(consumed energy in kcal/h) and body mass—Source: Brody (1945, p. 35). 
 
In the same vein, the linguist Zipf (1935) also observed this linear relationship in the 
occurrence of words96 in the vast majority of texts he studied97, as illustrated below 
with the number of times that words occur in a typical piece of English text (here the 
novel Moby Dick by Herman Melville), 
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Figure 3: Word Frequency (log-log plot) in the novel Moby Dick—Source: Newman (2006, p. 6). 
 
 
Precisely, the figure 3 shows that the frequency of one word in the novel Moby Dick 
is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table. These empirical 
observations are not simply due to a (un)happy coincidence, since this linear 
relationship has also been identified in several contemporary events: the magnitude 
of earthquakes (Newman, 2005), citations of scientific papers (Redner, 1998), 
internet hits (Adamic and Huberman, 2000) telephone calls (Aiello et al., 2000), 
copies of books sold (in the US) (Hackett, 1967), diameter of moon craters (Neukum 
and Ivanov, 1994), etc. In other words, this pattern appears in the observation of 
social and natural phenomena, which led some authors (Bak et al., 1987, Mantegna 
and Stanley, 1999) to consider this linearity as a law of nature (I will discuss this 
claim in Chapter 3). The increasing importance of this linearity seems to be a new 
scientific fashion for statistically treating the growing number of computerized data. 
This new paradigm of power laws is philosophically interesting because it offers a 
simple representation (straight line) of an increasing numbers-based complexity. 
 
All of these statistical observations show a linear relationship on a log-log plot, 
meaning that the numbers on both axes increase by a power of ten with each tick on 
the axis. In other words, variables expressed on the two axes can be related through 
the following equation:                where   and   are constants: while the 
first is the slope of the line (i.e the sensitivity of the x-axis variable related to the y-
axis one), the latter is a scale parameter referring to the unit of measure used in the 
observations. This formula can also be reformulated (by taking exponential of both 
sides) as a power law:            where the   is the characteristic exponent of the 
power law (this parameter is an indicator of stability since it refers to the sensitivity of 
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potential variations). I already detailed this kind of law in the first chapter when I 
introduced how Mandelbrot (and econophysicists) characterized the occurrence of 
extreme values in the financial markets. In other words, these power laws have been 
a source of inspiration for many scholars, regardless of their background. A reason 
for this intellectual interest in power laws is due to their scaling property (i.e. the 
relationship does not change if scales are multiplied by a common factor) which is 
the expression of a statistical invariance (for this reason, power laws are called 
scaling laws). As Mitchell (2009, p. 258) explained, “scaling describes how one 
property of a system will change if a related property changes”. Because power laws 
keep a “particular proportionality” between each level of analysis, they offer the ideal 
statistical framework for describing scale-invariance phenomena. Given the 
statistical features of a specific level of analysis (data on metabolism of mice or 
weekly financial data, for example) it is easy to deduce information related to another 
level of analysis (in line with my previous example: information about the metabolism 
of elephants or the major statistical features of monthly financial data).  
 
The first studies of this statistical invariance were those of Kolmogorov (1941, 1942) 
when he tried to find a scale invariance in data related to phenomena associated 
with turbulence in the 1940s. According to Hughes (1999), power laws (and their 
scaling property) appeared in physics during the same period, when Kolgomorov’s 
research (1941) about turbulence had progressively become widespread in the 
discipline98. Progressively scaling laws have been studied by physicists such as 
Kadanoff (1966), Domb and Hunter (1965) or Fisher (1957). However, as Stanley 
(1971) explained, there were no physical justifications, at that time, for the existence 
of scaling laws. Because these laws have an infinite second statistical moment, they 
appeared to be inappropriate for describing physical systems. On this topic, Stanley 
(1971, p. 18) wrote, “the scaling hypothesis is at best unproved and indeed, to some 
workers represents an ad hoc assumption entirely devoid of physical content”99. In 
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 Although modern probability theory was properly created in the 1930s, in particular through the 
works of Kolmogorov, it was not until the 1950s that Kolmogorov’s axioms became the dominant 
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two writers had a major influence on the construction of modern probability theory, particularly through 
their two main books published in the early 1950s, which proved, on the basis of the framework laid 
down by Kolmogorov, all results obtained prior to the 1950s, thereby enabling them to be accepted 
and integrated into the discipline’s theoretical corpus (Shafer and Vovk 2005, p. 60) 
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other words, physicists seemed to face the same kind of conceptual problems as 
financial economists regarding the empirical application of power laws. In the 1990s, 
some physicists (Mantegna, 1991; Mantegna and Stanley, 1994; Stanley et al., 
1996) revalued the use of power laws in physics by developing truncation techniques 
to deal with the infinite aspect of the volatility for such processes. Precisely, these 
techniques aim at making this volatility finite, thereby easing their physical 
interpretation (Schinckus, 2013c). Before the 1980s, power laws appear as a strictly 
conceptual framework in physics, but the implementation of computerized tools at 
the SFI paved a way for their observability. Furthermore, the empirical application of 
power laws was made possible by the development of truncation techniques that SFI 
scholars (econophysics’ founders) developed in the earlier 1990s. 
 
Identifying power law behaviour is not easy. As suggested previously in this section, 
the standard strategy consists of visually checking if data plotted on a double 
logarithmic scale align so that they are straight. This technique has several 
drawbacks: the visual line is sometimes not so “straight” and moreover, some data 
can show only power law behaviour for a part of the histogram. The most significant 
disadvantage of this visual technique is that it requires the highest number of data 
possible in order to identify a power law behaviour, meaning that only when a large 
volume of data is available, is it possible to distinguish between the two types of law 
(Newman, 2006). Miztenmacher (2004) also emphasized that, from a mathematical 
point of view, the linearity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for having a 
power law100. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, in the 1980s, computers became a physical 
and intellectual extension in the process of providing data about the world. 
Algorithms could generate work that could not be realized in any other way, while 
screens provided a new standpoint on data, emphasizing visual properties that could 
not be seen before (Mardia, 2000). By providing a high number of data combined 
with a visual analysis of these data, computers contributed to the renewed interest in 
power laws. In relation to that, Hughes (1999) explained that through the 
computerization of science observed in the 1980s, physicists got more and more 
                                                          
100
 See Mitzenmacher (2004) for mathematical considerations on power laws. 
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experimental evidence supporting the scaling laws and the existence of power laws 
in a variety of physical phenomena.  
 
This section explained how SFI scholars contributed to the renew interest in the use 
of power laws in physics and interdisciplinary studies. The following section will 
further investigate the reasons why the SFI scholars focused on this category of 
laws. Specifically, I will explain how the scaling properties of power laws are 
particularly interesting for characterizing complex dynamics. 
 
II.3. Scaling properties at the Santa Fe Institute 
 
 
The improvement of computing equipment of the institute was a first priority of 
Cowan when he set up the SFI (Cowan, 2010). The SFI got the best computerized 
tools available for identifying statistical patterns and therefore potential power laws. 
 
The increasing use of computers was a necessary condition for associating power 
laws with dynamic complexity, but it was not a sufficient condition. Indeed, such an 
association also required a theoretical justification, which had been proposed by a 
member of the SFI: Per Bak et al. (1987) who developed what he called “self-
organized criticality”. Bak was a Danish theoretical physicist who specialized in 
phase transitions; he worked at the Brookhaven National Laboratory at that time. He 
became member of the SFI in 1987 and became well known for his focus on the 
scaling property of power laws for characterizing complex dynamics. In particular, 
Bak claimed that the linearity visually identified on a log-log diagram describing the 
dynamics of two variables is the expression of the complexity of this phenomenon: 
“This simple law is impressive in view of the complexity of the phenomenon” (Bak, 
1994, p. 478). Statistically, this linearity means that variables involved in the 
dynamics evolve simultaneously by keeping a scaling property (i.e. proportional 
relationship). Of this particular property, Bak (1994, p. 478) wrote: 
“This is an example [plot with occurrences of earthquake] of a scale-free 
phenomenon: there is no answer to the question ‘how large is a typical 
earthquake?’ Similar behaviour has been observed elsewhere in Nature […] 
The fact that large catastrophic events appear at the tails of regular power-
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law distributions indicates that there is ‘nothing special’ about those events, 
and that no external cataclysmic mechanism is needed to produce them”. 
 
In other words, we have a “self-organized criticality” in which “slowly driven dynamic 
systems that have many degrees of freedom naturally self-organize into a critical 
state that obeys power-law statistics” (Bak, 1994, p. 480). The basic idea of self-
organized criticality is that certain phenomena maintain themselves near a critical 
state. A telling example of that situation is a quiet sand pile in which the addition of 
one grain generates mini-avalanches. At some point, these mini-cascades stop 
moving and the sand pile has integrated the effect of this additional grain. The sand 
pile is said to reach its self-organized critical state (because the addition of a new 
sand grain would generate the same process). Physicists talk about “critical state” 
because the system organizes itself into a fragile configuration based on a knife-
edge (the addition of only one sand grain would be enough to modify the sand pile). 
Bak et al., (1987) showed that the dynamics of critical state (i.e. the statistical 
characterization of the micro avalanches of the sand pile) follow a power law 
distribution.  
 
As a member of the SFI (in 1987), Bak found the perfect environment for promoting 
his theory of criticality, which gradually became widespread in several disciplinary 
contexts in the 1990s (Frigg, 2003). In the second part of the eighties, eminent 
physicists (including Bak, 1987, 1994) of the SFI associated the observation of 
power laws with dynamic complexity because these laws characterize the evolution 
of a system whose micro configurations are so complex and unstable that only a 
description of the macro dynamics is possible. Boosted by the development of these 
works, the nineties were the decades of power laws since empirical evidence was 
been increasingly observed and published (Dubkov et al., 2008). These included: 
chaotic dynamics of complex systems (Zaslavsky, 2005; Solomon et al., 1993); front 
dynamics in reaction-diffusion systems (del-Castillo-Negrete et al., 2003),  
thermodynamics of anomalous diffusion (Zanette et al., 1995), dynamic foundation of 
non-canonical equilibrium (Annunziato et al., 2001), quantum fractional kinetics 
(Kusnezov et al., 1999), diffusion by flows in porous media (Painter, 1996), kinetic 
Ising and spherical models (Bergersen and Racz, 1991). According to Shalizi, in the 
physics literature, one can find a real fascination for these power laws” 
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“Why do physicists care about power laws so much? […] The reason […] is 
that we're conditioned to think they’re a sign of something interesting and 
complicated happening. The first step is to convince ourselves that in boring 




This section clarified the historical affiliation between econophysics and the SFI. 
Power laws and their scaling properties are founding concepts of econophysics and, 
because SFI scholars contributed to the renewed interest (and popularization) of this 
statistical framework, this institution played an important role in the advent of this 
new field. In light of this section, the SFI’s influence on the emergence of 
econophysics can be summarized by three statements related to power laws: 1) their 
observability through computerized tools was implemented at the SFI; 2) their 
theoretical importance in physics was conceptualized by SFI scholars, and; 3) their 
empirical application was made possible by the development of truncation 
techniques that SFI scholars (econophysics’ founders) developed in the earlier 
1990s. 
 
Beyond these three points, the general research atmosphere (i.e. interdisciplinary 
research) promoted at the SFI acted as a real catalyst for the emergence of 
alternative approaches. In this context, SFI scholars combined their new 
considerations on statistical descriptions of complex dynamics with computerized 
power to model and simulate their works. Such momentum contributed to the 
development of agent-based modelling. The next section will clarify the link between 
this new approach and the power laws whose importance at the SFI was discussed 
in this section.  
 
III.4. Two computational sides of the same complex coin 
 
The previous sections presented the importance of the SFI and how this organization 
contributed to the development of two computational ways of dealing with dynamic 
complexity: agent-based modelling and statistical characterization of the evolution of 
critical states. Although these two computational approaches both emerged in the 
same institution (SFI), one could wonder what these two computational approaches 
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have in common. As Waldrop (1992, p. 307) explained, many scientists working on 
complexity in the 1980s acknowledged that at first sight, “Bak’s critical state 
[statistical perspective] didn’t seem to have anything to do with life or computation 
[usually modelled with an agent-based approach]”. However, it is worth mentioning 
that these two approaches share the same foundations since they study complex 
systems through the dynamics of numerous components interacting in a non-simple 
manner. Moreover, these two computational techniques use a methodology that is 
based on empirical verifications101. Some scientists (Langston, Kauffman) affiliated 
with the Santa Fe Institute were fascinated by the potential connection between 
these two computational approaches of dynamic complexity. More precisely, 
Langston (1986, 1990a, 1990b) proposed a formal connection between the 
dynamics of critical states and the one observed in computerized computation: 
“computation may emerge spontaneously and come to dominate the 
dynamics of physical systems when those systems are at or near a transition 
between their solid and fluid phases, especially in the vicinity of a second-
order or critical transition” (Langston, 1990b, p. 13).  
 
In other words, “we observe surprising similarities between the behaviors of 
computations and systems near phase [critical] transitions, finding analogs of 
complexity classes” (Langston, 1990, p. 12). By using this kind of similarity through 
statistical and agent-based approach, econophysics is a contemporary result of this 
progressive movement of physicists who are willing work on “the messy world of 
human affairs” by seeing communalities between the behaviours of economic and 
physical systems. The third part of this chapter will investigate how dynamic 
complexity was imported from physics into economics and how the two 
computational techniques associated with this kind of complexity have been 
implemented in economics. These two computational perspectives on dynamic 
complexity will also give me the context 1) to understand the current methodology 
used in econophysics (which will be studied in detail in the third chapter); and 2) to 
clarify to the historical debates that emerged after the advent of econophysics in 
economics, where the former is often presented as a pale copy of econometrics. 
These debates cannot be studied without understanding the role played by the SFI in 
the emergence of econophysics.  
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 This point will be discussed in the third chapter of this doctoral research. 
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III. The complexity era in economics 
 
While the previous part dealt with the emergence of complexity studies and the role 
played by the SFI in their expansion, this second part will focus on the development 
of these studies in economics. In particular, it is important to mention that, 
independently of SFI, complexity studies were also influenced by economics. Such a 
situation leads me to contextualize here the role of the SFI in the emergence of 
econophysics and this, for two reasons: 1) this institution was a place where physics 
was extended to economics, and; 2) the role of this institute also explains why 
econophysicists failed to impress economists. This section aims to deal with these 
reasons by presenting in detail on the one hand, how SFI shaped the emergence of 
econophysics and, on the other hand, how this historical influence clarifies the 
fundamental differences between econophysics and econometrics. 
 
The initial interest of SFI scientists for economics was directly related to the financial 
situation of the institution which, starting from 1987, sought funds (Waldrop, 1992)102. 
As previously mentioned, Cowan’s network (after his work at the WHSC) enabled 
him to find funds to launch the SFI and to secure the financial situation of the 
institution for the first two years (1984–1986). However, in 1987, when it was time to 
extend existing financial supports, Cowan was faced with an increasing reluctance 
from the funding bodies that preferred to allocate their funds to more conventional 
and clearly defined research (Cowan, 2010). In this difficult context, George Cowan 
(the director) contacted several potential donors, such as the Russell Sage 
Foundation, and during a meeting at that Foundation he met a man who had 
significant influence on the research agenda of the Santa Fe Institute: John Reed.  
 
John Reed was the CEO of Citicorp 103  and, although he has an economic 
background (MIT), he was very critical of the existing neoclassical economics, which, 
                                                          
102
 In 1975 Mitchell Waldrop earned a PhD in elementary physics from the University of Wisconsin 
and afterwards he obtained a Master’s in journalism in 1977. He worked as writer and editor for 
several scientific journals and magazines such as Science, Chemical and Engineering News.  He is 
currently a feature editor at Nature.   
103
 Citicorp is still a funding body of the Santa Fe Institute. 
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according to him, were not very useful in a real economic context (Waldrop, 1992, p. 
91). Reed’s feeling was in line with an increasing wind of revolt against economics 
that appeared to be more and more abstract and disconnected from reality 
(Mirowski, 1989b; Morgan, 1990). After a discussion with Reed at the Sage 
Foundation, Cowan invited Reed to give a speech about existing problems in 
economics. The CEO agreed and presented a survey he coordinated about 
econometrical models whose conclusion incited a better appreciation of the 
dynamics of the economy in which we live (John Reed implicitly associated 
economic systems with changing phenomena, implying a dynamic complexity, see 
Waldrop, 1992, p. 89-96). Reed awakened interest of physicists who decided to 
open their meetings to economists, which explained thus on the website of the 
Institute: 
“In August 1986 a small group of Institute researchers and invited economists 
met in Santa Fe at the request of Citicorp CEO John Reed, who was 
frustrated with his own economists’ past failures to foresee market 
catastrophes” (http://www.santafe.edu/about/history/). 
 
That meeting had a huge impact on the SFI since it “took the intellectual agenda in 
the service of society to the extreme” (Pines, 2014, SFI website). Indeed, after this 
meeting, Reed decided to commit $1 million for an initial period of four years to fund 
research on economic complexity. That financial support was salutary for the 
institute, as explained on its website:  
“Unrestricted funding like that from Citicorp became an important element of 
the Institute’s success. Its scientists sought refuge at the Institute from 
research environments where funding was assigned to individual projects 
that required specific results” (http://www.santafe.edu/about/history/). 
 
The event led to a major programmatic orientation for the SFI because the 
sustainability of the Institute depended on the necessity of dealing with economic 
issues. This re-orientation did not mean that the Institute had to deal only with 
economic topics, but the conditional funding influenced the research perspectives 
developed by the institution. Because of that perspective, several economists were 
even invited to be involved in the research activities. Why would economists be 
interested in joining such a scientific project? Simply because the timing was good: 
in line with the optimizing way of dealing with rationality promoted by the Cowles 
Commission and the RAND Corporation, neoclassical economics was mainly ruled 
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by a growing mathematical axiomatization focused on the Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory. This approach generated more and more debates (Mirowski, 
1989): some economists called into question the axiomatic-based methodology while 
others began to work on new emerging theoretical frameworks inspired by the recent 
development of behavioural sciences. In this challenging context, in the early 1980s 
there was a demand for a conceptual renewal in economics. James Tobin refused 
the invitation. Tobin was an American professor of Economics at Yale University and 
member of the Council of Economic Advisors for several US presidents. He won the 
Nobel memorial prize in Economics in 1981 for his work on state interventions for 
avoiding recession. According to Waldrop (1992), this recent prize (in 1981) led 
Tobin to decline the invitation to join the Santa Fe Institute (in 1984) because he was 
too embedded and exposed in the economic mainstream. Another laureate of this 
Nobel memorial prize (in 1972), Kenneth Arrow, accepted the invitation. Arrow is an 
American economist, professor of Economics at Stanford University and was a 
member of the Council of Economic Advisors in the 1960s. He is famous for his 
works on the mathematical formulation of the general equilibrium. In the early 1980s, 
Arrow (1962, 1964, 1982) was well known for his awareness of the problems of 
neoclassical economics and, moreover, he was “intrigued with the possibility of using 
the mathematics of nonlinear science and chaos theory in economics” (Waldrop, 
1992, p. 168) leading him to accept the invitation to join the SFI as well as  
suggesting the names of other economists: Michele Boldrin (University of California), 
William Brock (University of Wisconsin), Hollis Chenery (Harvard University), 
Timothy Kehoe (University of Minnesota), Thomas Sargent (Stanford University), 
Jose Sheinkman (University of Chicago), Mario Simonsen (Brazil Institute of 
Economics), Lawrence Summers (Harvard University) and Brian Arthur (Stanford 
University). In this list of economists (Bulletin of SFI, 1988, vol. 3, p. 18), the last 
name played a very specific role: Brian Arthur is a British economist who became 
well-known for his work on increasing returns and complexity. He was a professor at 
Stanford University where he founded the Institute for Population and Resources 
Studies—The role played by Arthur is particular for two reasons: 1) he was the only 
non-mainstream economist invited for the first meeting with physicists (Fontana, 
2009); 2) he became the first director of the economic programme of the SFI. Why 
did the only non-mainstream economist succeed in becoming the director of the 
economic programme? Simply because the other economists considered the SFI as 
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a research project in which physicists could contribute to the integration of non-linear 
modelling and stochastic analysis into the existing economic knowledge (Arrow, 
1988). In accordance with this view, Fontana (2009, p. 3) wrote that “the agenda for 
the economics side of the meeting [first meeting between economists and physicists] 
was to teach to physicists the fundamentals of orthodox economics”. This first 
meeting was indeed interesting since it exhibited conceptual differences but also 
different expectations between physicists and economists. In his summary of the 
meeting, Arrow wrote “The general perspective of mainstream (the so-called 
neoclassical) economic theory had certainly had some empirical success […] But it is 
clear that many empirical phenomena are not covered well by either theoretical or 
the empirical analyses based on linear stochastic systems, sometimes not by either” 
(Arrow, 1988, p. 278). Actually, Arrow’s idea was to consider the research conducted 
at the SFI as an addition and not as a potential alternative to the neoclassical 
framework (Fontana, 2009). This claim is also supported by Colander (2003) who 
explained that economists were mainly defending their axiomatic approach “facing 
sharp challenges and ridicule from the physicists for holding relatively simplistic 
views” (Colander, 2003, p. 8); and also by Waldrop (1992, p. 141) who reported on 
the reaction of the physicist Phil Anderson, who straightforwardly asked the 
economists “and you guys really believe that?”. Brian Arthur was the only economist 
who asked the same question and he really wanted to develop an alternative to the 
neoclassical economic framework. This view influenced his nomination as the first 
director of the economic programme of the SFI in 1988 when the Science Board of 
the SFI appointed him as director and gave him the opportunity to shape the future 
research agenda of the institution (Bulletin of SFI, 1988, vol. 3, p. 13). 
  
Despite the disciplinary challenges, the Santa Fe Institute progressively integrated 
economics into its research agenda and workshops specifically dedicated to 
economics were periodically organized 104 . By combining different disciplinary 
perspectives, the Santa Fe Institute played a very important role in creating a strong 
interest in complexity in economics, as Arthur (cited in Waldrop, 1992, p. 325) 
explained:  
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 The first one was organized a few months (September 1987) after the financial support was 
provided by Citicorp. It is worth mentioning that of the 21 contributors, six were working in a 
department of Economics, 12 in a department of Physics, on in a Food Research Institute, one in a 
department of Computer Sciences and one in a school of Medicine (See Anderson et al., 1988). 
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“What Santa Fe did was to act as a gigantic catalyst for all that [research on 
complexity]. It was a place where very good people—people of the caliber of 
Frank Hahn and Ken Arrow—could come and interact with people like John 
Holland and can deal with inductive learning rather than deductive logic, we 
can cut the Gordian know of equilibrium and deal with open-ended evolution, 
because many of these problems have been dealt with by other disciplines. 
Santa Fe provided the jargon, the metaphors, and the expertise that you 
needed in order to get the techniques started in economics”. 
 
 
Economic systems were considered an obvious candidate for complexity treatment 
because they are composed of multiple components that interact in such a way as to 
generate the macro properties. The dynamic complexity was explicitly mentioned as 
the major research target, as was written in the foreword of the proceeding volume 
related to this first workshop: “the purpose of the workshop was to explore the 
potential usefulness of a broadly transdisciplinary research programme on the 
dynamics of the global economic system” (Anderson et al., 1988, p. xiii). In his 
introductory speech for the workshop, Pines (1988) explained that the economic 
topics studied at the Institute were apportioned among working groups whose 
general schemes were “Cycle”, “Webs” and “Patterns”. The first scheme refers to 
nonlinear deterministic behaviour of systems, the second one concerns theories of 
large numbers of interacting units that generate emergent properties, while the last 
scheme focuses more on theories of statistical invariance. That distinction is 
interesting because it determined the methodological orientations for the research 
that the SFI initiated on economics: while the “Cycle scheme” does not really deal 
with complexity (but rather with chaos theory 105  as I will argue in the following 
section), webs and patterned themes were directly related to the two distinct 
computational approaches of dynamic complexity that I presented in the first part of 
this chapter: agent-based modelling (webs) and power laws (patterns). Interestingly, 
this categorization of SFI works influenced the methodological evolution of 
econophysics, as will be detailed later in this chapter. 
 
Before presenting these three categories that are in line with the three research axes 
(“cycles”, “patterns” and “webs”) identified by Pines, it is worth mentioning that 
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 I will deal with the distinction between chaos theory and complexity in the following section. 
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economists were aware of complexity as witnessed by the existence of a strictly 
historical literature on economic complexity106. These economic historians provide 
interesting perspectives on complexity; they try to locate this topic within the history 
of economic thought, but not in a way that helps us to understand econophysics. In 
the following section, the three schemes mentioned above will be detailed by 
emphasizing their contemporary links with econophysics. That presentation will give 
me the context to clarify the major differences (but also to emphasize the similarities) 
between econophysics and another area of knowledge that also emerged through 
the application in economics of statistical tools imported by physicists: econometrics. 
 
IV. Chaos theory associated with economic complexity 
 
 
As noted previously, Pines (1988) explained that economic topics studied at the 
Santa Fe Institute were apportioned among three working groups labelled “Cycle”, 
“Webs” and “Patterns”. The first scheme refers to nonlinear deterministic behaviour 
of systems, which does not really deal with complexity but rather with chaos theory. 
Although chaos is sometimes used as synonymous with complexity, these two 
issues are not the same thing. Chaos is a non-linear dynamic that describes a 
situation in which the output’s system varies so erratically that it looks random. The 
chaotic character of the system can be associated with two notions: the dependence 
on initial conditions and strange attractor. The former is often associated with the 
“butterfly effect” according to which a tiny difference in initial conditions can lead to a 
very different system outcome, while a strange attractor is rather “paths of 
complicated and irregular geometric shapes […] which might be [seen as] an 
equilibrium trajectory” (Rosser, 1999, p. 174).  
 
                                                          
106  An edited volume (Colander, 2000) providing a collection of papers devoted to historical 
perspective on economic complexity showed that this topic has some roots in early economists’ works 
(such as John Stuart Mill and Friedrich von Hayek). In his book dedicated to complexity in the history 
of economic thought, Colander (2000) proposed several other historical examples. Basically, these 
historical studies about complexity in economics usually aim to emphasize the pioneering dimension 
of these previous studies. These historical works allow heterodox economists to show that the new 
hype called “complexity” has some roots in their tradition. In a sense, this historical reconstruction 




Roughly speaking, chaos issues can be seen as a predecessor of the complexity 
era107, whose non-linear dimensions paved the way for the development of research 
on complexity. This claim seems to be confirmed by the evolution of the themes 
dealt with in the Santa Fe Institute publications devoted to economics. Indeed, the 
first book, entitled “Economy as an evolving complex system”, published in 1984, 
offered 13 articles; five were dedicated to Chaos 108  five focused on micro 
interactions and only two of these papers dealt with “patterns” (identification of 
statistical invariance). A decade later, in 1997, the second volume of “Economy as 
an evolving complex system” collected twenty articles of which seventeen were 
exclusively dedicated to micro interactions (i.e. agent-based modelling) and only 
three (Durlauf, 1997; Lane and Maxfield, 1997; Arthur et al., 1997) were devoted to 
the identification of invariance. Chaos issues totally disappeared from this volume 
and the word “chaos” was used only four times (in three papers) in the book. The 
third volume, published in 2006, definitively confirmed the historical nature of the 
chaos theory and its relationship to complexity since the word “chaos” did not even 
appear in the index anymore. This decreasing interest in chaos theory appeared 
therefore obvious; as Mirowski (1996, p. 38) put it, “the physical scientists at Santa 
Fe generally regard chaos theory […] as uninteresting or a dead end”. Twelve out of 
the fourteen articles proposed in this third volume were dedicated to micro 
interactions and agent-based modelling while only two (Stanley et al., 2006 and 
Lévy, 2006) dealt with the identification of patterns. However, although the latter 
topic was not the central theme of the book, it is worth mentioning that these two 
articles directly came from econophysics109. This evolution in the themes dealt in the 
books published by the Santa Fe Institute is very informative. Basically, the 
computational prospects opened up by cellular automata combined with a 
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 Rosser (1999) identified three predecessors of complexity: Cybernetics, Catastrophe theory and 
Chaos theory, which all proposed a specific framework for dealing with non-linear dynamics. Within 
the complexity framework, this non-linear dynamics is combined with emergent properties. See 
Rosser (1999) for further details about these issues and their links with complexity. 
108
 All applications of chaos theory in economics were not necessarily related to the Santa Fe 
Institute. One can mention, for example, the chaotic description of the macroeconomic environment 
(Kaas, 1998), the new chaotic econometric models (Dechert and Gencay, 1996, Bask, 1998) or the 
development of a chaotic tâtonnement price adjustment (Goeree et al., 1998).  The collection of 
papers edited by Prigogyne and Stengers (1984) on chaotic characterization of economic systems 
can also be associated with this literature. However, although there are some articles devoted to the 
application of chaos theory in economics, this theme has gradually been abandoned in economics 
(Rosser, 1999). 
109
 One of these articles was written by one of father of econophysics (Eugene Stanley); moreover, 




methodological adaptive individualism110 that was enhanced by economists involved 
in the SFI (Arthur; Arrow) progressively led the institute to focus mainly on the 
modelling of evolving micro interactions. This evolution also resulted from the choice 
of Brian Arthur as the first director of the economic programme of the SFI in 1988. 
Indeed, while Arrow had more of a role of “steersman, in the ambit of the science 
board, than as an active researcher” (Fontana, 2009, p.6); Arthur was the only 
heterodox economist working at that time on the stochastic/dynamic method in 
economics based on an algorithmic approach. His role, combined with the influence 
of computer-orientated scientists such as Holland or Wolfram, determined the 
concepts and tools developed by the future research agenda that was implemented 
by the SFI. As explained in the first part of this chapter, that research paved the way 
to the development of agent-based modelling in economics (I deal with this approach 
in the following section). 
 
This section explained that research on one of the key themes initiated by the SFI 
has been progressively abandoned, implying that the literature devoted to chaos did 
not really contribute to the development of econophysics, in contrast with the two 
other categories of works that were enhanced by the Santa Fe Institute: works on the 
identification of patterns in economic dynamics and research on economic 
interactions (associated with the group working on “webs”). These computational 
approaches have been extended in economics, mainly by SFI scholars. The rest of 
this chapter will present 1) how the SFI shaped these two themes, which laid down 
the methodological foundations of econophysics, and; 2) how this influence explains 
why econophysics can be seen as a different field from econometrics. 
 
V. Statistical patterns in economics  
 
V.1. Patterns and origins of econophysics 
 
The scheme labelled “Patterns” was supposed to study the statistical behaviour of 
complex economic systems. I explained previously how the progressive 
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 This methodology refers to an algorithmic calibration of individual properties allowing agents to 
change their behaviour depending on stimuli they get from the context. 
92 
 
computerization of society and science observed in the 1980s contributed to the 
development of the self-criticality theory (Bak et al. 1987, Hughes, 1999), which 
requires a high number of observations in order to characterize power laws in 
complex systems. By promoting the application of this theory to other areas of 
knowledge, the SFI played a key role in the genesis of econophysics. Indeed, as 
discussed in the first chapter, the economic mainstream (neoclassical economics) is 
mainly based on Gaussian law (Jovanovic, 2008). However, because this statistical 
framework requires that no critical (extreme) variations can happen, it was not 
appropriate for describing the “criticality of complex [economic] systems [i.e. extreme 
variations in financial prices]” (Bak et al., 1987). From this perspective, Bak (1987, 
1993) proposed an economic extension of his self-organized criticality through a 
model in which a shock in the supply chain (which acts as an additional sand grain in 
a sand pile) generates economy-wide fluctuations (like mini-avalanches in the sand 
pile) until the economy critically self-organizes (i.e. at a fragile state that could easily 
be modified by an additional small shock). This model showed that the dynamics of 
large fluctuations in the economy/finance can statistically be described through the 
scaling properties of a power law. That extension is very important for the 
emergence of econophysics, since the self-organized criticality is used to justify the 
use of power laws as the most appropriate macro description of complex 
economic/financial systems.  
 
The methodological birth of econophysics is usually associated with the publication 
of Mantegna (1991) in which the author compared the occurrence of extreme 
variations on the Milan financial market with the occurrence of earthquakes from 
which observations can statistically be described through a power law that is in line 
with the self-organized criticality framework. In other words, the self-organized 
criticality framework originally defined by the SFI physicist Bak (1987) is the 
conceptual foundational justification for the importation of power laws as they are 
used in statistical physics into financial/economic spheres. That conceptual bridge 
would generate, in the 1990s, an increasing number of empirical works that observe 
power laws in socio-economic phenomena: Mantegna and Stanley (1994), Lux 
(1996), Bak et al. (1997) and Gabaix et al. (2000) observed that the large 
fluctuations on the financial markets can be captured through the scaling property of 
a power law while Lévy (2003) confirmed the conclusion made by Pareto (1897) one 
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century earlier by showing that wealth and income distribution can both statistically 
be characterized by scaling properties. In the same vein, Amaral et al. (1997) 
explained that the annual growth rates for US manufacturing companies can also be 
described through a power law, whereas Axtell (2001), Luttmer (2007) and Gabaix 
and Landier (2008) claimed that this statistical framework can also be used to 
characterize the evolution of a firm’s size as a variable of their assets, market 
capitalization or number of employees.  
 
This research, which is based on the identification of a specific statistical pattern 
(power law) as the signal of dynamic complexity, was explicitly initiated in the 
inaugural workshop (1987) on economic complexity that was organized by the Santa 
Fe Institute. Although this theme of “statistical patterns” did not become the research 
priority of the SFI in the 1990s, it did not disappear from the research agenda of the 
institution. Between 1987 and 2006, the SFI published three collections of articles 
dedicated to economic complexity and one can observe that the theme of “statistical 
patterns” maintained its importance in these publications, while the “cycles” scheme 
(chaos theory) totally disappeared and the works dealing with “webs” (agent-based 
modelling) took on an increasing importance. Progressively, the theme of statistical 
patterns became an independent area of research that led to the advent of a field 
called econophysics. Because the SFI members clearly identified the 
characterization of statistical patterns as a path of research associated with 
economic complexity, and because the SFI was the place where the conceptual 
background (self-organized criticality) justifying this path was promoted, this 
institution played a key role in the crystallization of ideas that led to the emergence of 
econophysics. It is important to emphasize the role played by Prof. Eugene Stanley 
(who was a member of the SFI) in the development of econophysics. Precisely, the 
renowned scholar111 offered an important institutional support to the field – being the 
director of the Polymer Center at the Department of Physics (at Boston University), 
Stanley allocated to econphysics-oriented research a part of the annual budget that 
                                                          
111 
To remind, Eugene Stanley (born in 1941) is an American physicist and professor at Boston 
University who is well known for his works on statistical physics and on interdisciplinary studies in 
physics. He coined the name “econophysics”, the discipline of which he is said to be the father. He is 
also the author (with Rosario Mantegna) of the first textbook on econophysics, which was published in 
1999 by Cambridge University Press. Eugene Stanley has also been the editor of Physica A, a journal 
that was originally dedicated to condensed-matter physics and which appears to be today the first 
journal in econophysics. 
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his center got from the University. In doing so, Prof. Stanley contributed to the 
development of a community of econophysicists. Interestingly, a lot of post-doctoral 
scholars who joind Stanley came from Europe explaining partly the reason for why 
econophysics is today more developed in Europe112. In addition to this aspect, it is 
worth mentioning that Eugene Stanley has been the chief-editor of Physica A for 
more than 2 decades where he always promoted and welcomed articles dealing with 
econophysics. 
 
Despite the presence of economists in the SFI, it is worth mentioning that this 
scheme of “statistical patterns” did not arouse enthusiasm among economists. 
Indeed, the absence of a compelling set of theoretical models for explaining how the 
laws emerged (Durlauf, 2005) does not match with the usual micro approach 
enhanced by economists for whom an explanation in terms of individual 
characteristics is a disciplinary way of thinking (Hoover, 2013).  
 
Beyond this methodological gap between economists and econophysicists113, this 
lack of interest from the first in the works of the latter is enhanced by a feeling of 
“déjà vu”, since the development of the Santa Fe Institute/econophysics is often 
seen as a pale copy of the emergence of the Cowles Commission/econometrics in 
the 1930s. Because this historical issue is important and very often mentioned by 
economists114 (Durlauf, 2005, 2012), I propose hereafter to clarify this distinction in 
two steps: first, I will deal with the comparison between the Santa Fe Institute and 
the Cowles Commission to better understand why econophysics failed to impress 
economists. Secondly, I will emphasize the methodological differences between the 
way econophysicists and economists use statistics. 
 
 
                                                          
112
 Econophysics is still important at Boston University where Stanley’s group still produces a lot of 
research outcomes in econophysics.  Houston University (with Prof. McCauley) is also another 
university promoting econophysics oriented research. It is worth mentioning that the list of universities 
supporting econophysics is today longer in Europe (University of Leicester, UK; University of Palermo, 
Italy; University of Liege, Belgium; Kings College London, UK; Trinity College Dublin, Ireland; 
Univeristy of Warsaw, Poland etc.) 
113
 The fourth chapter will investigate the epistemological differences in terms of modelling practices in 
the two communities in more detail. 
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V.2. The development of the SFI, a feeling of déjà vu?  
 
Because the SFI and the Cowles Commission both hired physicists for promoting the 
use of statistics in economics, it is reasonable to draw a parallel between these two 
institutions in which the historical similarities are, at first sight, amazing, as Mirowski 
(1996, p. 19) wrote:  
“The Econometrics Society founded in 1930 by twelve Americans and four 
Europeans in a climate of economic contraction and academic hostility to 
mathematical formalism, might not have gone anywhere had it not found a 
long-term sponsor in Alfred Cowles. Cowles thought he was buying a better 
stock market predictor, but the trained physicists and mathematicians that 
had been taken on board reoriented the centre of research towards their own 
abstract concerns. Change the numbers, move the calendar to 1983, replace 
widespread hostility to mathematical formalism with a disdain for anything but 
formalism, replace Alfred Cowles with John Reed, and you have a fair 




Although Mirowski (1996) suggested this parallel, he did not further study this 
perspective. Let us investigate in more detail this comparison between the two 
institutions by retracing a quick intellectual evolution of the Cowles Commission: In 
the 1930s, the Cowles Commission was the spearhead of neoclassical economics, 
stressing the importance of mathematical formalism and the unicity of the scientific 
method (Mirowsky, 1989, 1996; Morgan, 1990). Starting in the 1940s, the Cowles 
Commission became more and more statistics-orientated and its leading members 
(Jacob Marshak and Tjalling Koopmans) developed their famous estimation 
methods, which were in line with the inference approach promoted by Pearson 
(1924). After the 1950s, none of the leading members of the Cowles Commission 
were still involved in empirical works and none of them investigated their 
econometric techniques further (Christ, 1994). The Commission became increasingly 
abstract since it “opted for pristine Bourbarkist mathematical abstraction, best 
represented by Debreu’s Theory of Value and Koopmans’ Thee Essays on the State 
of Economics Science in place of structural econometrics” (Mirowski, 1996, p. 17). 
From this perspective, adherence to the Walrasian general equilibrium theory 
combined with the use of a Bourbakist axiomatization became the required 
conditions for being part of the economic orthodoxy. Historic investigations 
(Mirowski, 1989b, 1996; Morgan, 1990) on the Cowles Commission concluded that 
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the general project of the institution collapsed because it evolved towards a more 
abstract and disconnected (non-empirical) research agenda. That general feeling 
seems to be shared by leading economists, since Kenneth Arrow and David Kreps, 
for example, claimed “that very little truly novel took place in economics after the 
triumph of the Cowles programme in the 1960s” Mirowski (2012, p. 166). In response 
to this lack of interest in empirical works in economics, some rival areas of 
knowledge emerged such as game theory, behavioural economics and artificial 
intelligence, which progressively emerged to fill the vacuum opened by the Cowles 
Commission. 
 
When the Santa Fe Institute began to deal with economic complexity in the 
beginning of the 1980s, no rival perspectives governed the orthodoxy of economics 
in which, according to Stiglitz (2003, p. 572), “something was [still] wrong—indeed, 
seriously wrong—with the competitive equilibrium models which represented the 
prevailing paradigm”. Economists who joined the SFI were usually looking for new 
intellectual challenges: Brian Arthur has never been considered as a mainstream 
economist and his first motivation to join the SFI were related to his critical thinking 
of the economic mainstream (Waldrop, 1992) while other big names (such as 
Kenneth Arrow) appeared to seek an new intellectual project by considering that the 
Santa Fe Institute could be the Cowles Commission of the 1990s (Mirowski, 1996). 
Here the similarities between the two institutions end. The Santa Fe Institute and the 
Cowles Commission can legitimately be associated: both institutions were funded to 
develop a research agenda based on statistical investigations of economic 
phenomena. 
 
The comparison between the SFI and the Cowles Commission does not go beyond 
the parallel evoked above. Actually, these two institutions have more differences 
than similarities, since they did not implement the same research programme. While 
the objective of the Cowles Commission was to formalize and axiomatize the 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory, the SFI, in contrast, was interested in the 
development of empirical and evolutionary research. Such opposition explains why 
the two institutions methodologically evolved in a very different way. The Cowles 
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Commission promoted a single method science by formalizing economic knowledge 
wherein all economic phenomena must be described in axiomatic terms consistent 
with core assumptions initially defined (such as agent’s perfect rationality, equilibrium 
as final state, etc.). For members of the SFI, this way of working was judged 
mathematically too abstract and disconnected from reality. In contrast with the 
Cowles Commission, the SFI did not focus only on an axiomatic methodology but it 
rather enhanced the cross-fertilization among disciplines by combining the empirical 
perspective promoted by physicists with the adaptive aspect enhanced by biologists 
and the computational techniques developed by computer specialists. Beyond these 
historical similarities and differences, it is also worth stressing that the two statistical 
ways of dealing with economic phenomena (econometrics and econophysics), which 
emerged from these two institutions, are technically very different. As a reminder, the 
first chapter explained how econophysicists mainly work with the description of the 
whole distribution (unconditional approach) when they describe the dynamics of 
economic/financial variables. In contrast, economists use technical solutions to save 
the Gaussian framework by working with conditional approaches consisting of 
describing the major trend of dynamics through a normal distribution whose large 
variations are characterized by a second distribution.  
 
This section emphasized how the SFI contributed to the development of 
econophysics by having initiated the works dealing with power laws (and their 
scaling properties). This key role played by the SFI explains why econophysics failed 
to impress economists for whom this field appears as a pale copy of the Cowles 
Commission. This section clarified this aspect by claiming that these two institutions 
contributed in very different ways to the understanding of economic phenomena. 
 
As an extension of this usual confusion between the SFI and the Cowles 
Commission, the existing literature usually presents econophysics as a pale copy of 
econometrics (initiated at the Cowles Commission). I would like to end this section 





V.3. Statistics in economics? Nothing new!: The case of statistical economics  
 
If econophysics is often compared to econometrics, it is not only due to the 
background of their members and their significant use of statistics but also because 
of the development of the former echoes a debate (called “measurement without 
theory”) that emerged in the early days of econometrics. Economists are aware of 
the use of statistical patterns as they witnessed the existence of what is called 
“statistical economics” (Morgan, 1999, p. 55). Roughly speaking, that research 
programme115 can be summarized as wanting to describe and measure business 
cycles through the identification of statistical patterns. More precisely, authors 
involved in this approach try to isolate fluctuating macro trends. In a sense, statistical 
economics can be seen as a precursor of econophysics for several reasons: this 
research programme focused a phenomenological description of economic systems 
through the identification of statistical macro patterns by criticizing econometrics’ 
dependence on the Gaussian distribution and its conditional approach. Moreover, in 
accordance with econophysics works, economists emphasized the potential for 
“infinite probable error” (Mills, 1927, p. 336), referring to the “fat tails” of the 
distributions of price changes. As Mirowski (1989) explained, this observation was 
persistently ignored by neoclassical economics. 
 
Beyond this historical similarity between econophysics and statistical economics, 
additional differences exist between these two research programmes: in contrast 
with the first, the latter did not identify statistical patterns as universal laws. Indeed, 
as Rutherford (2011) explained, the influence of the pragmatic school (especially 
John Dewey) on economic works at that time led economists to focus on 
contextualized treatments of statistical patterns. In line with the self-criticality theory, 
econophysicists see identified statistical patterns (i.e. power laws) as a signal of a 
universal framework. Concerning the statistical methodology, economists and 
econophysicists do not treat economic data in the same way since the first think the 
                                                          
115
 Most of works dedicated to this approach between 1910 and 1950 were associated with the 
American Institutionalist School, which mainly worked on the understanding of business cycles and 
the influence of institutions on economic behaviours. This school was mainly affiliated with the NBER 
and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, which had decided to sustain the Cowles Commission 
starting in 1947 (for further details about the history of the Institutionalist School, see Craver, 1986). 
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regularities of data were visible in the patterns of events of the cycle but not in the 
statistical characteristics, while the latter deal with the identifiable patterns and the 
statistical features of data. Another significant difference between econophysics and 
statistical economics is the way of thinking about how phenomena related to an 
emergent macro law. The economists saw statistical patterns as instruments for both 
investigation and social control by considering that the society was too complex to be 
associated with a natural order that had to be “replaced by a social order, maintained 
by social controls including public opinion, belief, social institutions and laws” 
(Rutherford, 2011, p. 13). In this context, statistics and macro laws were perceived 
as instruments for “an active intelligence guidance of social processes” (Ross, 1991, 
p. viii). As previously mentioned, econophysicists explicitly associate economic 
systems with a self-organized criticality that no external actor/factor can influence116.  
 
As shown in this section, the research scheme associated with the “statistical 
pattern” developed by the Santa Fe Institute echoes the historical debates in 
economics. By clarifying the specific role played by the SFI in the development of 
econophysics, this section showed that the emergence of this field is not a pale copy 
of existing economic works. In the same vein, the importance of the SFI and these 
echoes of historical debates explain why econophysics failed to impress economists, 
and is why, as explained in the first chapter, this field emerged in physics. 
 
VI. Webs in economics or agent-based modelling  
 
As detailed in the first part of this chapter, the early 1980s were characterized by a 
fragmentation of Cold War science leading to balkanization of scientific research. 
This challenging context combined with an increasing number of personal computers 
owned by scientific institutions favoured the development of several computer-based 
methodologies in science: agent-based modelling is one of them117. Brian Arthur (the 
first director of the economic programme of the SFI) was a pioneer of this 
methodology, which became progressively dominant in the research agenda of the 
                                                          
116
 This perspective is often emphasised by econophysicists who compare the self-organized 
dimension to the agents’ free will, making their approach more in line with the Hayekian idea of 
spontaneous order (Bouchaud, 2002; Schinckus, 2016d).  
117
 One can also mention the development of the Monte Carlo simulations.  
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institution. In the 1990s, (with David Lane 118  as director of the economic 
programme), the SFI contributed to the extension of this agent-based modelling to 
other themes, which explains why this modelling gradually become the most widely 
used tool for capturing economic complexity (Axelrod, 2005). Although that approach 
allows economists to define some behavioural features, this methodology explicitly 
associates human behaviours with sets of abstract algorithms that are supposed to 
describe the “fundamental behaviour” of agents 119 . In other words, models are 
formulated as computer programs in which agents’ behavioural characteristics are 
inputs while outputs are associated with the macro behaviour that results from micro 
interactions. 
 
As mentioned in the first part, agent-based modelling was developed at the SFI in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Arthur 1988; Holland, 1988). An analysis of the works 
published by the SFI shows how agent-based modelling progressively became the 
key area of research for this institution. In the three collections of articles dedicated 
to economic complexity that were published by the SFI between 1987 and 2006, we 
can observe that the theme of “statistical patterns” maintained the same importance 
in these publications, while the “cycles” scheme (chaos theory) totally disappeared, 
and the works dealing with “webs” (agent-based modelling) had an increasing 
importance, where this approach is used to describe diverse situations: the opinion 
transmission mechanism (Deffuant, 2006; Amblard and Deffuant., 2004); the 
development of industrial networks and the relationship between suppliers and 
customers (Brenner, 2001; Gilbert 2007; Epstein, 2006); the addiction of consumers 
to a brand (Janssen and Jager, 1999); the description of second-hand (cars) markets 
(Izquierdo et al., 2006); and the evolution of financial markets (Lebaron, 2006), 
etc.120. The best introduction to this literature is doubtless the three publications 
published by the Santa Fe Institute on economic complexity (Pine 1988; Arthur et al., 
1997 and Blume et al., 2006), which offer an impressive collection of works devoted 
to agent-based modelling as it is applied in economics. 
 
                                                          
118
 David Lane is an American economist known for his theory of artefact innovation and his work on 
economic complexity based on evolutionary processes. 
119
 From this perspective, “the entire market system is then seen as a network of interrelated 
individual automata\markomata whose profusion of forms may nonetheless be seen as relatively 
coherent if explained in terms of computational hierarchies” (Davis, 2013, p. 9). 
120
 See Cristelli (2014) for a detailed literature review of agent-based modelling applied in economics.   
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VII. Conclusion  
 
This second chapter presented a pre-history of econophysics and showed how this 
field can be connected with complexity studies. The first part of the chapter 
emphasized the key role played by the Santa Fe Institute in the development of 
computational techniques for dealing with dynamic complexity. These techniques are 
directly related to the rapid expansion of computers that allowed scientists on the 
one hand, to record and visualize a great number of historical data, and on the other 
hand, to simulate potential situations through computerized simulations. Basically, 
the two computational techniques promoted by the Santa Fe Institute for dealing with 
dynamic complexity refers to these two dimensions since the statistical (but also 
visual) identification of macro patterns has been favoured by the increasing 
databases, while agent-based modelling is a specific way of simulating complex 
situations.  
 
By promoting the extension of dynamic complexity outside of physics, the Santa Fe 
Institute also contributed to the development of complexity studies in economics. In 
this chapter I exposed the financial reasons for why this institution decided to work 
on economic issues. Although the Santa Fe Institute favoured the development of 
complexity studies in economics, it did not have a monopoly on the topic. The first 
section of the second part of this chapter mentioned other categories of works that 
are usually associated with economic complexity. From this perspective, some words 
were given on the historical studies and on the application of chaos theory. Broadly 
speaking, the historical presentation offered in this chapter could be summarized 






















Figure 5: Processes presented in this chapter. 
 
I quickly evoked the historical studies as an attempt to root complexity studies in the 
history of economic thought and I explained how chaos theory has progressively 
been abandoned in statistical physics121 (and economics). Because historical studies 
and works dedicated to chaos theory did not have a historical or methodological 
affiliation with econophysics, this doctoral dissertation will focus, in the next chapters, 
on the works dealing with the two computational techniques enhancing by the Santa 
Fe Institute to deal with complexity (agent-based modelling and identification of 
statistical macro patterns). Finally, the investigation of econophysics’ historical roots 
also gave me the opportunity to clarify some debates that exist in the literature, 
which regularly equate econophysics to a feeling of déjà vu in the history of 
economic thought. The last sections of this chapter emphasized the specificity of 
econophysics by explaining the extent to which this field differs from a previous 
influence of physics on economics. The following chapter will be more 
methodologically orientated since it will explain how econophysics originally emerged 
as an extension of works dedicated to the statistical identification of macro patterns, 
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 It is worth mentioning this field is still well and alive in other fields of physics (Quantum chaos for instance – 
see Wimberger (2014). 
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and how it progressively witnessed a methodological diversification. These 
methodological issues will lead me to deal with several key philosophical notions, 




Chapter 3: The methodological 





We now know that econophysics is not a discipline in a traditional sense (Chapter 1) 
and we have some ideas of where it came from within 20th century science (Chapter 
2). Now it is time to investigate the methodology of econophysics. In this chapter, I 
argue that there is not one methodology, but rather a diversification. Indeed, as 
explained earlier, econophysics is often associated with the umbrella of complexity 
and two of its computational techniques (statistical macro patterns analysis and 
agent-based modelling). What is interesting is to study how these two techniques are 
really implemented in econophysics. This chapter aims to clarify this point by 
showing how these two approaches can be actually decomposed into several 
methodological perspectives that have a different justification in their practitioners’ 
eyes. Although it is always risky to generalize across different projects in any 
science, especially a new and controversial one such as econophysics, I will attempt 
to present a categorization of three methodological perspectives. This is a non-trivial 
task because econophysics is a very recent field, and no clear statement of its goal 
and methods has been articulated. The main contribution of this chapter is to 
categorize the ideal types of this field that, in the final chapter, I can evaluate for their 
adequacy.  
 
In the history and philosophy of science, Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan have proposed 
conceptual frameworks to characterize the diversity of perspectives in scientific 
knowledge. In accordance with these philosophers, I will assume a distinction 
between the system of procedures (methodology) used in a specific area of 
knowledge and the set of concepts/standards through which we can evaluate 
existing methodologies. Specifically, this chapter will use a Lakatosian angle to 
characterize the methodological diversity of econophysics because this philosophical 
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approach offers a particular way of characterizing diversity within a unified and 
coherent field. I explain later in this chapter the reasons of this choice. 
 
The story of this chapter is at once one of the diversification of econophysics into 
three traditions and a story of a progressive rapprochement between these 
traditions. The best way to appreciate the dynamics of this rapprochement is to 
adopt the Lakatosian concept of research programme to characterize the almost 
simultaneous existence of three research approaches under the umbrella of 
econophysics. Interestingly, this evolution suggests a convergence that will be nicely 
represented with a progressive articulation of a common hard core. Despite its 
Lakatosian background, this chapter differs from the usual historicist theories 
developed by Lakatos (Kuhn or Laudan) simply because my intention is not to deal 
with the polemical issue of unity of science but rather to highlight the existence of 
different ways of doing science in econophysics. To situate this chapter, I provide 
hereafter a schema (figure 1 below) that summarizes the process developed in the 






















































The first chapter dealt with the disciplinary nature of econophysics by presenting the 
field as a boundary field that emerged in the 1990s. The second chapter focused on 
the history of econophysics in which the emergence of econophysics is clearly 
associated with the identification (and analysis) of statistical patterns in 
economic/financial data. This third chapter will show that this field has evolved 
towards a diversified situation where econophysicists combine their original 
statistical methodology with agent-based modelling. Precisely, echoing the two 
computational techniques developed at the SFI, econophysics can be  decomposed 
into three ways of doing econophysics (statistical econophysics, bottom-up agent-
based econophysics and top-down agent-based econophysics)122. 
 
Although the ways of using the label “econophysics” presented above deal with 
economic complexity, they conceptualize this notion differently. Indeed, these 
approaches explicitly associate economic complexity with the idea of emergence, but 
they all propose a different way of modelling this notion. This chapter aims to clarify 
the links that can be made between this concept of emergence and the different 
ways of doing econophysics. Before investigating these three traditions in 
econophysics, I will define (section 2) the key concept of emergence, which plays a 
central role in methodological characterization of econophysics. Afterwards, the 
chapter will present the three approaches, starting with the strictly phenomenological 
approach used in statistical econophysics, which will be associated with a “strong 
emergentism” in the philosophy of science. The methodological foundations of the 
bottom-up agent-based econophysics will then be discussed before the presentation 
of the more recent top-down agent-based modelling econophysics by presenting this 
very recent trend as the more integrative approach. This chapter will also pave the 
way for additional philosophical debates about the role of models and explanations in 
econophysics and financial economics (Chapter 4 will deal with this aspect). 
                                                          
122
 See my paper published in Contemporary Physics (Schinckus, 2013) for a classification and a 
complete review of the main works published in these sub-categories of econophysics. This chapter is 
partly based on this article (for the literature review) but it will go further in the analysis of the 
epistemological foundations of econophysics. 
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II. Preamble: Econophysics and the notion of emergence 
 
The previous chapter introduced two computational approaches, both of them mainly 
developed by the SFI scholars. I explained how the agent-based perspective 
progressively became the major research theme of the SFI for describing economic 
systems. In this context, the literature related to statistical patterns has gone its own 
way and gradually gave birth to econophysics in the 1990s. What this chapter will 
show is the methodological affiliation between these statistical patterns and agent-
based modelling. Roughly speaking, the two approaches did not interact for more 
than a decade until the 2000s when scholars started to combine them. Interestingly, 
this late interaction echoes earlier works initiated by the SFI, and they give birth to 
three different approaches in today’s econophysics: statistical econophysics, bottom-
up agent-based econophysics and top-down agent-based modelling. These three 
approaches explore the relationships between the micro and the macro levels in 
different ways, but all of them deal with the phenomenon of emergence, which can 
therefore be seen as a key element of econophysics.  
 
Emergence is a complex notion that generates a great deal of philosophical 
discussions (Kauffman, 1993; Hodgson, 1997; Jean, 1997; Kim, 1999; Batterman 
2002; Butterfield, 2011a, 2011b). Although emergence can take various forms123, it is 
often associated with the claim that “things can be greater than the sum of their 
parts”. More formally, emergence can be defined as “the arising of novel structures, 
patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex system” 
(Goldstein, 1999, p. 50). In this context, this notion of emergence often indicates the 
presence of properties that cannot be explained as the consequence of the simple 
aggregation of micro components. This situation suggests that emergence appears 
as the opposite of what philosophers call “reducibility”. This chapter will review the 
major debates about this tension between emergence and reducibility, which  
became a “widespread ideology” (Butterfield, 2011, p. 3) in the philosophy of 
                                                          
123
 See Cunningham (2001) for a taxonomy of emergence. 
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science. Specifically, this chapter will investigate this tension in the context of 
econophysics and its methodological diversification. 
Cunningham (2001, p. 62) reminds us that emergence is an old idea that was 
reemployed in the 1990s with the development of “complexity science” in which we 
observe a “re-emergence of emergence”. The idea of emergence dates back to the 
old British Emergentism attributed to Mill (1843), Alexander (1920), Morgan (1923) 
and Broad (1925). In opposition to the reductionist framework that dominated 
science between the 1930s and the 1960s, the emergentism inspired by Broad 
(1925) considered that emergence referred to the properties of the whole, which, on 
one hand, cannot be deduced from the properties of the parts; and on the other 
hand, is not reducible to the laws governing these parts. From this perspective, 
emergence appeared as a macroscopic phenomenon with no micro foundations, 
leading some reductionist authors (Epstein, 2006; Gregersen, 2002) to consider that 
emergentists favoured an “anti-scientific explanation” (Epstein, 2006, p. 32). In 
relation to this anti-scientific critique of the emergentist approach, in the 1940s, 
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 568) explained that:  
“This version of emergence is objectionable not only because it involves and 
perpetuates certain logical confusions but also because not unlike the ideas of 
neovitalism, it encourages an attitude of resignation which is stifling to scientific 
research”. 
 
The confusion emphasized by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) arises because 
logically speaking, emergent properties (from an emergentist perspective) are not 
deducible from the micro ones. However, we can only deduce propositions in a 
formal language from other propositions formulated in this same language. If a 
macro proposition (theory explaining the whole) contains terms that are not terms of 
the micro propositions (theory explaining the parts) then, of course, it is impossible to 
deduce the macro level from propositions describing the micro level. In this context, 
the “whole” is not deducible from its parts for purely logical reasons and then, the 
emergence is trivially not deducible. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and more 
recently Stephan (1992), showed that the non-deducibility is always relative to the 
proposition (i.e. to a specific formal language) used to characterize the micro and 
macro level. So non-deducibility does not establish absolute or ontological 
emergence, as the classical emergentists claimed it did.  
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The linguistic perspective initiated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) was developed 
by Nagel (1961), who associated scientific process with reduction. More precisely, 
Nagel (1961, p. 338) assumed that “reduction [...] is the explanation of a theory or a 
set of experimental laws established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually 
though not invariably formulated for some other domain”. Reduction is therefore 
defined through the logical idea, according to which a theory can be a definitional 
extension of another (Nagel, 1961, p. 351). As Butterfield (2011, p. 6) explained: 
“Writing t for “top” and b for “bottom”, we say: Tt is a definitional extension of 
Tb if one can add a set D of definitions, one for each of Tt’s non-logical 
symbols, in such way that Tt becomes a sub-theory of the augmented theory 
Tb ∪ D”. 
 
When the reduced theory (Tt) is derivable from the descriptive premises contained in 
the reducing theory (Tb) and that terms used in Tt have approximately the same 
meaning that they have in Tb, then Nagel used the label of “homogeneous 
reduction”. Although Nagel (1961) illustrated this kind of reduction through the 
reduction of the Galilean laws of falling bodies to Newtonian mechanics, the idea of 
approximation used by the author was problematic. Sklar (1967) underlined the 
logical problems generated by this “approximation”, which, strictly speaking, made 
incompatible the process of reduction. Nagel (1961) was aware of this point since he 
also developed the idea of “heterogeneous reduction”, which refers to a reduction 
process that involves revising the reduced theory. In other words, the reduced theory 
(Tt) contains terms or concepts that do not appear in the reducing theory (Tb). The 
classical example of heterogeneous reduction is the one of thermodynamics to 
statistical mechanics because the first “contains the concept of temperature (among 
others) that is lacking in the reducing theory of statistical mechanics” (Batterman, 
2012, p. 2)124.  
 
                                                          
124
 Batterman (2012, p. 4) explained that the reduction of classical thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics fails because the reducing theory cannot associate a non-statistical feature with the 
concept of temperature. Thermodynamics is not originally a statistical theory and the possibility 
finding a bridge relationship “that captures the concept of temperature and the strict, non-statistical 
role it plays in thermodynamics seems impossible” (Batterman, 2012, p. 4). See Batterman (2012) for 
a detailed analysis of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics.  
110 
 
Although this heterogeneous version of reduction allows the modeller to avoid the 
blurred approximation evoked above by integrating the idea of potential new 
properties, it is still problematic from a logical point of view: if the reduced theory 
contains terms that do not appear in the theoretical assumptions of the reducing 
theory, then the logical derivation of the first from the latter required a condition of 
derivability (Nagel, 1961, p. 352). Butterfield (2011a, 2011b) explicitly associated this 
condition of derivability to the idea of deducibility. This condition can take the form of 
“suitable relations” between the two theories (these relations are also called “bridge 
assumptions or laws”125). Schaffner (1976) explained that these bridge relations 
between reduced and reducing theories require an empirical justification126.  
 
This concept of heterogeneous reduction paved the way for a connection between 
the concepts of reduction and of emergence: by allowing the reduced theory (Tt) to 
contain concepts that do not appear in the reducing theory (Tb), the heterogeneous 
reduction opened the door for a semantic shift in which what appears as the 
emerging properties is actually associated with the new concepts evoked in the 
reduced theory. In that context, the question is, how did these properties emerge? 
This is a deep philosophical question whose scope goes far beyond the object of this 
work127. In this dissertation, the notion of emergence will be analyzed through the 
way econophysics characterizes emergent properties (in so doing, I will not assume 
whether these properties really emerge in reality or not). This research deals with 
epistemological dimension of emergence and not with the metaphysical aspect of the 
phenomenon. While ontological emergence raises controversial questions (what are 
the true causes of it?), the epistemological emergence is sufficient for understanding 
what is happening in econophysics. Indeed, the methodological diversification of this 
field can actually be illustrated through a variety in the ways of dealing with 
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 An example of bridge law is the association of heat with the mean molecular motion in the 
reduction of thermodynamics to statistical physics. See Kim (1998) for a discussion of this aspect. 
126
 Shaffner (1976) illustrated his claim with the following example: “Genes were not discovered to be 
DNA via the analysis of meaning; important and difficult empirical research was required to make 
such an identification” (Schaffner, 1976, p. 615).   
127
 This creation of new properties can take two forms: ontological emergence or epistemological 
emergence. The first refers to the idea that reality contains emergent properties, while the latter 
considers emergence as a semantic gap between the way of describing the micro and the macro 
levels. I will not deal with these philosophical debates here. See Siberstein and McGeever (1999) or 
Butterfield (2011a, 2011b) for further detail on this topic.  
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emergence in economic phenomena (Schinckus, 2013). Precisely, the three 
computational approaches (statistical econophysics, top-down agent-based 
econophysics and bottom-up agent-based econophysics) in question consider 
emergence as what has to be modelled (i.e. explanandum). This common 
perspective opens a door for a methodological classification based on the idea that 
these traditions have a common set of assumptions (i.e. hard core) that are 
implemented in different ways.  
 
III. Methodological diversification of econophysics: Overview 
 
The era of complexity in economics combined with the last financial/economic crisis 
has generated several debates about the relevance of economic theory. This 
challenging context favoured the emergence of a variety of new approaches that are 
trying to deal with complexity in economics. In this fragmentation of economic 
knowledge, Colander et al. (2004) explained that the “profession will, over time, 
adopt certain kinds of technical, mathematical, analytical and statistical tools to deal 
with that complexity [in economics]” (Colander et al., 2004, p. 358). Econophysics is 
a good illustration of this fragmentation of economic knowledge.  
 
On the one hand, statistical econophysics offers a strictly phenomenological 
perspective of economic/financial systems and is founded on the self-criticality 
theory, according to which a dynamic system composed of a large number of 
interacting elements tends to have a critical point as an attractor. Such framework 
led physicists to describe the evolution of financial markets by using macro laws 
(taking the form of a power law). On the other hand, agent-based econophysics 
emerged because of increasing demand for a microscopic approach in econophysics 
whose original methodology was considered by some physicists (Farmer, 1999; 
Sornette, 2003) as too phenomenologically orientated. In this challenging context, 
some key econophysicists (Cont and Bouchaud, 1997; Farmer and Foley, 2009; 
Sornette, 2003), in the 2000s, promoted the creation of a methodological bridge 
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between agent-based modelling and the statistical perspectives originally used in 
econophysics128. 
 
The literature dealing with agent-based models, which come from physics but are 
applied in economics can be separated into two categories: on the one hand, we 
have research characterizing the emergence of specific macro properties without 
using a pre-defined macro pattern, and on the other hand, one can find works whose 
objective is to reproduce existing macro statistical patterns that are taken as being 
given from previous empirical observations. It is worth mentioning that the first 
approach is quite similar to the one used by economists i.e. a modelling to 
characterize the emergence of a specific macro result (without conceptual 
assumption information about the emerging macro output) in which all micro 
interactions are defined through plausible assumptions. The second approach 
instead uses agent-based techniques in order to reproduce existing data in which all 
micro interactions between agents are initially calibrated in order to generate a pre-
existed (given) macro pattern. In other words, the first category of works does not 
expect any kind of macro patterns (bottom-up approach) whereas the latter aims at 
reproducing (through calibration of micro interaction) a specific given macro pattern 
(top-down approach). 
 
These two perspectives that deal with micro-macro interactions combined with the 
statistical approach, as mentioned above, lead us to consider three ways of 
conceptualizing the notion of emergence in econophysics: 1) statistical econophysics 
(or the original econophysics); 2) bottom-up agent-based econophysics; and 3) top-
down agent-based econophysics. The next section will detail how these three 
methodological traditions are related (and how they refer to the concept of 
emergence). 
 
The argumentation will be developed through a series of key points identified for the 
three traditions: for each of them, I will propose how they implement the asymptotic 
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 See, for example, the recent publication of a book entitled “Agent-based econophysics” at Springer 
Press—Abergel et al. (2014).  
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reasoning in their works (I will label this aspect with the word “machinery”). 
Afterwards, other aspects will be discussed for each approach: I will define the initial 
conditions (starting points) these traditions require to implement their methodology 
and I will clarify the goals, the outcomes and the way they deal with the notion of 
emergence.  
 
IV. Statistical econophysics 
 
 
Roughly speaking, statistical econophysics can be defined as an area of knowledge 
that deals with the phenomenological characterization of statistical patterns that 
macroscopically describe the dynamics of complex economic systems. In this 
approach, the notion of emergence is often associated with statistical regularity that 
is observed in a very high number of past macro interactions. However, the 
phenomenological identification of the macro patterns implicitly requires the 
existence of a micro activity; the way the micro dynamics finally fits with a specific 
macro patterns is not detailed. Furthermore, because micro states are judged as 
being too complex to be micro defined, the identification of macro properties can 
help in characterizing a potential description of the micro level (McCauley, 2004).  
 
Beyond the presentation of this methodological tradition, this section aims to deal 
with several philosophical questions that the idea of statistical regularity raises. 
These aspects will be investigated in the fourth sub-section. The first sub-section will 
present the initial conditions/results as well as the kind of machinery (computational 
tool) this approach uses. The second sub-section will introduce the scientific 
justification of such an approach. Afterwards, I will discuss how the idea of 
emergence can be perceived as a phenomenological invariance that avoids the 
description of micro states.  
 
IV.1. An asymptotic machinery  
 
As previously mentioned, statistical econophysics is mainly founded on statistical 
processes. This machinery refers to a particular objective through a specific 
combination of inputs and outputs. This methodological tradition considers that 
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economic systems are composed of multiple interacting components (not learning 
agents) that are assumed to interact in such a way that they generate macro 
properties for systems (Rickles, 2008). Knowledge developed by this kind of work 
mainly results from the analysis of past data that scholars try to describe through 
complex statistical processes. In other words, the objective of this area of knowledge 
is to describe the statistical regularities that arise in the observation of financial (or 
economic) time series/data and that seem to be persistent across various time 
periods, places, markets, assets, etc. (Chakraboti et al., 2010, p. 994). The more 
data econophysicists have, the more reliable the statistical machinery will be. From 
this perspective, the input (initial conditions) of such a technique is the high number 
of past data related to the system, which has to be explained/clarified. In terms of 
output (results), the accumulation of observations allows econophysicists to observe 
a specific statistical regularity, which often takes the form of a power law. Concretely, 
the way to produce this output consists of visually checking on a simple histogram 
that the frequency distribution of the quantity of x appears as a straight line when 
plotted on double logarithmic axes. If a distribution falls approximately on a straight 
line, then one can consider that the distribution follows a power law, with a scaling 
parameter α given by the absolute slope of the straight line. Such visual investigation 
has guided econophysicists’ empirical research (Mantegna and Stanley, 1999; 
Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017) and can be illustrated with the following figure:  
 
Figure 2: Empirical cumulative distribution of the absolute values of the normalized 15-min 
returns of the 1,000 largest companies in the Trades and Quotes database for the 2-year 




This kind of visual relationship has been observed in many financial and economic 
phenomena. The reasons and the way econophysicists use the log-log system was 
explained in detail earlier. Statistical econophysicists tend to see this linearity in a 
large collection of empirical observations and, according to them, this repetition is 
not due to a(n) (un)happy coincidence; rather it stresses the phenomenological 
universality of power laws that emerge in different contexts. This idea of universality 
has supported the claim, according to which methods and models from statistical 
physics could be applied outside physics (McCauley, 2006; Mantegna and Stanley, 
1999).  
 
In the light of the elements presented above, power laws appear as an emergent 
behaviour that is totally unexpected from the mere analysis of interactions between 
individual components. Analytically speaking, this novel (not expected) and robust 
(regularly observed) results from the idea that the macro system can be perceived as 
a sequence of micro systems whose parameters can go to infinity. In order words, 
power laws appear as a novel behaviour by taking the limit      where n is the 
number of observations in accordance with, 
   
   
       
 
In this relationship, T1 refers to the power law observed at the macro level while T2 
rather characterizes the (unknown or unnecessary) description of micro interactions. 
However, the concept of limit is a mathematical artefact that could be questioned in 
the physical world where systems always appear as finite. To put it in other words, 
one could ask whether this use of asymptotic reasoning makes sense from a 
physical point of view. As previously mentioned, econophysics comes from statistical 
mechanics (and more precisely phase transitions analysis) where physicists are 
used to working with what they call the “thermodynamic limit”129, according to which 
a theoretical description of a phase transition requires that one take a limit towards 
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 It is worth mentioning that phase transitions analysis exists that does not use this concept of 
thermodynamic limit. See Gross (2001) for further details on this approach. 
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infinity of the number of constituents. The usual justification for this limit is 
mathematical convenience, since a collection of 1023 particles is infinite from a 
practical point of view. Indeed, the high number of variables—as many as 
Avogadro’s number, 6 × 1023—generates a gigantic number of equations of motion 
that have to be resolved 130 . This high number of relationships makes a strictly 
equations-based analysis unworkable, even for a computer. “Quite plainly, this is 
impossible … [the] subject is so difficult that [physicists] are forced to adopt a 
radically different approach to that employed in other areas of physics” (Fitzpatrick, 
2012, p. 4). In this context, the implementation of this mathematical artefact does not 
mean that the limit      is physically real, but just that its use makes sense from a 
computational and physical point of view131.  
 
This infinite limit that provides a finite result offers an interesting mathematical 
structure for describing the evolution of a system composed of a high number of 
elements. Furthermore, this asymptotic characterization of emerging properties 
provides a mathematical derivability in line with the heterogeneous version of 
reduction. Since no physical systems are infinite, a key question for scholars is to 
know when an emergent limiting behaviour (i.e. the ability to identify a macro pattern) 
will appear. The next section will investigate the theoretical framework for justifying 
emergence in statistical econophysics. 
 
IV.2. Phenomenological invariance and renormalization group theory 
 
In this section, I clarify the scientific justification (renormalization group theory) used 
by physicists to apply their asymptotic reasoning. This presentation will also give me 
the opportunity to further discuss the relationship between statistical econophysics 
and the idea of emergence. For econophysicists, financial/economic systems can be 
seen as a self-organized entity whose large fluctuations seem to follow a power law, 
which is often presented as an emerging statistical macro outcome. Two aspects of 
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 As Fitzpatrick (2012) noticed, to solve a system with 6 × 10
23
 particles exactly, we would have to 
write down 1,024 coupled equations of motion, with the same number of initial conditions, and then try 
to resolve the system.  
131
 The use of limit can also be physically motivated by the idea that the density (     ) remains 
fixed when both the number of components (n) and the volume (v) tend to infinity (Butterfield, 2011b). 
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this invariance are philosophically fascinating: 1) the “universality” of these power 
laws that seem to describe several self-organized phenomena; and 2) the meaning 
of these macro laws (what econophysicists conclude from these macro patterns).  
 
The first aspect (universality of power laws) probably enhances the modellers’ 
expectations and the prospect of observing the emergence of such invariance in 
different phenomena. The universality of these emerging laws is so widespread in 
the minds of some scientists132 that they associate the emergence of this statistical 
invariance with “the essential dynamic process for everything that evolves and 
becomes complex” (Paczuski and Bak, 1999, p. 2). From this perspective, an 
expected universality of power laws can implicitly influence the detection of patterns 
observed by analysts (Crutchfield, 1994). This is supported by the analysis proposed 
by Newman (2005), which showed that the distinction between a power law and an 
exponential one is not so easy, explaining that scholars’ expectations can play a 
significant role in the identification of macro patterns. Although this aspect does not 
totally explain the reason why power laws are so important for physicists, it partially 
highlights why economists and econophysics describe the same macro emergent 
properties (i.e. the occurrence of extreme values) with different statistical 
interpretations. Both have disciplinary expectations: economists expect to observe a 
Gaussian law that is justified by micro economic foundations, whereas statistical 
econophysicists believe that these properties can be characterized macroscopically 
through a power law (I will come back to this aspect in Chapter4). 
 
Let us here consider the second interesting aspect: what does the existence of 
power laws imply? What do these macro patterns mean for a system? Basically, the 
observation of power laws means that there is a constant ratio between the 
probability of observing an event of magnitude x and observing one of x’. This ratio 
does not depend on the standard or measurement; it is constant, regardless of the 
“scale of observation” (as explained in an earlier chapter). In other words, when a 
system is characterized through a power law, a constant relationship is presupposed 
                                                          
132
 Newman (2005). 
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between components (micro level) and the system (macro level), explaining why 
power laws are also called scaling laws. This constancy is therefore considered as a 
macro property that results from the behaviour of a large number of interacting 
components from lower levels. The renormalization group theory is related to the 
idea of self-criticality (introduced in the previous chapter) in which interactions 
between micro components are associated with “degrees of freedom […] allowing 
them to barely survive under different conditions” (Bak, 1994, p. 493). As Frigg 
(2003) explained, the self-organizing criticality does not provide a clear definition of 
“interaction”. Instead, this word of “interaction” appears to be a filler term133 (Craver, 
2003) in order to characterize the fact that “something is moving” between units 
whose behaviours generate a power law. This notion of interaction is blurred in self-
criticality because this conceptual framework does not require a clear identification 
for what happens at the micro scale. Actually, micro interactions are even judged to 
be too complex to be reduced (and then defined) through a mere analytical form 
(McCauley, 2004). The question now is to clarify how physicists can justify this 
approach, assuming that micro interactions are too complex to be captured. This is 
the contribution of the renormalization group theory presented in the next section. 
 
IV.2.1) Renormalization Group Theory  
 
The theoretical foundation of the asymptotic reasoning used in statistical 
econophysicists refers to what physicists call the “renormalization group theory”. In 
1982, the (high energy or elementary particle trained) physicist Kenneth Wilson 
received the Nobel Prize in Physics for his contribution to the connection between 
macroscopic and microscopic levels. More precisely, Wilson was awarded the prize 
for having developed the renormalization group theory for critical phenomena in 
connection with phase transitions 134 . The systematic study of such a critical 
phenomena emerged in the 1960s when physicists observed the emergence of 
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 A filler term refers to a word with a “minimal lexical content [that] play[s] a strategic role in an 
unfolding utterance (Fox, 2010).  
134
 As Lesne and Laguës (2011, p. 3) point out, the study of critical phenomena was initiated by 
Cagnard de Latour in 1822 and then boosted with the work of Andrews from 1867 onwards. In 1869 
Andrews observed a spectacular opalescence near the critical point of carbon dioxide. However, “the 
1960s saw the emergence of a new general approach to critical phenomena, with the postulation of 
the so-called scaling laws, algebraic relations holding between the critical exponents for a given 
system” (Hughes 1999, p. 111). 
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macro regularities in the evolution of complex systems. Before going further, it is 
worth explaining what physicists mean by “critical phenomena”. This concept is used 
to describe systems whose configuration evolves through a dynamics of critical 
states. A critical state is a particular configuration of the system in which two phases 
(or two states) are about to become one. The most telling example is water. Water is 
commonly known to be liquid in a room condition but when the temperature or the 
pressure of this environment changes, the state of water changes as well (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Temperature-pressure phase diagram for a fluid—source: adapted from Batterman 
(2002). 
 
The transition of one state into another one is due to the gradual change of an 
external variable (temperature or pressure); it is simply called “phase transition” in 
physics. This transformation can be likened to the passage from one equilibrium 
(phase)135 to another. When this passage occurs in a continuous way (for instance, a 
continuous variation of temperature), the system passes through a critical point that 
is defined by a critical pressure and a critical temperature and at which neither of the 
two states is realized (Figure 3). This is a kind of non-state situation with no real 
difference between the two configurations of the phenomenon—both gas and liquid 
                                                          
135
 It is important to mention that the concept of equilibrium can be associated with the notion of phase 
in an “all other things being equal” based analogy. Indeed, in the case of continuous variations of 
pressure/temperature, the phase is progressively moving toward a critical state, implying that it cannot 
be associated with a static equilibrium. 
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coexist in a homogenous phase. Indeed, physicists have observed that at the critical 
point, the liquid water, before becoming a gas, becomes opalescent and is made up 
of liquid water droplets, made up of a myriad of bubbles of steam, themselves made 
up of a myriad of droplets of liquid water, and so on. This is called critical 
opalescence. In other words, at the critical point, the system appears the same at all 
scales of analysis. This property is called “scale invariance”, which means that no 
matter how closely one looks, one sees the same properties. In contrast, when this 
passage occurs in a discontinuous way (i.e. the system “jumps” from one state to 
another), there is no critical point. Phenomena for which this passage is continuous 
are called critical phenomena (in reference to the critical points). Since the 1970s, 
critical phenomena have captured the attention of physicists due to several important 
conceptual advances in the characterization of scale invariance through the theory of 
renormalization136 on the one hand, and to the very interesting properties that define 
them on the other. Among these properties, and probably the most important one for 
this study, the fact that the dynamics of critical states can be characterized by a 
power law deserves special attention because this is a foundational element of 
econophysics. As explained in Chapter 1, power laws refer to a specific statistical 
process that can be characterized by a critical exponent. This parameter refers to the 
“dimensionless number [that] characterizes the (virtually) identical behaviour of 
systems as diverse as fluids and magnets near their critical points” (Batterman, 
2002, p. 37). In a fluid context, this exponent characterizes, independently of the 
chemical constitution of the fluid, the behaviour of its density as a function of 
temperature near a critical point, whereas it describes the behaviour of magnets 
when they undergo a ferromagnetic transition137. From this perspective, the micro 
details about the structure of a particular fluid are irrelevant for describing the 
behaviour of the system. As Bouchaud (2001) and Galam (2004) explained, 
physicists began to observe these power laws in more and more interacting 
components based systems. The so-called modern theory of phase transitions along 
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 Lesne and Laguës (2011) and Lesne (1998) provide an extremely clear and exhaustive 
presentation of renormalization methods. These papers make a very good introduction to intuitions 
and formalisms.  
Stanley (1999) provides a short presentation. See also Wilson (1982 [1993]), Jona-Lasinio (2001), 
Calvo et al. (2010) or Stanley (1971) for further details. 
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 In this section, I will focus only on an illustration related to the fluids without presenting the details 
of the Ising model, which is related to the ferromagnetic transitions. See Hughes (1991) for a 




with renormalization group techniques brought condensed matter physics into its 
golden age, leading several hundred young physicists to enter the field with a great 
deal of excitement. Of course, one could ask for an explanation of such 
phenomenological regularity and why one can observe it on very diverse systems. 
That is the objective of the renormalization group theory.  
 
As previously mentioned, Wilson won the Nobel Prize for his method of 
renormalization, which he used to mathematically demonstrate how phase 
transitions occur in critical phenomena. His approach provides a conceptual 
framework for explaining critical phenomena in terms of phase transitions and 
enabling exact resolutions.  
“The development of [the renormalization group] technique undoubtedly 
represents the single most significant advance in the theory of critical 
phenomena and one of the most significant in theoretical physics generally” 
since the 1970s (Alastair and Wallace, 1989, p. 237).  
 
The renormalization group theory has been applied in order to describe critical 
phenomena that are characterized by the existence of critical states in which the 
phenomenon shows the same properties independently of the scale of analysis. The 
major contribution of the renormalization group theory is to propose a conceptual 
framework offering a better understanding of phase transitions. The simplest way to 
illustrate this framework is to consider a fluid whose difference in densities of the 
vapour and liquid present in the container is given by the term             . The 
behaviour of this fluid depends on a critical temperature Tc below which one can 





Figure 4: Illustration of the behaviour of a fluid at critical state—source: Batterman (2002, p. 40) 
 
Experimental data show that near the critical point, fluids exhibit a coexistence state 
as illustrated by the curve on Figure 4. Physicists observe that this curve can be 
characterized by a particular relationship between the difference of densities and 
temperature since       (where  
     
  
 , which refers to the difference in 
temperature from the critical temperature in dimensionless units). The clarification of 
such behaviour is given by the renormalization group theory, which assumes that 
every system (fluids, magnets, etc.) can be represented by a function (i.e. its 
Hamiltonian). This function describes the kind of interactions between the system’s 
components. When the fluid is in its gaseous or liquid phase, components are 
weakly correlated with each other, implying that these elements interact only with the 
nearby component (and therefore that they are almost uncorrelated with others). 
When the system is near its critical point, interactions between components increase 
such that that all of them contribute to the physics of the system. In other words, the 
length of correlation138 between components grows without bound. This statement is 
very interesting and Chapter 4 will detail how econophysicists analogically apply their 
framework to financial/economic systems.  
This section presented the renormalization group theory; the following one will detail 
how this theory is used as a scientific justification for exporting condensed-matter 
physics to other areas of knowledge. 
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 The length of correlation refers to the average length-scale on which microscopic elements are 
correlated. I will investigate this aspect in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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IV.2.2) Renormalization Group Theory as scientific foundation 
 
To characterize such phenomena, renormalization group theory proposes an 
abstract space (the space of Hamiltonians) in which all transformations preserve the 
form of the initial Hamiltonian that describes the real physical system. Such method 
enables the renormalization of parameters in such a way that the new renormalized 
function characterizes a system that exhibits similar behaviour. This theory can be 
looked on as a set of transformation combining components by keeping a specific 
scale invariance (which is a key property of power law). While the concept of 
invariance refers to the observation of recurrent characteristics independently of the 
context, the notion of scale invariance describes a particular property of a 
system/object or law that does not change when scales of length, energy or other 
variables are multiplied by a common factor. In other words, this idea of scale 
invariance means that one (or some) recurrent features can be found at every level 
of analysis. Concretely, this means that a macroscopic configuration can be 
described without describing all the microscopic details. This aspect is a key point in 
the renormalization theory developed by Wilson, the scholar who extended Widom’s 
(1965a, 1965b) and Kadanoff’s (1966) discovery of “the importance of the notion of 
scale invariance which lies behind all renormalization methods” (Lesne, 1998, p. 25). 
More precisely, his method considers each scale separately and progressively 
connects contiguous scales to one another. This makes it possible to establish a 
connection between the microscopic and the macroscopic levels by decreasing the 
number of interacting parts at the microscopic level until one obtains the 
macroscopic level (ideally a system with only one part). Such characterization of 
scaling invariance allows physicists to capture the essence of a complex 
phenomenon by identifying key features that are not dependent on the scale of 
analysis. 
 
Consider a phenomenon (a magnet, a fluid) whose interactions of micro components 
can be described with the following sequence: , composed of kn 
random independent variables and identically distributed. The renormalization group 









into n blocks of k random variables. The pairing process implies a reduction in the 
number of coupled components (or degrees of freedom) within the correlation length. 
The transformation Sn takes the sequence X into a new sequence of random 
variables—still independent and identically distributed. This transformation becomes 
truly fruitful when it is iterated, when each renormalization leads to a reduction in the 
number of variables, leading to a system that contains fewer variables while keeping 
the characteristics of the original system—thanks to the fact that the system stays 
independent, identically distributed and stable 139 . For instance, considering the 
previous sequence X with kn = 8, n = 4 and k = 2, we can renormalize the sequence 
three times in order to obtain a single random variable that characterizes the initial 
sequence. 
 
Figure 5: Renormalization group method applied to a stochastic process 
Source: Sornette (2006, p. 53). 
 
When applied several times, this pairing method allows modellers to “climb” the 
scales by reducing the number of variables (kn) without losing key features of the 
phenomena, which are captured in the scaling invariance of the process. In other 
words, this technique allows the grouping of random variables into (n) blocks of 
variables in order to reduce the initial complexity of the phenomenon. Roughly 
speaking, the technique can be summarized by the following equation, 
, 
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 For more details, see Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994) and Lesne (1998). 
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where Sn is the sequence at a specific scale of analysis describing the phenomena, 
while Xj refers to the number variables used at that level of analysis. The α is called 
the “critical exponent” and it describes the scale invariance of the phenomena. Here 
is the important link between the power laws and the renormalization group theory: 
the latter can be seen as a scientific foundation of the former. The two frameworks 
are based on exponents that describe a universal property observed without regard 
for the scale. Considering the renormalization group method, the system at one 
scale is said to consist of self-similar copies of itself when viewed at a smaller scale, 
but with different (“rescaled”) parameters describing the components of the system.  
 
The scale invariance assumption was not new in physics 140 , but the properties 
allowing the mathematical demonstration of invariance were only established at the 
end of the 1970s. This demonstration makes it possible to mathematically study 
macroscopic regularities that occur as a result of microscopic random interactions 
without to having study these microscopic interactions141. The focus is therefore on 
the macroscopic level, which is directly observable for physical phenomena. In other 
words, since the 1970s, thanks to scale invariance, from the microscopic 
constituents, physicists can infer some key parameters allowing them to capture and 
describe the dynamics of macroscopic behaviours without studying in detail what 
happens at the microscopic level. For these reasons, the renormalization group 
theory is the foundation of any modern approach of statistical physics142 aimed at 
understanding the collective behaviour of systems with a large number of variables 
that interact with each other.  
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 For instance, it exists in the work of Euclid and Galileo. 
141
 To understand the importance of this approach, it is worth remembering that the macroscopic level 
is supposed to be directly observable—for instance a table—but the microscopic level—the molecules 
that constitute the table —is not directly observable (one needs a tool, such as a microscope).  
142
 It is worth mentioning this foundation is widely accepted by statistical econophysicists who 
implicitly assume that their readers are aware of it. Several econophysicists orally confirmed for me 
this implicit assumption (see Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2016 or Sornette and Cauwels, 2015 for 




IV.2.3) Renormalization Group Theory and econophysics 
 
Renormalization Group Theory is a very useful tool because it offers a set of 
transformation through which a set of variables can be replaced by another set of 
(usually) coarse-grained variables without changing the key physical properties of 
the system. These transformations are computed in a space of Hamiltionians 
allowing modellers to estimate fixed-points taking the form of Hamiltonians 
characterizing the dynamics of a system near a transition phase. Methodologically 
speaking, the identification of these fixed points indicates that microscopic details of 
the system are irrelevant in the study of its close-transition dynamics. This method 
suggests that different systems (e.g. fluids and ferromagnets for instance) might 
have same characteristics in terms of fixed points and dynamics – physicists 
therefore consider that these systems belong to the same universality class justifying 
the use of the same model (e.g. Ising model) to describe the behaviours of these 
systems. The identification of such universality class results from empirical 
observations of systems - when two systems have some empirical properties (e.g. 
following a power law with the same exponent) that means that these systems flow 
to the same fixed points by iterations of the renormalization method. In this context, 
they are said to have the same dynamical properties and therefore belong to the 
same universality class. Renormalization group theory is mainly used in 
econophysics to characterize either the dynamics of financial prices or to describe 
the occurrence of financial crashes. I discuss further these two issues hereafter. 
 
The first issue is the major theme studied in statistical econophysics since it can be 
associated with the methodological origin of the field (Mantegna, 1991). Generally 
speaking, econophysicists acknowledge that financial prices evolve by following a 
power law whose exponent is estimated at 3 (Mantegna, 1991; Mantegna and 
Stanley, 1995; 1999; McCauley, 2004; Stanley et al. 2008). The universality of this 
observation is justified by the repeated occurrence in diverse contexts. Precisely, this 
exponent is has been observed for the majority of stocks in several financial 
markets: USA, UK, France, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Spain, South Korea, 
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Germany and Netherlands (see Gabaix et al. 2003 for further details on the 
estimations). Although some authors (Farmer and Lillo, 2004 or Durlauf, 2005) 
explained that this universality could result from a methodological bias, they do not 
negate that financial markets appear to be complex with a particular universality 
(Rickles, 2008) 143 . From the empirical studies, one can observe the repeated 
occurrence of a power law exhibiting the same exponent in different countries. This 
situation might suggest a kind of universality for these markets. Consequently, these 
markets can therefore be studied as systems that are perpetually in a near-critical 
state144, as Rickles (2008, p15) explained it, 
“Econophysicists, by contrast [with economists], use the statistical properties 
as their starting point; the basis from which to construct realistic models: the 
universality of the statistical properties – i.e. the fact that they reappear across 
many and diverse financial markets – suggests (to physicists at least) a 
common origin at work behind the scenes and points towards the theory of 
critical phenomena (with its notion of universality)”.  
 
Interestingly, although econophysicists emphasize the universality of the power law 
in financial dynamics, they do not necessarily detail how the renormalization group 
theory could actually estimate the exponent that they find. Very few works (Canessa, 
2000; Wu 2012) detail the link between power laws and the renormalization group 
theory in econophysics. Often, scholars involved in econophysics associate this 
universality of exponent to the observation of a universal class consistent with the 
renormalization group theory. In this context, the real question is to know if the 
repeated observation of power law with the same exponent (i.e. universality) is a 
sufficient condition for mobilising the renormalization group theory. This aspect 
would deserve further research145.  
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 As Rickles (2008, p.26) explained these critiques actually suggest that the complexity of financial 
markets should be treated with more care and attention but they do not refute the idea that there is 
something in common between all these financial markets. 
144
 This statement is actually supported by the recent computerization of financial sphere which deeply 
changed the dynamics of financial prices by making it constantly moving. 
145




The second theme to which econophysicists apply the renormalization group theory 
is the dynamics of financial crashes (Sornette, 2003; 2006) that generated more 
debates in econophysics (Bouchaud, 2001, 2002; McCaulley, 2004). Precisely, even 
if the renormalization group theory is mentioned as a methodological justification in 
the studies of financial crashes, it is worth mentioning that, although dynamics of 
financial crashes appear to follow a power-law, the exponent of this law does not 
converge to the same value. This situation therefore complicates the identification of 
a universality class of phenomena. Graf et al. (2003) showed that different financial 
crashes exhibited different critical exponents confirming that all financial crashes do 
not belong to the same universal class of phenomena. Related to this theme, the real 
question is therefore to know if the occurrence of power laws with different 
exponents (no universality) is a sufficient condition to mobilise the renormalization 
group theory as a scientific foundation. Several authors (Jhun et al., 2017; 
Butterfield, 2011 or Butterfield and Bouatta, 2015) explicitly rejected this possibility. 
The use of the renormalization group theory as a scientific foundation for statistical 
econophysics is debatable depending on the kind of dynamics under consideration. 
Precisely, the use of this framework to characterize the dynamics of financial prices 
seems to be acceptable in accordance with a broader definition of a universality 
class propose by Batterman and Rice (2014) who promoted the use of such notion 
as a justification for minimal model to describe systems outside of physics exhibiting 
same critical exponents. However, regarding the characterization of financial 
crashes, it appears that there is no real methodological justification for the use of the 
renormalization group theory since these phenomena do not exhibit universal 
behaviour. 
 
IV.3. Phenomenological invariance as an emergent property 
 
This section aims at clarifying how statistical econophysics deals with emergence. 
For statistical econophysicists, economic systems are composed of multiple 
components interacting in such a way as to generate the macro properties for 
systems that take the forms of power laws. The emergence of macro patterns 
requires a large sample of data. In this context, the macro laws are assumed to be 
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encapsulated, “out there”, in the existing observations, but their description requires 
a specific recurrence through the observations of a high number of events. This 
methodology, which was implemented by statistical econophysicists, is implicitly 
associated with the frequentist tradition in statistics. More precisely, key models used 
in econophysics usually consider that the probability of an event is given by the long-
term relative frequency (allowing the use of asymptotic reasoning like in statistical 
physics 146 ). The macro invariance is theoretically founded on an asymptotic 
reasoning in which the system is assumed to contain an infinite number of data in 
order to make prediction/infer information on the behaviour of real finite systems. 
This methodological perspective results directly from the conceptual framework used 
in statistical physics where:  
“The assumption that the system is infinite is necessary for the symmetry 
breaking [i.e. the fact that the whole is more than the sum of its parts] 
associated with phase transitions to occur. In other words, we have a 
description of a physically unrealizable situation (an infinite system) that is 
required to explain a physically realizable phenomenon (the occurrence of 
phase transitions in finite systems) […] A good deal of asymptotic behaviour 
that is crucial for describing physical phenomena relies on mathematical 
abstractions ” (Morrison, 2015, p. 28–29). 
 
As Morrison (2015) explained, the complexity of physical systems is therefore 
associated with the observation of emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the 
sum of the system’s components. While Morrison uses the word “abstraction”, I 
would say instead that phenomenological invariance is conceptually founded on a 
minimalist idealization (I will detail this claim in the following chapter). By idealization, 
I mean here a voluntary distortion of reality, i.e. a process that describes situations in 
a way that cannot be realized in the physical world (here infinite population). This 
aspect is very important because it can provide theoretical representations for the 
description of complex phenomena. However, idealization-based reasoning calls for 
a simple question: how can mathematical properties [asymptotic behaviour] provide 
physical/economic information for a real system? This is a big question that is largely 
debated in the philosophy of science since it generates debates in quantum physics 
                                                          
146
 It is worth mentioning the distinction between the Bayesian tradition and the frequentist one: The 
Bayesian approach is used when it is possible to update the existing knowledge with a new 
information arriving from an external environment (implying a revision of beliefs in accordance with the 
new data) whereas the frequentist method is rather used to study events with large samples of data for 
which unbiased (non-subjective) estimators implemented.  
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(Zim-Justin, 1998), in thermodynamics (Huang et al., 2005) and in renormalization 
group theory (Batterman, 2002; Butterfield, 2014)147. A key question now is to know 
how this asymptotic reasoning can characterize emerging properties, such as power 
laws.  
 
By considering the statistical macro patterns as a novel quality of physical or social 
systems, econophysicists implicitly consider these complex systems as entirely 
constituted by composite structures that are not mere aggregates (nor definitional 
extension) of the simple ones. The emerging statistical macro laws suggest the 
existence of a gap between micro and macro scales. Moreover, many physicists 
acknowledge their inability to predict these macro laws (McCauley et al., 2016). 
From this perspective, one can legitimately wonder whether econophysicists who 
deal with statistical invariance are not implicitly promoting a strong emergentism 
within which emergent properties cannot be reducible/deducible or predictive 
(Morgan, 1923; Kim, 2006). At first sight, statistical econophysics does not provide a 
clear formulation for the occurrence of emergent properties for two reasons: macro 
laws look to emerge suddenly after a high number of observations, while physicists 
confess they cannot predict the exact form of these laws. From this perspective, the 
emergence of these macro laws would be intractable/non-deducible and therefore 
incompatible with the classical Nagelian reduction evoked in the first part of this 
chapter. The rest of this section will discuss these points by analyzing the 
relationship between statistical econophysics and the notion of emergence. 
 
The emergence of macro patterns through a high number of observations results 
from an asymptotic reasoning founded on the renormalization group theory. This 
conceptual framework has given scholars a comprehensive way of characterizing the 
emergence of power laws, implying that this phenomenon is not a mysterious figure 
that exists in econophysicists’ minds. Despite the existence of this theory to describe 
how macro properties can emerge from a huge number of interacting micro 
elements, the association of emergence with asymptotic reasoning generates many 
                                                          
147
 See Morrison (2015, Chapter 2) for a good literature review on the topic. 
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debates in philosophy of science. Roughly speaking, the literature can be divided 
into two perspectives: some philosophers (Batterman, 1997, 2002; Kim, 1999) 
consider that asymptotic reasoning cannot related to emergence phenomena while 
others (Butterfield, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Morrison, 2015) instead claim that an 
asymptotic reasoning offers a framework from which emerging properties can 
rigorously be deducible (with some limitations). These debates are interesting for 
econophysics because they refer to the way physicists justify their use of macro 
patterns to describe economic/financial systems. From a physicist’s point of view, the 
observation of power laws in financial/economic phenomena seems to be justified, 
since their emergence can be characterized through the renormalization group 
theory. However, from an economist’s viewpoint, the extension of this theory in 
economics/finance does not make sense simply because they cannot give an 
economic justification for this conceptual framework. To put it in other words, 
although from a physicist’s point of view, this asymptotic reasoning offers a particular 
deducibility of emergent power laws through a heterogeneous emergence, this 
approach is associated with a strong sense of emergentism by economists. This 
interesting point directly echoes a perspective emphasized by Butterfield (2011a, p. 
17) when he wrote that the “claims of deducibility are of course sensitive to exactly 
which theories are being considered”. I will come back in Chapter 4 to these 
meaningful differences between economists and econophysicists. 
 
The second aspect I would like to deal with in this section is regarding the 
predictability of macro laws. The ability to identify a power law in a complex system 
does not mean that one can predict the behaviour of this system. Indeed, the 
predictability must be understood in a specific way: these macro laws are not 
predictive (i.e. deduced or anticipated) because they are observed from past 
empirical data. The only thing econophysicists are able to predict is that a statistical 
invariance will appear in a specific form in complex systems, but they are unable to 
deduce the evolution of these complex systems. The emerging invariance is not 
deducible from initially defined rules, but rather it can be deduced from an asymptotic 
reasoning based on an accumulation of empirical data observed in the past. 
Although the exact form of the macro laws is still unpredictable, the nature of these 
macro laws (power laws) can be deduced from an asymptotic reasoning. Such 
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deduction is interesting since power laws have important statistical (scaling) 
properties that give room for further analysis (or actions/decisions in the case of 
financial data). 
 
Statistical macro pattern analysis is the first computational method used by 
econophysicists in their extension of physics to finance and economics. In so doing, 
they implemented a classical asymptotic reasoning founded on the scientificity of the 
renormalization group theory to characterize emergent properties. The macroscopic 
methodology initially implemented by econophysicists can visually be represented by 







Figure 6: Lakatosian visualization of the core elements and the protective belt of the original 
(statistical) econophysics. 
 
In this conceptualization, dealing with emergent properties in economic/financial 
systems by using an asymptotic reasoning appears as the core of statistical 
econophysics. This way of implementing a macroscopic method defines what can be 
improved or changed (without modifying the core elements). This Lakatosian 
characterization is interesting because it offers a way of introducing the first debates 
about the micro foundations of econophysics that emerged in the 2000s (Chakraborti 
et al., 2016). In this context, econophysics literature has progressively provided 
another sub-category of works that deal with micro realization of these emerging 
macro results. I discuss this approach in the following section. 







V. Agent-based econophysics 
 
Statistical econophysics is based on a macro approach of complex systems. In the 
early 2000s, one can observe an increasing demand for a microscopic approach in 
econophysics whose original methodology was considered by some physicists (Cont 
et al., 1997) as too phenomenology-orientated. Although this methodological 
perspective is interesting, it generated many debates and critiques that can roughly 
be summarized by the words of Durlauf (who was an economist involved in the 
Santa Fe Institute): 
“The empirical literature on scaling laws [i.e. power laws] is difficult to 
interpret because of the absence of a compelling set of theoretical models to 
explain how the laws might come about. This is very much the case if one 
examines the efforts by physicists to explain findings of scaling [power] laws 
in socioeconomic contexts” (Durlauf, 2005, F235).  
 
The economic mainstream is founded on a microscopic approach of economic 
phenomena, and the phenomenological description of macro patterns proposed by 
statistical econophysics does not help economists understand how these macro laws 
emerge. Consequently, “The econophysics approach to economic theory has 
generally failed to produce models that are economically insightful” (Durlauf, 2005, 
F236). At the end of the 1990s, some econophysicists tried to address such critiques 
by introducing the agent-based modelling in econophysics. The main idea of this 
approach was to provide microscopic foundations to econophysics. In this 
challenging context, some key econophysicists (Farmer, 1999; Sornette, 2003; Cont 
et al., 1997) promoted the creation of a methodological bridge between agent-based 
modelling and statistical perspectives originally used in econophysics 148 . The 
debates about the micro approach generated a specific literature that can be divided 
into two traditions: bottom-up agent-based econophysics and top-down agent-based 
econophysics. The next two sections aim at presenting these two approaches. 
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 Although this conceptual combination between a macro-based and inductive approach 
(observation of statistical patterns) and a micro based and deductive method (agent-based modelling) 
could be seen as contradictory, the previous chapter showed that these two frameworks have a direct 
link with the historical roots of econophysics, since they were mainly developed by scholars of the 




V.1. Bottom-up agent-based econophysics  
 
This first category of papers concerns research that imports a bottom-up agent-
based modelling in econophysics. Roughly speaking, this corpus works on the 
definition/calibration of interactions that rule the micro elements’ behaviour in order 
to generate a macro spontaneous order. In such an approach, micro interactions are 
considered as inputs and the emerging macro result is seen as outputs of the 
process. According to Turing (1936), there is no systematic analytical method to 
select the best algorithm. That means that initial conditions defining the process play 
a key role. In this context, the initial assumptions made by the modellers for the 
implementation of their algorithmic have a crucial role.  
Authors involved in modelling economic micro interactions will try to calibrate the 
basic behaviour that rules agents’ interactions, which leads the system to a complex 
situation (i.e. within macro properties emerged). The way of defining the rules of 
behaviour determines the methodological perspective enhanced by modellers. 
Inspired by Moss (2009), I provide hereafter a specific methodological classification 
for works using agent-based modelling in economics and econophysics. 
 
 the perfect agent-based modelling, 
 the adaptive agent-based modelling, 
 
The perfect agent-based modelling is the classical methodological individualism 
used in economics. This approach results from the mechanizing way of modelling 
rationality that was promoted by the Cowles Commission and the RAND 
Corporation: interactions’ rules are defined in a “utility function” that is associated 
with a rational optimization of contextually defined theoretical constraints. The 
system’s macroscopic behaviour is therefore deduced from the addition of individual 
characteristics. In this context the hypothesis of perfect rationality combined with an 
assumed perfect additivity of agents defines the aggregative rule at the macro level 




In opposition to this perfect agent-based modelling within the principle of additivity 
allowing the modeller to deduce the macro level, the adaptive agent-based modelling 
instead required a large number of computerized iterations to infer the macro 
result149. In accordance with the idea that human beings have limited computing 
abilities, this methodology integrates the heterogeneity and the autonomy of agents 
considering that “individuals may differ in myriad ways—genetically, culturally, by 
social networks, by preferences, etc.” (Epstein, 2006, p. 6). This heterogeneity, 
which found its roots in the bounded rationality framework, implies some differences 
with the neoclassical framework. Indeed, because adaptive agent-based modelling 
does not require the condition of perfect rationality, this approach enlarges the 
means of modelling economic incentives since the algorithmically defined decision 
functions can integrate some concepts that come from behavioural economics, such 
as loss aversion, overestimation or conservatism, for example. Regarding the 
agents’ autonomy, the adaptive/learning abilities defined for agents ensure them a 
particular degree of freedom, since they can evolve depending on their plausible 
interaction rules inspired from economic world (Gallegati et al., 2006). These simple 
interaction rules are then expected to generate an emergent order far beyond 
individual capacities or wishes. In a sense, the only difference between the perfectly 
rational and the adaptive agent-based modelling refers to the method of inferring the 
macro level of the system: while the first is explicitly based on deduction, the latter 
instead requires an algorithmic simulation. When implemented in economics, these 
approaches are based on an incentives-based modelling in which (economic or/and 
behavioural) motivations must be initially pre-defined.  
 
The economic mainstream promotes a modelling based on perfect rationality, while 
adaptive agent-based modelling has instead been promoted by alternative 
approaches (behavioural finance). The perfect agent-based modelling can be 
presented as a complementary approach to the adaptive agent-based framework 
(Lebaron, 2006). Some works combine perfectly rational agents with irrational 
agents, showing that the two frameworks can support and complement each other. 
As Lévy (2009, p. 20) explained: 
“The Agent Based approach should not and can not replace the standard 
analytical economic approach. Rather, these two methodologies support and 
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 See Epstein (2006) or Cristelli (2014) for a review of this huge body of literature. 
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complement each other: When an analytical model is developed, it should 
become standard practice to examine the robustness of the model’s results 
with agent based simulations. Similarly, when results emerge from agent 
based simulations, one should try to understand their origin and their 
generality, not only by running many simulations, but also by trying to capture 
the essence of the results in a simplified analytical setting”.  
 
Although agent-based econophysics looks methodologically similar to what 
economists do, there is a major difference: in opposition to the latter, the first use 
non-economic assumptions to calibrate the micro interactions. 
 
As noted earlier, agent-based modelling requires a particular calibration/definition of 
micro interactions that are based on specific assumptions regarding the behaviour of 
microscopic elements that can generate an emerging order. Aggregate phenomena 
that exhibit unanticipated properties are not limited to social systems. In physical 
systems, such phenomena can also appear to show macro properties that are 
distinct from the properties associated with the micro components. In this context, 
agents are considered as interacting particles whose adaptive behaviours create 
different structures (such as molecules, crystals, etc.). The progressive emergence 
of this order is algorithmically described through computerized simulations. In 
accordance with what I previously called the core elements, agent-based 
econophysicists work on the emergent properties of economic phenomena. 
 
An increasing literature exists that is based on this specific methodology: Pickhardt 
and Seibold (2011), for example, explained that income tax evasion dynamics can 
be modelled through an “agent-based econophysics model” based on the Ising 
model of ferromagnetism, while Donangelo and Sneppen (2000) and Shinohara and 
Gunji (2001) approached the emergence of money through studying the dynamics of 
exchange in a system composed of many interacting and learning agents. In the 
same vein, some authors used an agent-based approach to characterize the 
emergence of non-trivial behaviour, such as herding behaviour: Eguiluz and 
Zimmerman (2000), Stauffer et al. (1999) and Wang et al. (2005), for example, 
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associate the information dissemination process with a percolation model among 
traders whose interactions randomly connected their demand through clusters.  
 
Some econophysicists applied agent-based approach for studying the dynamics of 
order-driven markets. Bak et al. (1997) used a reaction diffusion model in order to 
describe the order dynamics. In this model, orders were particles moving along a 
price line, and whose random collisions were seen as transactions (see also Farmer 
et al. (2005), for the same kind of model). Maslov (2000) tried to make the model 
developed by Bak et al. (1997) more realistic by adding specific features related to 
the microstructure (organization) of the market. Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) 
improved the Maslov (2000) model by considering two particles (ask and bid), which 
can be characterized through three potential states: deposition (limit order), 
annihilation (market order) and evaporation (cancellation). Slanina (2001) also 
proposed a new version of the Maslov model in which individual position (order) is 
not taken into account, but is rather substituted by a mean-field approximation.  
 
These works can be methodologically characterized by a non-economic agent-based 
approach since non-economic assumptions are initially made/used for the calibration 
of micro interactions. Actually, econophysicists define algorithmic rules that generate 
micro interactions in terms of “physically plausible” events, implying that agents and 
their interactions are described with notions such as potential states (deposition, 
cancellation, annihilation, etc.), thermal features (heat release rate, ignition point, 
etc.) or magnetic dimensions (magnetic permeability, excitation). In other words, the 
input in such modelling is a pre-defined set of micro interactions that are physically 
plausible/meaningful. By applying these existing models to describe economic 
phenomena, econophysicists implicitly assume a kind of physicality since they 
consider them a social reality that can be explained in physical terms. Indeed, by 
using physical concepts to deal with economic/social reality, econophysicists don’t 
deny that the world contains non-physical elements, such as items of a biological, 
psychological, moral or social nature, but, as Stoljar (2010) explained, “they insist 
nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene 
the physical” (Stoljar, 2010, p. 1). In a sense, econophysicists use this “physically 
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plausible dimension of micro interactions” as an analogy for economic relations (I will 
study in detail the nature and the role of analogy in econophysics in the following 
chapter). This way of modelling is far from the economic-incentives-based models 
developed by economists. Consequently, there is no link with usual economic 
knowledge, which explains why this kind of agent-based econophysics is largely 
ignored by economists (who instead implement an economic incentives-led agent-
based modelling). This not economic calibration; in econophysics, modelling can be 










Figure 7: Modelling process for this application of agent-based modelling. 
 
By defining a particular derivability of reduced theory (macro state) from reducing 
one aspect (micro level), the agent-based approach subscribes to the principle of the 
Nagelian definition of reduction since it transforms the first into a “definitional 
extension” of the latter. The modelling process starts with the characterization of the 
micro level whose dynamic is pre-defined in accordance with a particular conceptual 
framework (i.e. assumptions are physically plausible for agent-based econophysics). 
Afterward, computerized simulations generate an increasing number of interactions 
between micro components. When the number of simulations is large enough for the 
micro rules to become macroscopic, an invariant pattern, presented as a 
spontaneous order, emerged from the computerized iterations. This emergent macro 
order is the output of this bottom-up agent-based econophysics. 
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Except for the definition of the initial conditions and the physicalism mentioned 
above, these studies applied the same modelling processing as the one used by 
economists when they developed agent-based modelling. Roughly speaking, this 
bottom-up methodology can be associated with what Arthur et al. (1997a) called the 
“small tent complexity” that the authors identified through six joint characteristics: 1) 
dispersed interactions among locally interacting heterogeneous agents, 2) no global 
controller who could exploit opportunities resulting from these dispersed interactions, 
3) cross-cutting hierarchical organization with tangled interactions, 4) continual 
learning and adaptation of agents, 5) novelty and mutations of the system and 6) 
out-of-equilibrium dynamics. 
 
The agent-based modelling used in econophysics implicitly assumes an equivalence 
between the macro level physical and economic systems. This perspective is often 
justified by a naïve and approximate association of physically plausible interactions 
with economic interactions. For example, some physicists describe the formation of 
coalitions or the fragmentation of opinions on the market by using the physical 
phenomenon of spin glasses150 (Galam, 2008; Pickhardt and Seibold, 2011), while 
others instead associated herding behaviours with a slow-diffusing process 
(percolation phenomenon) likely to generate sudden “breakthrough” (Eguiluz, 2000; 
Wang et al., 2005). It is worth mentioning that this implicit physicalism allows 
physicists to not study the potential reciprocal effect between the micro and the 
macro levels that Arthur (2014) called the “meso level”. Specifically, because they 
deal with human behaviours, economists tried to integrate a “reciprocal causation 
[that] operates between different levels [… and that] may even give rise to new 
patterns and entities at both higher and lower levels” (Arthur, 2014, p. 94). 
                                                          
150  “A spin glass is a disordered magnet with frustrated interactions, augmented by stochastic 
positions of the spins, where conflicting interactions, namely both ferromagnetic and also 
antiferromagnetic bonds, are randomly distributed” (Zhang, 2013, p. 10).  This magnetic phenomenon 
exhibits both quenched disorder and frustration, and has often been cited as an example of “complex 





Authors involved in a bottom-up agent-based modelling assume that the macro level 
is considered derivable from the micro level whose interactions have beforehand 
been defined in line with specific assumptions. In this context, the emergence of 
properties at the macro scale is derivable from rules defining micro interactions. I 
discuss this aspect further in the following section. 
 
V.1.a) Agent-based econophysics and the emergence as a spontaneous order 
 
In the literature devoted to agent-based modelling, emergence often refers to a 
“stable macroscopic order arising from local interaction of agents” (Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996). Lévy (2009) explained that the agent-based modelling approach is a 
new way of investigating the complex and messy world through a micro based 
framework in which a spontaneous order emerged from the heterogeneity of agents. 
In accordance with this logical analysis of emergence, Epstein (2006, p. 33) showed 
how agent-based modelling and classical emergentism (i.e. emergent properties that 
are not derivable from the lower levels) are incompatible. Here is the summary of this 
logical argument: Let C stand for what is emergent in a classical sense, D for what is 
deduced, E for what is explained and G for what is generated or simulated (through 
an agent-based model), by using classical texts from literature dedicated to classical 
emergentism and agent-based approach, we can have the following predicates: 
 
(1) C → ¬D: classically emergent implies that it is not deducible (Broad, 
1925) 
(2) C → ¬E: classically emergent implies that it is not explainable in lower 
level (Alexander, 1920) 
(3) ¬G → ¬E: not generated implied not explained (Epstein, 2006) 




Then, G → ¬C: generated (by agent-based models) implies that it is not classically 
emergent. In other words, the reducing theory Tb determines what is generated (G 
which refers to micro interactions) and allows the macro state to be deduced (i.e. a 
reduced theory Tt). Given this result, Epstein (2006, p. 33) concluded that “Agent-
based modelling and classical emergentism are incompatible” (emphasis in original). 
The author added that classical emergentism wanted “to preserve the mystery gap 
between micro and macro” (Epstein, 2006, p. 33), while the agent-based approach 
seeks to provide an explanation for this gap by giving micro foundations to the 
emergence process by providing some rules on the micro scale, which will ensure 
the derivability of the macro level. However, although these macro properties can be 
algorithmically derivable from micro components, they are not deducible from the 
lower levels. This point is epistemologically interesting because it implies a tractable 
but not deducible notion of emergence. Butterfield (2011, p. 21) also mentioned this 
point when he wrote, “I should register the importance for heuristics of computer 
simulations […] In particular, computer simulations of Tb (or models of Tb) with finite 
N often show, regardless of deduction, the approximate behaviour characteristic of 
Tt—and often the approximation is very accurate. Besides, the deduction/simulation 
distinction is not so sharp”. In other terms, the association between reductionism and 
agent-based modelling depends on the meaning we give to the derivability process 
that cannot, strictly speaking, be perceived as a deduction. Interestingly, this 
undefined area explains why econophysicists and economists perceive this 
derivability of macro levels in a different way. 
 
In this context, the bottom-up dimension refers to the fact that macro regularities are 
not strictly deducible from individual features, but that they are rather inferred from 
interaction between individuals. However, despite the situation, agent-based 
modelling allows an “a posteriori computerized traceability” of these macro 
regularities, inviting some authors (Gallegati et al., 2009, p. 7) to present that 
approach as a “bridge between methodological individualism and methodological 
holism”. If we give a broader meaning to the notion of derivability, in line with Dudau 
(2006), who wrote that reductionism can be seen as the thesis in which predicates in 
the higher-level theories are definable in terms of lower-level predicates, then the 
bottom-up agent-based modelling can be regarded as an algorithmically reducible 
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(but not deducible) framework. In the light of this analysis, it seems that the bottom-
up agent-based approach mainly deals with what Bedau (1997) called a “weak 
emergence” (i.e. those which need to be simulated to be revealed but, at the same 
time, which can be reducible to their microscopic entities).  
 
Because the methodological analysis proposed in this section is valid for all potential 
applications of agent-based modelling, Rosser (2008, p. 19) and Lux (2009, p. 35) 
wrote that this “way of modelling [in economics] can be seen to be very compatible 
with what is implied by many econophysics models”. Those words paved the way to 
a potential collaboration between economists and econophysicists, since they use 
the same methodology when they develop a bottom-up agent modelling. However, 
there is an econophysics literature that uses agent-based modelling in the same way 
that economists do (Gallegati et al., 2009), I explained previously that collaborations 
between the two communities are not common, simply because economists and 
physicists do not have the same conceptual framework: economists consider that 
interactions between agents can generate the emergence of intermediary (meso) 
orders (associated with economic institutions as market or money for instance) that 
could reciprocally influence the micro interactions. This way of modelling for 
economists appears to work contrary to the second law of thermodynamics, since 
adaptive systems evolve by transforming initially simple rules/structures into 
increasingly complex ones (Davis, 2013): order emerges from simple micro 
interactions whose basic features can be algorithmically described. From that 
perspective, macro order is not taken for granted and instead, it results from 
algorithmic micro configurations that allow economists to define a computable order. 
From this computerized simulation of this reciprocal influence, a spontaneous macro 
order emerges. In contrast, agent-based econophysicists do not deal with this meso 
order and they focus instead on the emerging pattern that results from the physically 






V.1.b) The macro derivability as an asymptotic property 
 
All econophysicists consider that complex economic systems consisting of a high 
number of interacting elements can be studied through their emergent properties, 
which are often associated with recurrent macro patterns. In the first part of this 
chapter, I identified this claim as a core element of econophysics. I also wrote that 
econophysicists share another common point: the use of asymptotic reasoning. 
Depending on the methodological tradition econophysicists are involved in, the use 
of such reasoning can vary. While statistical econophysicists implement an 
asymptotic technique by referring to the large number of micro elements, agent-
based econophysicists instead use this reasoning in relation to a high number of 
computerized simulations151. The asymptotic nature of the analysis is not necessary 
in the observation of the phenomenon, but instead in the way data is generated and 
associated with this phenomenon. From this perspective, computers are used as the 
apparatus and computerized simulations can be regarded as a numerical experiment 
(Morrison, 2015). This is an important difference from statistical econophysics, where 
data are directly collected from the observation of the phenomena. In contrast, 
agent-based modelling aims at generating computerized data that reproduces 
existing observations related to phenomena. There is another element of distinction 
between statistical econophysics and agent-based modelling: while the first 
considers that microscopic interrelations are too complex to be described, the latter 
founds its methodology on the assumption that these micro interactions can be 
characterized through a particular calibration. When rules governing the micro level 
are defined, a high number (ideally an infinity) of computerized simulations is 
required to capture the macroscopic domain of the system, as explained. Let us 
illustrate the way agent-based econophysics implements the asymptotic reasoning. 
For this purpose, let us consider that X0 refers to the macro behaviour of a system 
composed of a high number of components with a specific configuration of micro 
states at time t0. Agent-based modelling will then characterize the dynamics 
associated with the evolution of that system X0 → Xn where Xn is the macro 
behaviour of the system associated with the configuration of micro states after n 
computerized simulations. The dynamics characterizing the evolution of the system 
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are defined by an algorithmic implementation of rules that describe micro interactions 
between components. Those computerized iterations will evolve the system’s micro 
states over time in accordance with the following schema:  






After n iterations, the micro interactions begin to generate a macroscopic result that 
takes the form of a persistent pattern [P]. That macro result is then looked on as an 
emergent order whose macroscopic domain, P, can be modelled as a macroscopic 
domain [χ] regrouping all potential microstates after n iterations:  
P = [χ] = {∑ Xi; with i between n → ∞}. 
Between X0 → Xn, the switch between Xi-1 and Xi (∀ i < n) is not an invariant function 
(Γ) of the previous switches that justifies a new iteration (i+1). When a persistent 
relationship Γ begins to appear Xn, then the system is said in to be in the 
macroscopic domain. Conceptually, that limit is reached after n iterations when the 
pattern (Γ), which rules the dynamics, appears as persistent for a great number of 
iterations for Xn+2 →   . Actually, the macro pattern (Γ) appears to be “a set of states 
invariant under the dynamics” 152  since all additional iterations will reinforce its 
analytical form. To put it another way, in the course of iterations, the system tends to 
evolve towards a macro result whose the derivability from a micro level can be 
reduced to an asymptotic property. The emerging macro pattern is not initially 
contained in the description of the micro level, but it can be expressed (not 
deductively) in terms of the micro scale description (reducing theory) since we know 
the process required in order to generate the first from the latter. The reduced theory 
                                                          














(macro pattern) can therefore be looked on as an asymptotic definitional extension of 
the reducing theory (description of the micro interactions). Such a way of modelling 
can also be looked on as a heterogeneous version of reduction. Although there are 
several dissimilarities to statistical econophysics, it is worth stressing that these two 
approaches interestingly preserve the same core element, as explained in the 
following section. 
 
V.1.c) Agent-based econophysics as a first methodological extension of 
econophysics  
 
Although bottom-up agent-based modelling keeps the core elements 153  used by 
statistical econophysicists, it gives another meaning to these elements. However, in 
contrast with the latter, the first start their studies from the definition/calibration of 
microscopic elements’ interactions. In so doing, agent-based econophysicists have 
extended the range of econophysics by adjusting the initial condition in an 
acceptable way (keeping the core elements and the physically plausible aspect of 
their analysis). The contribution of agent-based econophysics is to extend the way of 
dealing with this hard core by implementing a new computerized method that still 
makes sense for physicists. It is important to emphasize that this agent-based 
econophysics has never been presented as an alternative to the original (statistical) 
econophysics, but rather as a complementary approach. In other words, bottom-up 
agent-based econophysics can be perceived as a methodological extension of the 
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Figure 8: Lakatosian visualization of the core elements and the protective belt of the bottom-up agent-
based econophysics. 
This perception has been progressively promoted, leading to the advent of a third 
methodological approach attempting to bridge these two existing perspectives. In the 
following section, I will discuss this last extension of the econophysics protective belt 
by dealing with what I call top-down agent-based econophysics. 
 
V.2. Top-down agent-based econophysics: An in-between approach 
 
The second category of works developing an agent-based econophysics refers to 
research whose objective is to reproduce existing statistical data. In opposition to the 
previous category, authors dealing with this area of knowledge usually refer to 
existing empirical statistical patterns as inputs. Once a specific macro pattern is 
identified in economic/financial phenomena, the objective is to derive information for 
the calibration of micro interactions (these will be the outputs in this process). These 
simulated interactions are supposed to generate the macro patterns that were 
initially targeted/identified. The real target in this research is not directly the 
description of the system, but rather the kind of calibration needed to reproduce the 
initial emergent properties (patterns observed in data). In contrast with agent-based 
economics, individual incentives are not the constraint for the calibration of micro 
interactions. The real micro constraint for these works is actually defined by the 
information that can be derived from the initial macro laws in order to reproduce it 
with an agent-based modelling. While the initial condition of this approach (existence 
of a macro pattern) can be regarded as an extension of the initial condition used by 
statistical econophysicists (high number of observations), the machinery used by 
scholars involved in this approach is very similar to the one implemented (algorithmic 
rule) in bottom-up agent-based modelling. In line with the latter, the asymptotic 
reasoning is also used as a conceptual bridge between the observed macro patterns 
and the high number of iterations of micro interactions. Regarding the treatment of 
emergent properties, top-down agent-based econophysics do not offer something 
new in comparison with the two other traditions. In a sense, the real target in this 
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research is not directly the emergent properties, but rather the kind of calibrations we 
need in order to generate the initial observed macro input. 
 
The literature related to this tradition is quite recent. Although there is a corpus of 
some papers that were published in the 2000s, the real development of this literature 
began around 2010. This consists of a set of papers that use the analogy “agent-
particle” to develop what econophysicists call the kinetic wealth exchange models 
whose objective is “to predict the time evolution of the distribution of wealth, by 
studying the corresponding flow process among individuals” (Chakraborti et al., 
2011, p. 1,026). All these studies use a macro pattern as initial constraint for the 
calibration of micro interactions which are expected to generate the pre-defined 
macro pattern identified in the literature related to the statistical econophysics 
evoked above. By using a power law as initial macro pattern, Heinsalu et al. (2009) 
or Patriarca et al. (2010) provided models that describe the transfer of wealth for 
homogeneous agents (i.e. with the same statistical properties) while Chakraborti and 
Patriarca (2009) developed a more complex kinetic wealth exchange model in which 
agents are diversified (in terms of initial wealth and savings parameter for example). 
Some studies started their analysis with other kind of macro patterns: Richmond et 
al. (2013) used Lotka-Volterra equations to describe the wealth distribution, while 
others expressed wealth exchange by using matrix theory (Gupta, 2006), Markov 
chains (Scalas et al., 2007) or the Boltzman equation approach (Slanina, 2014; 
During et al., 2008).  
 
In contrast with the bottom-up agent-based approach, initial assumptions (inputs) are 
formulated by integrating information from a particular macro pattern observed in the 
past evolution of the complex system. The following diagram summarizes the 






















Figure 9: Modelling process of econophysics agent-based modelling.  
 
As previously evoked, the emergence of econophysics is directly associated with the 
identification of statistical regularities in complex economic/financial dynamics. When 
the statistical approach is combined with agent-based modelling, the analysis begins 
with the phenomenological observation of a statistical regularity in a particular 
economic phenomenon. Afterwards, conditions are derived from the observed macro 
pattern to calibrate the micro interactions of individual market participants. These 
micro interactions will then be algorithmically generated with the hope of 
quantitatively reproducing the initial macro pattern. Concretely, the scaling properties 
of power laws are very interesting since they allow the modeller to consider that what 
is observed at the macro level can be proportionally found at a micro level. For 
instance, the scaling property of a distribution describing a financial time series 
implies that statistical features observed annually or semi-annually can be extended 
to monthly or weekly data. Such characterization means that these statistical 
features are not time dependent. In context, the macro pattern initially identified for 
this financial system will then be constraining for the calibration of the rules 
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governing interactions between agents, as Feng et al. (2012, p. 8,388) explained, 
“the interaction strength between agents need to be adjusted with agent population 
size or interaction structure to sustain fat tails in return distributions [i.e. power 
law]” 154 . In their top-down agent-based modelling, econophysicists consider that 
statistical macro characterization can influence micro interactions. Indeed, 
econophysicists describe macro regularities that emerge from economic/financial 
complex systems in terms of statistics, and the characterization of that macro pattern 
is supposed to determine the behaviour of lower-level components. As Rickles 
(2008, p. 7) explained:  
“The idea is that in statistical physics, systems that consist of a large number 
of interacting parts often are found to obey ‘universal laws’—laws 
independent [causally] of microscopic details and dependent on just a few 
macroscopic parameters”.  
 
The recent advent of this top-down agent-based econophysics illustrates the 
coherent and unified perceptions that econophysicists have about their fields: the 
macroscopic and microscopic techniques can be complementary combined to offer a 
global comprehension of the target system. On the one hand, statistical 
econophysics macroscopically describes emergent properties (power laws) in 
economic/financial systems; and, on the other hand, the bottom-up agent-based 
econophysics methodologically extended this objective through a more micro 
approach. More recently, top-down agent-based econophysics provides a 
methodological bridge between the two previous perspectives. Visually, one can 
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Figure 10: Lakatosian visualization of the core elements and the protective belt of the bottom-up 
agent-based econophysics. 
 
In this visualization, I represent the contribution of the top-down agent-based 
modelling as a dilution of the separation between the micro and the macro 
methodologies. While the previous section presented bottom-up agent-based 
modelling as a first methodological extension of econophysics through a micro 
approach, this section shows that the top-down agent-based econophysics provides 
a coherent framework that integrates the two initial approaches discussed in this 
chapter. Figure 10 suggests an interesting Lakatosian perspective of econophysics 
that will be investigated in more detail in the following section.  
 
VI. From diversity to unity: A Lakatosian coherence 
 
The literature devoted to econophysics is extremely scattered. This section presents 
a set of criteria through which the three approaches evoked above will be presented 
as a coherent and unified research programme. Precisely, this section will structure 
the differences and similarities identified between the three methodological 
perspectives through a Lakatosian lens. Writing about what defines econophysics 
necessarily implies a methodological choice. Precisely, I use, in this section, a 
Lakatosian perspective to define the methodological core of econophysics. 
Alternative philosophical frameworks (Kuhn, 1962; Toulmin, 1972 or Laudan, 1984) 
could have been used here - however, given the way I introduced and analysed 











econophysics in the two first chapters, a Lakatosian lens is probably the most 
appropriate one for several reasons. First, the Lakatosian division of research 
programs in terms of hard core and protective belt fits the evolution of econophysics 
especially well and no such resources are available in other frameworks. A second 
reason for chosing a Lakatosian approach to characterize the methodological 
evolution of econophysics refers to the acknowledged statement, among 
econophysicists, that power laws are at the heart of the field. Such generalized 
agreement in the econophysicists community paves the way to a more 
straightforward Lakatosian analysis. More importantly, another reason refers to the 
fact that the evolution of econophysics can be perceived as a ‘linear evolution of 
knowledge’. Indeed, although there are some cultural differences between 
economists and physicists, the field of econophysics emerged without conceptual 
break with economics. The theoretical core of econophysics is based on the use of 
power laws that are actually well-known in economics. Power laws have even been 
investigated in financial economics in the 1960s and 1970s (as evoked in the first 
chapter) but abandoned due to their lack of substantial empirical insights (e.g. 
indetermination of the variance). In this context, econophysics can be presented as 
an extension of an old research program that has been abandoned in financial 
economics in the 1970s (the first chapter investigated this aspect). Before detailing 
this characterization of econophysics, the next section will present the key 
Lakatosian concepts that will be used in my analysis. 
 
VI.1. The concept of “hard core”  
 
The concept of “hard core” is known in history and the philosophy of science through 
Lakatos’ theory of knowledge. Imre Lakatos associated a set of theories with what he 
called a research programme whose hard core refers to common features of the 
theories shared by all scientists acting in this research programme. Lakatos used 
this idea of hard core to summarize what members of a scientific community take for 
granted in their activity. Lakatos (1978) explained that these fundamental 
assumptions that comprise the hard core are usually protected by what he called a 
“protective belt” (i.e. features of theories that may be altered in the research). This 
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protective belt opens a door for the evolution of the research programme since it 
may evolve in line with a positive heuristic (i.e. what paths to pursue), exploring new 
issues/puzzles and their formulations required to preserve the hard core statements. 
This positive heuristic can be seen as a sequence of injunctions to not change the 
hard core or as an “implicit long-term research policy that anticipates refutations” 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 50). For Lakatos, a research programme is said to be progressive 
when its alterations allow scholars to make and confront novel predictions. This idea 
of progress is very important for the Hungarian philosopher because it offers a 
demarcation between progressive and degenerative research programmes in 
science. The latter characterizes a programme whose alterations are no more than 
ad-hoc adjustments or reformulation of the existing protective belt to preserve the 
hard core assumptions. Roughly speaking, the dynamics of a research programme 






Figure 11: Illustration of the dynamics of a Lakatosian research programme 
 
This schema shows that a progressive research programme is supposed to evolve in 
line with increasing empirical progress (the horizontal arrow). This is the role of the 
positive heuristic (arrow going the same direction as the horizontal one): to ensure 
this specific movement. On this illustration, the arrow going in the opposite direction 
represents the regression of the research programme when scholars do not follow 
the positive heuristic (i.e. injunctions that members must follow in order not to break 
the progress of the research programme). In other words, negative heuristics refer to 
a “classical conventionalism [that decides] not to allow refutations to transmit falsity 
to the hard core as long as the corroborated empirical content of the protective belt 
of auxiliary hypotheses increases” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 49).  
Negative Heuristics 
Protective belt 





As an illustration of his methodology, Lakatos analyses in detail Bohr’s research 
programme, which was founded on the claim that light emission results from 
electrons jumping from one orbit to another within atoms. This explanation of light 
emission was quite debatable since it generated an opposition between two well-
corroborated theories: the Maxwell-Lorentz theory of electromagnetism and the 
Rutherford theory of atoms 155 . In this context, Bohr suggested to ignore this 
inconsistency and develop a research approach whose refutable elements were 
inconsistent with the Maxwell-Lorentz theory. In so doing, he defined the core 
elements of his research programme, which Lakatos (1978, p. 56) summarized as 
follows:  
“1) The energy radiation [within the atom] is not emitted (or absorbed) in the 
continuous way assumed in ordinary electrodynamics, but only during the 
passing of the systems between different “stationary” states.  
(2) That the dynamical equilibrium of the systems in the stationary states is 
governed by the ordinary laws of mechanics, while these laws do not hold for 
the passing of the systems between the different states.  
(3) That the radiation emitted during the transition of a system between two 
stationary states is homogeneous, and that the relation between the 
frequency v and the total amount of energy emitted E is given by E = hv, 
where h is Planck’s constant.  
(4) That the different stationary states of a simple system consisting of an 
electron rotating round a positive nucleus are determined by the condition 
that the ratio between the total energy, emitted during the formation of the 
configuration, and the frequency of revolution of the electron is an entire 
multiple of 1/2h. This assumption is equivalent with the assumption that the 
angular momentum of the electron around the nucleus is equal to an entire 
multiple of h/2π. 
(5) That the “permanent” state of any atomic system, i.e. the state in which 
the energy emitted is maximum, is determined by the condition that the 
angular momentum of every electron around the centre of its orbit is equal to 
h/2π”. 
 
In this specific research context, Bohr implicitly defined his negative heuristic 
specifying the irrefutable element of his hard core through methodological decision. 
                                                          
155
 According to which electrons are moving around atoms in a planetary-like system. 
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In the same vein, Bohr’s research on light emission implied a positive heuristic, 
indicating a research direction that was focused on adjustment of some refutable 
variants in the core elements (i.e. elements that could potentially be inconsistent with 
the Maxwell-Lorentz theory). 
 
In this section, I will use this conceptual framework to describe the methodological 
diversification of econophysics. More precisely, I will show how the three traditions 
share the same hard core, but how they investigate/protect it in different ways. In this 
context, the methodological diversification observed in econophysics will be 
presented as the result of different crystallizations of the protective belt in 
accordance with a positive heuristic. In other words, all econophysicists will continue 
to share the same common feature, regardless of the approach they subscribe to.  
 
VI.2. The hard core of econophysics 
 
First of all, the three econophysics traditions deal with the extension of knowledge 
from physics to economics/finance. In this extension, the vast majority of 
econophysicists consider economic/financial phenomena as complex systems that 
are composed of a large number of interacting elements. This methodological point 
is important because the high number of components requires a specific process of 
generalization in order to transform the accumulation of facts/statements into a 
structured knowledge. Regarding this aspect, econophysicists consider that 
“something happens” between the micro and the macro levels of complex systems 
by considering that macro results can be presented as emergent properties that 
transcend the micro components’ behaviour. In this context, emergent properties 
take the form of power laws that are said to emerge from the complexity of systems. 
I explained earlier in this chapter that each tradition comprising econophysics 
developed a specific way of dealing with the emergence of power laws that, 
paradoxically, all of them derive from an asymptotic convergence that results from a 
large number of implementations of the reduced theory T2. This way of 
conceptualizing emergence can be looked on as 
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In this schema, a more encompassing (macro) theory T1 reduces a specific (micro) 
theory T2 if the laws of T1 can be asymptotically derived from the observations/ 
iterations of T2. This way of characterizing the notion of emergence is inspired by 
Batterman (2002), who promoted the development of an “asymptotic reasoning” 
(Batterman, 2002, p. 3). Through this definition, Batterman (2002) claimed that many 
of why-question based theories “are explanatorily deficient” for understanding how 
universality can arise (by universality, Batterman refers to “a feature of the world—
namely that is in certain circumstances distinct types of systems exhibit similar 
behaviors”, Batterman, 2002, p. 9). When the philosopher presented his approach, 
he wrote that “Sometimes, science requires methods that eliminate both details and, 
in some sense, precision […] I call these methods ‘asymptotic methods’” (Batterman, 
2002, p. 13). Generally speaking, the latter can be defined as methods describing 
the limiting behaviour of a specific phenomenon. These techniques assumed the 
existence of a sequence of data that were related to a particular configuration of 
systems composed by noisy elements/variables. In such a context, only the 
asymptotic domain (behaviour at the limit-situation) is considered as information 
worthy for understanding the emergence of universality because it avoids details that 
could obscure the understanding of the phenomenon (Batterman, 1997). In other 
words, the asymptotic reasoning is appropriate for describing a behavioural similarity 
observed in diverse systems. Through a mathematical characterization of their 
elements, an asymptotic method captures what is universally common between 
diverse dynamics under study.  
 
The term “universality” does not necessarily have good press in the philosophy of 
science where some authors (Berry, 1987, p. 185) associate this notion with “the 
slightly pretentious way in which physicists denote identical behaviour in different 
systems”. However, according to Batterman (2002), some systems exhibit, to some 
extent, the same macro behaviour, while we obviously know that their micro details 
differ significantly. To illustrate this notion of universality, Batterman (2002) took the 
example of the behaviour of pendulums—when one wants to understand why 
pendulums with different characteristics (masses, lengths, composition), one focuses 
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on the fact all of these items have all periods that are proportional to the square root 
of the length of the rod from which the bob is hanging. More formally, the period θ 
(i.e. angular displacement) of pendulums exhibiting small oscillations is given by  




where g is the acceleration due to gravity and l is the length of the pendulum. 
Whatever the differences we can find between the potential pendulums, all of them 
will depend on few parameters that are expressed in terms of units of length, mass 
and time. In this context, the dimension of θ is T (time), the one of l is L (length) and 
the one of g is LT-2. Any changes in the units of time or length would imply a 
variation of the ratio l/g. For instance, if one considers that the unit of length can be 
decreased by a factor x and that the unit of time is decreased of a factor b, the 
acceleration due to gravity will increase by a factor xb-2, implying that the quantity  
Δ  
 
    
 
remains constant under a change in the fundamental units. In other words, this ratio 
is dimensionless. For Batterman (2002), such invariance is a good example of 
universality: it is a dimensionless invariant feature observed in the behaviour of 
different pendula whose individual characteristics are irrelevant for the behaviour of 
interest because they generate an “explanatory noise” (Batterman, 2002, p. 15).  
 
According to Batterman (2002), asymptotic reasoning is essential for understanding 
how universality can arise. The example of the pendulum is the simplest way to 
understand the notion of dimensionless universality. However, in most of the cases, 
this universality does not necessary take the form of a constant, but it is rather 
associated with an equation in which the parameter Δ evoked above is a function as 
expressed hereafter: 
Δ                 
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where    can be considered as extremely small or extremely large. In such a context, 
one can reduce the problem by taking the limit so that    can be replaced by a 
constant       = C or       = C. 
 
Generalizing this example, Batterman (2002, p. 17) explained that the role of an 
asymptotic reasoning is to formulate the equations that describe universal features 
(like Δ instance for instance) of systems by assuming that the limits       or       
exist. In line with this reasoning, all econophysicists (whatever approach they use) 
assume that complex phenomena can be captured through the analysis of a high 
number of observations/iterations. Specifically, econophysics can then be looked on 
as a way of describing interacting-element-based systems for which we can 
deduce/derive a novel and robust behaviour by investigating the limit Δi ( ). The 
idea behind asymptotic reasoning is to develop a method that eliminates micro 
details in order to highlight a significant regularity echoing an identical asymptotic 
behaviour in different systems/phenomena. As noted in the first chapter, this 
regularity often takes the statistical form of a power law presented as a “universal 
feature” whose statistical stability guarantees the dimensionless aspect of the 
analysis156. Although the three econophysics traditions deal in a different way with 
the emergence of power laws, they all use a particular asymptotic reasoning in their 
justification of the occurrence of these macro-patterns.  
 
In a sense, econophysics offers an interesting context for studying the link between 
emergence and asymptotic reasoning. There is an important literature dedicated to 
asymptotic methods, and some philosophers (Pexton, 2014; Hooker, 2007) have 
emphasized that although asymptotic methods provide a limiting value that 
characterizes the behaviour of functions/systems, this limiting value is supposed to 
be approached indefinitely closely, but it is never really reached. In other words, if 
asymptotic reasoning can be used to describe the phenomenon of emergence, it is 
based on physically uninterpretable mathematics. Batterman (1997, 2002a, 2002b) 
did not clarify this aspect because he mainly focused on the dimensionless 
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properties in order to justify his use of asymptotic reasoning. However, his 
justification is strictly mathematical and, to some extent, the passage to the limit, 
which provides the limiting value, does not belong to the sequence of data 
associated with the system under investigation. This passage to the limit requires 
non-physically interpretable elements, which generates many debates 157  in 
philosophy. I discussed earlier in this chapter that although some authors 
(Butterfield, 2014; Batterman, 2002) associate this asymptotic reasoning with a 
principle of derivability, this reasoning cannot, strictly speaking, be looked on as a 
deduction. Such blurred perspective on the explanative power of asymptotic method 
keeps room open for interpretations and debates, as witnessed by the way 
econophysicists and economists disagree on the way of thinking about such 
reasoning.  
 
In light of the analysis suggested in this chapter, the core elements conventionally 








This chapter illustrated that these elements define the intellectual scope of 
econophysics and they tell econophysicists what paths of research to pursue. First of 
all, it is commonly accepted that econophysics refers to the extension of statistical 
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elements generates many debates about the explanatory power of asymptotic methods (Batterman, 
1997, 2002, 2009, 2012; Pexton, 2014; Hooker, 2004; Buenon and French, 2012).  
 
Protective belt:  
Asymptotic reasoning 
to justify the 











physics to finance and economics. That being said, econophysics agree on what has 
to be modelled: complex economic systems can be described through power laws. 
This statement can be seen as the core of econophysics. As discussed in this 
chapter, econophysicists consider that these systems can be observed through a 
specific way of modelling, which is based on an asymptotic reasoning according to 
which a high number of observations/iterations can reveal the exact form of these 
power laws. Despite the existence of common ideas that are conventionally 
accepted among econophysicists, the literature (Chakraborti et al., 2011a, 2011b; 
Schinckus, 2013; Ausloos, 2013) devoted to this field indicates that there are several 
ways of implementing these ideas. 
 
VI.3. Beyond the hard core, the diversity! 
 
Econophysics is still a young field and the main core elements identified in the 
previous section do not offer a unifying framework for understanding the state of art 
in econophysics. The existence of this core statement is the necessary condition to 
present econophysics as a coherent field, but the comprehension of the 
methodological richness of econophysics requires a more peripheral analysis. That 
is the purpose of this section, which will show that the notions of a positive heuristic 
and the protective belt can be used as a source of innovation for the evolution of a 
research programme. By definition, the protective belt refers to the evolving/dynamic 
dimension of a research programme since it provides a sequence of auxiliary 
hypotheses that can be altered by future research. In other words, the protective belt 
offers many potential paths of research for the future evolution of the programme 
and, combined with a specific positive heuristic, this belt can be progressively 
transformed. 
 
I claim here that the proliferation of methodological traditions in econophysics results 
from the intellectual dynamics generated by different treatments of puzzles that 
original (statistical) econophysicists were faced with. More precisely, I will show that 
this fragmentation is due to a diversity of potential solutions for solving existing 
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puzzles. In this context, the last two decades can be seen as having a fertile 
momentum that may speed up the growth of econophysics158 without upsetting the 
coherence of the field (i.e. the hard core evoked in the previous section is not called 
into question). In contrast, this pluralistic situation takes the form of a converging 
evolution of econophysical methodologies, leading me to consider that these 
traditions are ruled by common concerns about the original puzzle: how to find micro 
foundations for the initial macroscopic approach proposed by econophysics. A 
decade after the advent of statistical econophysics, a bottom-up agent-based 
econophysics emerged in the literature (Abergel et al., 2014). Works using this 
technique require the definition of fundamental constraints, which takes the form of 
pre-defined rules that describe the micro interactions between elements. Afterwards, 
a large number of interactions are simulated due to computational power. The use of 
computer simulations refers to the repeated applications of a set of instructions that 
describe the initial configuration of the target system. This initial setup will evolve 
according to algorithms used to define the complex interactions between the 
microscopic system’s components, which are defined in the initial step of the 
modelling. Because it is based on a microscopic approach, this way of modelling is 
conceptually closer to what economists do. Indeed, as Feng et al. (2012) explained, 
the mere implementation of agent-based modelling is not an intrinsic feature of 
econophysics, whose origin refers to the characterization of macro patterns. With the 
purpose of combining the two methodological perspectives, some econophysicists 
(Stanley et al., 2012) very recently proposed a movement to adapt the bottom-up 
agent-based modelling to statistical econophysics. Specifically, scholars have used 
information inferred from statistical observations of systems as key elements in the 
definition of the micro interactions that are then computationally iterated. From this 
perspective, one observes the emergence of a top-down agent-based econophysics 
in which the input of the technique includes specific statistical characteristics inferred 
from the observed system (i.e. the existence of a power law with defined parameters, 
for instance). In accordance with the purpose of the bottom-up agent-based 
econophysics, the objective is to reproduce data observed for existing systems 
through a high number of computerized iterations of statements that are 
algorithmically constrained. However, in contrast with the bottom-up approach, 
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 This momentum can easily be observed by the increasing number of publications using the label 
“econophysics” (Ausloos, 2013). 
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assuming that macro results can be derived from the micro levels, the top-down 
perspective tries to combine the two other traditions discussed in this chapter. 
 
The co-existence of these three methodological approaches is very interesting from 
a philosophical point of view. Beyond the question of the field coherence, this 
methodological diversity characterizes different ways of dealing with asymptotic 
reasoning and concepts such as emergence, reduction, derivability/deducibility, etc.  
 
VI.4. Asymptotic reasoning as a source of diversification 
 
The implementation of one of the core elements defined in the previous section 
characterizes the dissimilarities between the three econophysics traditions. Because 
the use of asymptotic reasoning actually ensures the link with physics (through its 
link with the renormalization group theory), it constitutes a conclusive protective belt 
giving a room for each tradition to extend the econophysics research without altering 
the core statement. As a reminder, such reasoning can be schematized as, 
   
   
       
This equation describes the situation in which a more encompassing (macro) theory 
T1 reduces a specific (micro) theory T2 if the laws of T1 are asymptotically 
approached from the observations/iterations of T2. Even though an implicit 
agreement exists about the use of this asymptotic reasoning in econophysics, the 
three traditions evoked in this chapter implement it in very different ways. Statistical 
econophysics, for instance, considers that the parameter n must be the number of 
observations; that T1 is the statistical macro pattern (i.e. power law) which 
phenomenally emerged from the data, while T2 refers to the undefined 
characterization of the low-level (microscopic) complexity ruling the individual level. 
From this perspective, T2 describes a specific configuration of the micro level, which 
takes the form of a recorded number. In other words, T2 is considered as a meso 
level since it characterizes a particular configuration of the components that can be 
associated with the value of a parameter that summarizes this micro level. This 
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methodology raises particular issues, which I discussed in the first part of this 
chapter.  
 
Regarding works devoted to agent-based econophysics, they also use asymptotic 
reasoning but in a different way since they explicitly associate the parameter n to the 
number of computerized iterations required to let the power law emerge, 
characterized by T1 while T2 refers to the description (pre-definition) of the micro 
level that must be defined (for bottom-up agent-based econophysics) or estimated 
(for top-down agent-based econophysics). In this bottom-up agent-based 
econophysics, T2 is not given, but it must be pre-defined according to realistic 
assumptions about the microscopic interactions. T1 (power law) will therefore be 
estimated through “an infinite number” of computerized interactions. Concretely, 
authors involved in this tradition define micro interactions inspired by existing 
theoretical frameworks (for instance, magnetism) to generate computerized 
simulations with the objective of reproducing the dynamics of the financial markets. 
 
The top-down agent-based econophysics provides another schema: T1 is given 
since it results from a macro pattern originally observed in the target system (this T1 
refers to the T1 evoked in statistical econophysics) whereas T2 will be 
estimated/adapted in order to generate T1. The objective is to find a realistic 
definition of micro interactions that will generate the same macro pattern as the one 
observed in the evolution of the system under study. In other terms, the limit evoked 
above must read from left to right since T1 is taken as given and that the target of the 
research is T2. A telling example is the work of Feng et al. (2012), who used macro 
statistical parameters (i.e. variance, critical exponent, etc.) derived from a macro 
pattern (power laws) characterizing the financial markets dynamics in order to define 
micro interactions for their agent-based modelling simulation whose objective was to 
reproduce the macro evolution of markets. 
 
The existence of these three methodological traditions in econophysics indicates a 
methodological coherence in accordance with the historical roots of the field. As a 
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reminder, Chapter 2 explained how the Santa Fe Institute initiated the two major 
computational approaches (statistical and algorithmic techniques) used in 
econophysics to deal with complex economic/financial systems. Even though 
statistical econophysics is often presented as an independent literature and that the 
use of with agent-based modelling is more recent in the field, the diversification of 
econophysics directly results on the one hand, from its historical roots, and the other 
hand, from puzzles that led econophysicists to diversify their approach (but without 
changing the initial hard core of the field). Since the existence of power laws as an 
indicator of complexity is still central for all approaches. From this perspective, by 
combining the macro perspective enhanced by statistical econophysics with the 
micro approach implemented by agent-based modelling, top-down agent-based 
econophysics appears to be the more integrative tradition. This methodological 
diversification of econophysics indicates a movement between the macro and micro 
perspectives; and the recent emergence of the third tradition (top-down agent-based 
econophysics) could appear as a non-winning compromise, since the three traditions 
still co-exist in the current literature. In Lakatosian terms, this coexistence can be 
explained by the fact that although the development of new perspectives improved 
the explanatory power of econophysics, they do not refute the pre-existing one. 
 
VI.5. The role of the positive heuristic in the evolution of econophysics 
 
One purpose of this chapter is to show that the evolution of econophysics implies a 
methodological diversification and that it can be combined with a conceptual 
coherence, since by doing so, econophysics does not lose its original hard core. 
According to Lakatos, this development suggests an empirical progress that is 
characterized by the observation of novel predictions. Through novel predictions, 
scholars improve their understanding of unknown phenomena, such as the view that 
scientific progress refers to an increasing of advancement of scientific knowledge 
(cognitive progress). However, this way of describing the enrichment of knowledge 
mainly focuses on the goal of a research programme, and it underestimates the 
other aspects of scientific progress 159  that can also be expressed in more 
technological (increased effectiveness of techniques), societal (social increasing 
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 For more details about these debates, see Niiniluoto (2015) 
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quality of life and justice in society), professional (rising status of the scientific 
institutions) or methodical (invention of new method of research) forms (Niiniluoto, 
2015). In this context, I will use this idea that a research programme can evolve at 
the same time, at the level of empirical characterization of phenomena (in 
accordance with the linear perception of Lakatos) but also at the methodical level. 
Such evolution implies a double progress since it combines a classical Lakatosian 
evolution of knowledge with a progressive improvement of research methods. This 
improvement takes the form a specific evolution of the protective belt induced by the 
positive heuristic of the field.  
 
In my analysis then, two aspects of the research programme evolution will be 
studied160. First of all, I acknowledge that the three econophysics traditions evoked 
above keep the same conceptual hard core and the same major objective, which is 
to make predictions regarding phenomenon (emergent properties-based systems) 
whose mechanism appears for a long time as unknown for scholars (cognitive 
dimension). The second aspect refers to the methodical evolution of a scientific 
enterprise. By keeping its fundamental statements, as identified in the previous 
section, and by following the objective mentioned above, econophysics 
investigated/used different scientific instruments that led to a methodological 
diversification of the field. While the original econophysics focused on the statistical 
description of economic/financial systems without dealing with their individual 
components, other econophysicists explored methodological paths that were based 
on computer simulations. In so doing, they contributed to the methodical 
development of econophysics, which can be schematized as follows: 
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Figure 12: Illustration of the methodological evolution of econophysics. 
 
This figure schematizes the evolution of econophysics through two dimensions: 
cognitive (horizontal axis referring to the evolution of the research program) and 
methodical (vertical axis describing the refinement of instruments used in 
econophysics). While the first rectangle describes the original (statistical) 
econophysics, which mainly used a macroscopic based approach, the second 
rectangle refers to a corpus of works founded on more a microscopic perspective 
and, from this perspective it illustrates the bottom-up agent-based econophysics that 
emerged in the 2000s. Finally, the last rectangle on Figure 11 is associated with the 
top-down agent-based econophysics, which has appeared very recently. It is worth 
mentioning that these three traditions co-exist in the current literature. Figure 11 
shows that the proliferation of approaches results from a specific evolution of 
econophysics in accordance with a methodological diversification whose objective 
was to solidify key assumptions of the field by keeping its hard core unmodified. In a 
sense, this diversification is an extension of the protective belt resulting from what 
Lakatos called a “positive heuristic”, which consists of an articulated set of 
suggestions on how to change and solidify the protective belt. Lakatos explained:  
“The positive heuristics sets out a programme which lists a chain of ever 
more complicated models simulating reality: the scientist’s attention is riveted 
on building his models following instructions which are laid down in the 
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positive part of his programme. He ignores the actual counterexamples” 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 51). 
 
When he wrote about these positive heuristics, Lakatos associated them with: 
 
 “A set of initial conditions (possibly together with the observational theories) 
which one knows is bound to be replaced during the further development of 
the programme” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 51).  
 
This quotation opens the door to a methodological evolution (and therefore a 
potential diversification) of the research programme. By considering the evolution of 
the research programme through the lens of the refinement of instruments, I directly 
illustrate this potential replacement of the initial conditions evoked by Lakatos. In the 
case of econophysics these initial conditions refers to the implementation of the 
asymptotic reasoning that evolved (as shown on the figure 12) but still ensures the 
protection of the hard core of econophysics. While original (statistical) econophysics 
used a macroscopic approach with its specific initial conditions (the existence of a 
high number of observations), the bottom-up agent-based econophysics that 
emerged several years later instead focuses on a microscopic perspective, implying 
different initial conditions based on the pre-definition of the micro interactions 
between components. Finally, the last tradition (top-down agent-based 
econophysics) provides a modelling that requires an initial condition that combines 
the ones used by the two other approaches. As a reminder, top-down agent-based 
econophysics requires the existence of a statistical macro pattern from which 
statistical properties will be induced to define micro interactions that are likely to 
reproduce the initial macro behaviour. Although the high number of iterations is still 
required, the set of initial conditions has changed since it assumes the pre-existence 
of a macro pattern whose statistical information will help to the identification of micro 
interactions that can generate this macro pattern. 
 
In Lakatosian terms, agent-based modelling extended the way of implementing the 
asymptotic reasoning to produce a progressive problem shift in the protective belt of 
econophysics. Indeed, agent-based econophysics did not emerge because of radical 
(or accumulation of) refutations, but rather as the results of debates (Abergel et al., 
2014) about the micro foundations of econophysics, which emerged in the 2000s. 
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Through a Lakatosian lens, this evolution can be characterized from two points of 
view: the perspective of adopted by agent-based econophysicists who have to justify 
their works; and the viewpoint of statistical econophysicists who see the evolution of 
their field. Agent-based econophysicists did not change the hard core of 
econophysics; they keep the same fundamental aspects shared by all authors 
involved in the statistical tradition. While the emergence of the bottom-up agent-
based econophysics extended the protective belt of the research programme, the 









This chapter dealt with the methodological diversification of econophysics. More 
precisely, I showed that although econophysics is often presented as a unified area 
of knowledge (Abergel et al., 2014; Slalina, 2013) this new field is rather 
characterized by a profusion of works that deal with complex economic phenomena.  
 
Statistical econophysics emerged in the 1990s and it defined the original core 
assumptions of the field. A decade or so later, a bottom-up agent-based 
econophysics progressively appeared to solve the increasing number of anomalies 
that scientists were first faced with. Even though this second way of doing 
econophysics kept the core assumptions of the field, it also faced some problems for 
which a third approach (top-down agent-based econophysics) emerged in order to 
investigate. This evolution of the field is interesting since it shows, at the same time, 
a conceptual coherence (the three approaches keep the same core assumptions) 
and a methodological diversification (development of a micro and macro 
methodology). The combination between a micro and a macro approach, although 
incompatible at first sight, found its origin in the historical roots of econophysics, 
which dated back to the works on complexity that were promoted by the Santa Fe 
Institute. In this chapter, I used a Lakatosian framework to show how this 
diversification can be seen as an extension of the conceptual protective belt 
protecting the core of econophysics. The following two tables briefly summarize the 
major points discussed in this chapter and the role played by the traditions in the 







Hard core:  
Existence of power 
laws  
Defined Preserved Preserved  
Protective belt:  
Asymptotic reasoning 
Defined Extended Solidified 




The use of asymptotic reasoning to justify the occurrence of power laws gradually 
took several forms. Originially, scholars working on (statistical) econophysics 
explained the existence of these power laws by using an asymptotic reasoning 
applied in a macro-analysis of data. Progressively, this perspective has been 
extended with the development of bottom-up agent based econophysics that 
enlarged the methodological scope of econophysics. Precisely, this approach shows 
that the emergence of power laws can actually be justified at a microscopic level. 
Finally, the recent category of works dealing with top-down agent-based 
econophysics provides a methodological link between the two previous categories of 
works; solidifying therefore the protective belt and the use of asymptotic reasoning 
as a way of dealing with power laws in econophysics. 
Beyond this categorization, each methodological approach can also be summarized 
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No condition of 
derivability between 
the macro and the 
micro level 
 
Definition of the 
micro level from 
which the macro 
level must be 
derived 
Definition of the 
macro level from 
which the micro level 






version of reduction 
 
Heterogeneous 
version of reduction 
 
Heterogeneous 
version of reduction 
Table 3: Comparison between the three approaches in econophysics 
The first line of this table refers to the methodological angle chosen by the three 
methodological traditions to deal with complex economic/finance systems. The 
second one echoes the initial conditions (i.e. starting points) required by these 
traditions in order to implement their methodology. Afterwards, I evoke the form of 
knowledge that these three approaches propose by clarifying the outputs they offer. 
My presentation also differentiates these traditions in terms of goals and machinery 
(techniques) used by econophysicists. The goals refer to what scholars want to do 
by implementing their research. Their goal can be backward-looking or forward-
looking since it can consider the present as either the starting or the final point of the 
research. While statistical econophysics aims at fitting historical data for description 
(backward-looking), bottom-up agent-based econophysics instead algorithmically 
reproduces data for predictive purposes (forward-looking). The following elements of 
the table refer to the way each of the three econophysics approaches characterizes 
the concepts of emergence and reduction.  
 
It is worth emphasizing that the diversity of elements presented in this table does not 
call the conceptual hard core of econophysics into question. In contrast, the first 
table above shows that this diversity rather indicates a particular dynamics of 
research that is trying to keep the original assumptions of the field intact. While this 
chapter focused on the internal diversification of econophysics, the fourth chapter will 
deal instead with the way econophysicists produce their knowledge and how they 





Chapter 4: Modelling practices in 
econophysics and economics 
 
 
Part I: Modelling practices in econophysics 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter deals with the treatment of models in econophysics. Because 
econophysics is a new boundary (in-between) field (Chapter 1) founded on a 
conceptual coherence and a plurality of methodologies (Chapter 3), this area of 
knowledge appears to be an interesting ground for investigating philosophical issues 
that are usually associated with the theme of models in science. In line with the 
methodological categorization suggested in the third chapter, this final chapter 
studies how econophysicists implement models and how they justify/use them in 
their research.  
 
Chapter 2 explained what the historical and contextual factors were that favoured the 
emergence of econophysics. The idea of importation of techniques and concepts 
from physics to economics is extremely important because it denotes a specific way 
of developing knowledge that involves two different disciplines. If physicists export 
their conceptual tools into another disciplinary horizon, that means they probably 
“see” something familiar outside of their borders. Therefore, this in-between situation 
provides a unique environment wherein the modelling practices can be studied 
through the lens of analogy. This chapter investigates the role of analogy in the 
extension of the econophysics model in financial economics.  
 
By definition, an analogy is a comparison between two objects/systems that have 
similarities. Analogies play a key role in scientific practices: several authors have 
emphasized their pedagogical utility (Hodstrater, 2001; Weisberg, 2016) while others 
have detailed their heuristic role in the aid of discovery (Bartha, 2013; Bailer-Jones, 
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2009). In the context of the development of econophysics, which is characterized by 
an extension of physics outside of its borders, the issue of scientific analogy became 
particularly interesting. What do econophysicists see in financial economics that 
could appear so familiar to them? What are these similarities that paved the way for 
physicists to export their knowledge to finance? More precisely, I will investigate how 
econophysicists justify their modelling practices through a formal analogical 
reasoning in contrast with economists’ way of understanding this modelling. 
 
If one considers econophysics to be a new field developed by physicists for 
physicists, the issue of justification can be perceived as unidisciplinary. In this 
context, econophysicists generate abstract works that are published in physics 
journals without any economic justification or implication. This kind of situation would 
associate the field with a purely abstract intellectual game that involves economic 
data, and it would not raise a special philosophical interest. Although this way of 
considering econophysics is well spread among economists, the explicit objective of 
econophysics is to go out of physics since its scholars aim at developing tools that 
could be useful for practitioners and policy makers (Johnson et al., 2003; McCauley 
et al., 2016).  
 
In this challenging situation, this chapter shows that the status of econophysical 
models differs radically, depending on the context in which they are considered. 
Because econophysicists develop models that capture the dynamics of economic 
actors/systems by using methods and concepts coming from physics, they do not 
really take into account the existing theories that were developed by financial 
economists (Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017). In this context, it is important to 
understand the role of analogies and what is meaningful for econophysicists in the 
extension of their models in finance/economics. 
 
The first part of this chapter presents how econophysicists formulate their reasoning 
by presenting the first econophysical model (Stanley et al., 1996). This model can be 
labelled as working in statistical econophysics, which is still, today, the largest part of 
the literature in the field (Gingras and Schinckus, 2012). Afterwards, I will investigate 
how this knowledge is stabilized. This analysis of the justification will be 
deconstructed into two steps: what makes sense for econophysicists and what 
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makes sense for economists. This peculiar analysis will clarify how these two 
communities differ in their way of developing models and what is required in order for 
these two communities to accept the explanatory dimension of a model. The 
analogical nature of models will be presented as an essential aspect for 
econophysicists, whereas financial economists have different modelling practices 
that are based on a testing methodology. Finally, the last part of this chapter will 
explain the reasons for why one can observe epistemological gaps between 
econophysics and economics. This part will clarify the reasons for what can be seen 
as an explanation for physicists is simply perceived as a non-justified induction for 
economists. Beyond developing a better understanding of the status of models in 
econophysics, this chapter also contributes more generally to debates in philosophy 
of science about the use of analogies in science and Thomas Kuhn’s thesis of 
incommensurability.  
 
II. Econophysical Modelling: A telling example 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 explained the turning point that took place in physics in the 1980s 
and the 1990s concerning the new connection between the theories of statistical 
mechanics (also called statistical physics) and social sciences. Statistical physics’ 
main purpose is to explain the macroscopic behaviour of a system and its evolution, 
in terms of physical laws that govern the motion of the microscopic constituents 
(atoms, electrons, ions, spins, etc.) that make it up. Statistical physics distinguishes 
itself from other fields of physics through its methodology, which is based on 
statistics. This is due to the enormous number of variables on which statistical 
physicists have to work; for instance, Avogadro’s number (6 × 1023) refers to a 
gigantic number of equations of motion that have to be solved161. This high number 
of relationships makes a strictly based-equations analysis unworkable, even for a 
computer. “Quite plainly, this is impossible … [the] subject is so difficult that 
[physicists] are forced to adopt a radically different approach to that employed in 
other areas of physics” (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 4). From this perspective, statistics 
became a very important tool in physics where particles’ behaviour is described 
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 As Fitzpatrick (2012) noticed, to solve a system with 6 × 10
23
 particles exactly, we would have to 
write down 1,024 coupled equations of motion, with the same number of initial conditions, and then try 
to resolve the system.  
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through the statistical properties of each particle motion. The methods used in 
statistical physics are thus essentially dictated by the complexity of the systems, due 
to the enormous number of constituents. This situation leads statistical physicists to 
start with statistical information about the motions of the micro constituents’ 
properties of the system in order to statistically infer some macro properties for this 
system. The statistical approach is so common that “in most situations physicists can 
forget that the results are statistical at all, and treat them as exact laws of physics” 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 6)162. This integration of statistics into physics occurred in the 
1970s as the direct result of this problematic of extremely voluminous data. The 
second chapter explained how the progressive computerization of society and 
economic sphere generated a huge amount of data that began to attract the 
attention of physicists. The computerization of financial marketplaces and the 
systematic recording of all transactions have created huge databases that have 
become attractive for all disciplinary profiles that have a strong background in 
statistics. This section presents how the first econophysical model emerged and how 
statistical physics has been gradually extended to economics and finance. 
 
II.1. From DNA to econophysics  
 
The term “econophysics” was created in 1996 in an article written by Stanley et al. 
(1996), strangely entitled, “Anomalous fluctuations in the dynamics of complex 
systems: from DNA and physiology to econophysics”. This section presents this 
paper in more detail and shows how authors developed the first econophysics model 
for describing the dynamics of companies’ growth rates. At first sight, one could ask 
what the link is between DNA and econophysics. As the abstract of the paper notes, 
the authors aimed to export physics into other disciplinary contexts. Precisely, they 
wanted to:  
“discuss examples of complex systems composed by many interacting 
subsystems […] These includes the one-dimensional sequence of base pairs 
in DNA, the sequence of flight time of the large seabird Wandering Albatross 
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 For instance, as Fitzpatrick (2012) commented, the familiar equation of state of an ideal gas, P V = 
n R T, is actually a statistical result. In other words, it relates the average pressure (P) and the 
average volume (V) to the average temperature (T) through the number (n) of particles in the gas. 
“Actually, it is virtually impossible to measure the pressure, volume, or temperature of a gas to such 
accuracy, so most people just forget about the fact that the above expression is a statistical result, 
and treat it as a law of physics interrelating the actual pressure, volume, and temperature of an ideal 
gas” (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 6). 
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and the annual fluctuations in the growth rate of business firms” (Stanley et 
al., 1996, p. 302).  
 
How can DNA, seabirds and business growth rate be related? How (and why) can 
physicists model these different phenomena within the same conceptual framework? 
The major idea connecting these complex phenomena refers to the existence of 
anomalous fluctuations in their dynamics. According to Stanley et al. (1996), these 
anomalous changes indicate analogies in the underlying mechanism in totally 
different systems. Concretely, the authors focused on correlations between the 
anomalous variations in the sequence of DNA, sea birds movements and the sales 
fluctuations of firms. Such statistical analysis aims at identifying common patterns in 
these complex large fluctuations. Stanley et al. (1996) began their argument by 
studying the anomalous variations in the DNA walks (frequency of each pairing 
nucleotide couple changes). After having observed the existence of anomalous 
fluctuations, the authors gave a visual representation of how nucleotides couple 
each other. Here is an illustration of such visualization:  
 
 
Figure 1: DNA fluctuations—Source: Carbone (2013) 
 
This graph shows three levels of visualization (linear, discontinuous and continuous) 
of different kinds of nucleotides (characterized by three levels of colours: white, dark 
grey and light grey). What is important here is the evolution of the DNA where the 
movement of the nucleotides can move either up (u(i) = +1) or down (u(i)=-1) for 
each step of the walk. In other words, positive fluctuations (going up on the graph 
above) corresponds to what geneticists call a “purine-pyrimide” pair, while negative 
fluctuations (going down on the graph above) refers to a “hydrogen bond” pair. This 
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visual representation is very important because it allows Stanley et al. (1996, p. 303) 
to go further in their reasoning by proposing the analogy of the DNA sequences and 
the Ising system, which characterizes the polarization of metallic entities in a 
magnetic field. In other words, Stanley et al. (1996) associated the move (up or 
down) with the potential orientations of ferromagnetic particles in a system submitted 
to an important change of the temperature (see next section). In this analogy, all 
nucleotides going up would be associated with a positive polarization of metallic 
entities, while those pointing down would view a negative polarization. Before 
continuing the presentation of the first econophysical model, it is worth presenting  
this Ising model, which Stanley et al. (1996) seem to consider as well-known by the 
readers, in more detail.  
 
II.2. The magnetic appeal of the Ising model 
 
Because the Ising model is a foundational element (an “exemplar”, as I will explain) 
of econophysics, it is important present this framework. Let us begin this section with 
a peculiar phenomenon: beyond a critical temperature (770°C), iron exhibits 
paramagnetic rather than ferromagnetic behaviour, implying that it loses its magnetic 
feature above this temperature. The idea of the Ising model is to describe 
microscopically why the system exhibits radical changes in its properties at a critical 
temperature. This situation was modelled in 1925 by Ernst Ising, who, by uncovering 
concepts that were not yet developed (universality, renormalization and emergence), 
correctly demonstrated the phenomenon of magnetization for a system composed of 
two-state spins163.  
 
This model is considered to be the simplest description of a system that has a critical 
point; it played a central role in the development of research into critical phenomena 
and it occupies a place of importance in the minds of econophysicists. Briefly, the 
Ising model consists of discrete variables that represent magnetic moments of 
                                                          
163
 Ernst Ising (1900-1998) was a German physicist who worked on modelling of ferromagnetism. The 
Ising model published in Zeitscrift of Physik in 1925 is his major contribution to physics—it is quite 
interesting to mention that although Ising became professor of physics at the Bradley University 
(Illinois, USA), he never published again after 1935 and he instead focused mainly on teaching 
activities. For more information on the history of the Ising model, see Taroni (2015) and for more 
biographical elements on Ising, see Kobe (1996). 
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atomic spins, which can take one of two states, +1 (“up”) or −1 (“down”), the two 
states refer to the direction taken by the spins. The concept of spin characterizes the 
circular movement of particles (electrons, positrons, protons, etc.) implying that they 
have a specific rotation as described below. 
 
Figure 2: Schematisation of a particle’s spin—Source: Jovanovic and Schinckus (2017). 
 
There is no way to speed up or slow down the spin of an electron (i.e. its revolution 
on itself) but its direction can be changed due to particular physical conditions, such 
as an important change of temperature. The interesting element is that the direction 
of one spin directly influences the direction of its neighbour spins.  
 
Figure 3: Schematisation of the interaction between particles’ spins—Source: Jovanovic and 
Schinckus (2017). 
 
This influence can be captured through a function of correlation that measures the 
extent to which the behaviours of spins are correlated. The major idea of the Ising 
model is to describe this interaction between particles’ spins. From this perspective, 
the spins are arranged in a graph, usually a lattice, in which each spin exerts an 
influence on its neighbours. This influence is measured by the distance over which 
the direction of one spin affects the direction of its neighbour spins. This distance is 
called the correlation length; it has an important function in the identification of critical 
phenomena. Indeed, the correlation length measures the distance over which the 
behaviour of one microscopic variable is influenced by the behaviour of another. 
Away from the critical point (at low temperatures), the spins of an iron specimen 









a role; the direction of each spin depends only on its immediate neighbours making 
the correlation length finite.  
 
Figure 4: Two-dimensional Ising model at low temperature. 
Source: http://www-f1.ijs.si/~vilfan/SM/ln4b.pdf (p. 98). 
 
 
Figure 4 shows an almost black graph that indicates that all the spins are pointing in 
the same direction. In terms of relations (correlation length), this implies that each 
spin is directly dependent on and influenced by its close neighbours. In this situation, 
iron can be magnetized simply because all the microscopic entities are pointing in 
the same direction, thereby easing the diffusion of a magnetic field through the 
system. At the critical point, when the temperature (770°C) has been increased to 
the critical temperature, the situation is completely different. The spins no longer 
point in the same direction because the thermal energy influences the whole system 
and the magnetization spin-spin vanishes. In this critical situation, spins point in no 
specific direction and follow a stochastic distribution.  
 
Figure 5: Two-dimensional Ising model at the critical temperature 
Source: http://www-f1.ijs.si/~vilfan/SM/ln4b.pdf (p. 99). 
 
As we can see in Figure 5, there are regions of spin up (black areas) and regions of 
spin down (white areas), but all these regions are speckled with smaller regions of 
the opposite type, and so on. In fact, at the critical point, each spin is influenced by 
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all other spins (not only its neighbours) regardless of their distance164. From this 
perspective, the Ising model offers a particular description in which the coupling of 
neighbour pairs (taking an up or a down direction) can explain the magnetization of 
iron, and where the correlation length is presented as a measure of this 
magnetization (the higher, the less magnetic the specimen is). When the system 
reaches the critical temperature, we have a specific configuration in which the 
correlation length is very important (it is considered to be infinite). At this critical 
state, the whole system appears to be in homogeneous configuration, characterized 
by an infinite correlation length between spins (whatever the size of the system, all 
spins influence each other). 
 
What is interesting is the statistical dynamics of these correlation lengths that 
phenomenologically follow a power law. Indeed, physicists have observed that the 
magnetization (M) evolves as a power law, depending on the level of temperature (t). 
Statistically speaking, this phenomenon takes the following form, 
 
                 (1) 
 
Where   is called the critical exponents. This statistical characterization is very 
important because it offers an important tool for analyzing the system. In particular, 
Onsager (1944) showed that power laws exhibit scaling properties, implying that the 
spin system has the same statistical properties regardless of the scale (microscopic 
or macroscopic) considered. The scale invariance assumption was not new in 
physics165, but the method allowing the mathematical demonstration of invariance 
was only established at the end of the 1960s by Kadanoff (1966) and Wilson (1971) 
with his renormalization group theory (which I presented in the previous chapter)166. 
As a reminder, this theory is “a method for establishing scale invariance under a set 
of transformation that allows us to investigate changes in a physical system viewed 
at different distance scales” (Morrison, 2016, p. 57). Before the development of this 
theoretical framework, universal behaviours (for instance, the fact that the correlation 
                                                          
164
 This is due to the magnetization of the spins pointing in the same direction. 
165
 It exists in the work of Euclid and Galileo, for example. 
166
 For further information about the link between scaling law and the renormalization group theory, 
see Goldenfeld (1992). 
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lengths between spins follow a power law) were observed experimentally without 
theoretical foundation (Morrison, 2016). This theory makes it possible to study 
mathematically macroscopic regularities that occur as a result of microscopic 
random interactions without to having study these microscopic interactions167. The 
focus is therefore on the macroscopic level, which is directly observable for physical 
phenomena. In other words, since the 1970s, due to scale invariance, physicists can 
infer from the microscopic constituents some key parameters that allow for the 
capture and description the dynamics of macroscopic behaviours without studying, in 
detail, what happens at the microscopic level. For these reasons, scale invariance is 
the foundation of any modern approach of statistical physics that is aimed at 
understanding the collective behaviour of systems that have a large number of 
variables that interact with each other. From this perspective, the renormalization 
group method can then be applied. By performing successive transformations of 
scales on the original system, one can reduce the number of interacting spins and 
therefore determine a solution from a finite cluster of spins.  
 
Beyond the ability to describe the spin’s movement, there is another point of interest 
in the Ising model. Because of its very simple structure, it is not confined to the study 
of ferromagnetism. As the philosopher of physics, R.I.G. Hughes wrote, “[p]roposed 
as a model of ferromagnetism, it [Ising model] ‘possesses no ferromagnetic 
properties’ ” (Hughes, 1999, p. 104)! Its abstract and general structure has enabled 
its use to be extended to the study many other problems or phenomena: 
“The Ising model is employed in a variety of ways in the study of critical point 
phenomena. Ising proposed it […] as a model of ferromagnetism; 
subsequently it has been used to model, for example, liquid-vapour transitions 
and the behaviour of binary alloys. Each of these interpretations of the model 
is in terms of a specific example of critical point behaviour. [T]he model also 
casts light on critical point behaviour in general. Likewise, the pictures 
generated by computer simulation of the model’s behaviour illustrate […] the 
whole field of scale-invariant properties” (Hughes, 1999, p. 124–125). 
 
This model has been implemented to describe the behaviour of gases (Eyring, 1939) 
and, afterwards, it has been widely used to characterize various physical systems, 
                                                          
167
 To understand the importance of this approach, one has to keep in mind that the macroscopic level 
is directly observable–for instance a table—but the microscopic level—the molecules that constitute 
the table—is not directly observable (one needs a tool, such as a microscope).  
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such as fluid and gas dynamics168 that exhibit radical changes in their properties at a 
crucial temperature. For these reasons, statistical physicists consider the Ising model 
as the perfect illustration of the simplest unifying mathematical model. Their looking 
for such models is rooted in the scientific view of physicists for whom “the assault on 
a problem of interest traditionally begins (and sometimes ends) with an attempt to 
identify and understand the simplest model that exhibits the same essential features 
as the physical problem in question”169. According to Hughes, (1999, p. 99), the 
advantage of the Ising model meets this requirement and its use is not restricted to 
statistical physics because “the specification of the model has no specific physical 
content”; its content is mathematical. Therefore, this model is independent of the 
underlying phenomenon studied and it can be used to analyze any empirical data 
that share the same characteristics. With these new theoretical developments, 
statistical physicists had a powerful mathematical model and method that could solve 
crucial problems in physics or in all areas of knowledge wherein phenomena can be 
interpreted in accordance with the foundation of the model. They were able to 
establish the behaviour of systems at their macroscopic level from hypotheses about 
their microscopic level, but without analyzing this microscopic level. 
 
This section aimed to clarify the Ising model to which Stanley et al. (1996) refer in 
their paper where they coined the term “econophysics”. After having explained the 
importance of this Ising model in physics, I come back now to the presentation of this 
seminal paper. We will see that the statistical characterization (power laws) of the 
magnetization (correlation lengths between micro entities) is the heart of the 
explanatory dimension of statistical econophysics. 
 
II.3. Back to DNA  
 
As noted previously, Stanley et al. (1996)170  proposed an analogy between the 
magnetization in the Ising model and the walks of DNA sequences. Starting from the 
visualization of these DNA walks (Figure 1), the authors wrote: 
                                                          
168
 For further information on the potential extension of Ising model, see Taroni, 2015. 
169
 See Alastair and Wallace (1989, p. 237) for further information. 
170
 It is worth mentioning that the first author of Stanley et al. (1996) wrote an important book in the 
seventies on the importance of the Ising model for explaining transition phases. For further 
information, see Stanley (1971). 
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“coding sequences typically consists of a few lengthy regions of different 
strand bias, resembling domains in the system in the ferromagnet state. 
These observations can be tested by rigorous statistical analysis. Such DNA 
landscapes naturally motivate a quantification of these fluctuations by 
calculating the ‘net displacement’ of the walker after l steps, which is the sum 
of the unit steps u(i) for each step i” (Stanley et al., 1996, p. 309, my italics). 
 
From this perspective, the dynamics of the DNA sequence after i steps can be 
considered as a sum where the trajectory (l) can be expressed as follows: 
 
                         (2) 
 
Another important indicator in this walk is given by the root mean square fluctuation 
about the average of the displacement (l). Statistically, this quantity can be estimated 
with the following relation: 
                                            
 
     (3) 
 
where the        is defined by                and the bars indicate the average 
over all positions   in the gene. This quantity informs us about the average sequence 
in the dynamics of the DNA sequences. What Stanley et al. (1996) wanted to 
describe is the anomalous fluctuations around this average (i.e. dispersion) and they 
observed that the statistical distribution of these variations follows a power law taking 
the following form: 
       F(l)~ l α    (4) 
 
with the critical exponent  < 2 (implying that the variable follows a stable Lévy 
process, as I explained in the first chapter). Visually, that means that the coding of 





Figure 6: DNA sequence behaviour - Source: José et al. (2009, p. 12) 
 
This diagram indicates a power law in the relative dispersion (RD) of fluctuations 
after i steps. One can observe that these fluctuations evolve in line with a power law 
according to which every step generates a variation that is exponentially correlated 
to the previous one. But how can this empirical observation be related to the Ising 
model? Interestingly, Stanley et al. (1996) questioned their own methodology by 
asking “how can power law correlations arise in the one-dimensional system such as 
DNA in analogy with spins of one-dimensional Ising models?” According to the 
authors, these two phenomena belong to the same category of events that exhibit 
the same statistical structure. This formal structure is clarified by Stanley et al. 
(1996) when they assume the existence of only two kinds of nucleotides (say a and 
b), each of them can be represented by a step up or a step down in the DNA 
sequences (one can notice the first similarities with the Ising system discussed in the 
previous section). After k steps, the dynamics will generate a sequence of 
   nucleotides, whose total excess of a nucleotides over the b ones is given by the 
following relationship: 
 
            
 
                   (5) 
 
Schematically, this process can be summarized by the figure following on which 





Figure 7: Step in the dynamics of the DNA sequences -  Source: Stanley et al. (1996, p. 310) 
 
This graph is important in the reasoning because it shows the long-range 
correlations that result from the fact that all nucleotides are descendent from a 
common origin. So statistically speaking, the move (l) decays exponentially with a 
factor k and acts therefore as a power law. In other words, this way of describing the 
DNA sequence is similar to the way the Ising model describes a critical 
phenomenon: all micro entities can take only two directions (up or down); these 
entities are correlated and the length of their correlation appears to follow a power 
law (straight line on a log-log graph). This similarity led Stanley et al. (1996) to use 
the Ising model to describe the DNA walks. 
 
 
II.4. What is the link with econophysics?  
 
 
In their article, Stanley et al. (1996) deal with unrelated phenomena, which they 
describe through the same conceptual framework. After having characterized the 
evolution of the DNA sequences in terms of the Ising model, the authors used the 
same analogy171 to describe the fluctuations of annual growth rates for firms by 
showing that the dynamics of sales generate the same statistical situation as the one 
observed for spins movement in the Ising model. Using public data published by 
American companies, the authors worked on the average annual fluctuations of 
sales        (and number of employees), which they presented as a function of the 
initial value of sales (initial number of employees)   . Observing the evolution of this 
                                                          
171
 The analogical nature of econophysical models will be studied in detail later in this chapter. 
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variable, they noticed that “the remarkable linearity of the        vs    function on a 
log-log scale over many orders of magnitude may indicate some universal law of 
economics that is applicable for small companies […] as for giants of size” (Stanley 
et al., 1996, p. 311). This power law discovered by the authors takes the following 
form: 
 
Figure 8  Companies sales growth: —Source: Stanley et al. (1996, p. 311) 
 
This diagram shows a power law dependence between the standard deviation        
of sales and the initial level of sales      as expressed in the following relationship: 
 
                    
        (6) 
 
where   is empirically estimated at 0.82. This power law characterizes the evolution 
of sales, which increases by following a constant pattern. The authors assumed that 
this evolution has its origin in the internal structure of each firm. In so doing, they 
considered that the evolution of sales (or the employee number) results from N 
independent units, which can be computed as follows: 
 
                  
 
          (7) 
 
where the unit sales    have an average of        and an annual variation      
independent of   . In this context, the annual change in sales can be estimated by: 
 




The familiarity of this equation with the statistical description of the DNA sequence 
walk (see eq. 2) caught the attention of Stanley et al. (1996) who wrote that the 
evolution of sales for companies and the DNA sequence walks can be explained 
through the same conceptual framework (i.e. Ising model): “Remarkably, the 
hierarchical structure of the company can be mapped exactly onto the diagram of the 
DNA mutations” Stanley et al. (1996, p.312). Visually, we have: 
 
 
Figure 9: Hierarchical structure of the company -  Source: Stanley et al. (1996, p. 310) 
 
Stanley et al. (1996, p. 312) described this diagram as follows:  
“Each level of the firm hierarchy corresponds to one generation of repeat 
family and each modification of the head decision by the lower level 
management corresponds to a mutation. Note that the        for firm sales is 
exactly      for DNA sequences” [see the similarity between eq. 4 and eq. 6 
for an illustration of these words].  
 
Considering the duality (flying or sitting on the water) of sea birds’ behaviour, the 
authors extended the conceptual framework to the description of sea birds’ migration 
by quantifying their behaviour with the help of an electronic recording device that 
was placed on the legs of several birds. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the vast majority of statistical econophysicists do not detail 
the statistical structure of variables as Stanley et al. (1996) did. However, this 
literature often quotes Stanley et al. (1996) as a seminal paper (see Gingras and 
Schinckus, 2012 for further information on the importance of this paper for the 
literature in econophysics). Methodologically speaking, models developed in 
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statistical econophysics are founded on the existence of a power law pattern in 
which scholars adopt the reasoning proposed by Stanley et al. (1996). In other 
words, these authors provided the methodological foundations for statistical 
econophysics by making the Ising model an “exemplar” of the field (I will detail this 
claim later in this chapter). 
 
This extension of the Ising model was used for coining the term “econophysics” and 
it is today a seminal article that founded the scientific justification of the field. It is 
worth mentioning that although this paper is largely quoted in the econophysics 
literature, no work questions the scientific justification of the approach. Another 
seminal article (and probably the first econophysics paper even though the term did 
not exist yet), by Mantegna (1991) is a telling example of the way econophysicists 
work: the author observed phenomenologically that the anomalous fluctuations of the 
Milan stock exchange follow a power law with a critical exponent lower than two. 
Considering the scaling properties of this particular statistical pattern, Mantegna 
(1991) made some recommendations in terms of analysis of the financial markets. 
However, he did not go beyond the phenomenological description of the financial 
data (Mantegna (1991) was aware of this aspect since he mentioned it in his 
discussion section). Interestingly, this paper also contributed to the crystallization of 
econophysics since it initiated the macro approach that is widely used today by 
statistical econophysicists. The following section will study in more detail the way 
econophysicists sustain their methodology and how they justify their analogical 






Part II: The analogical extension of the Ising model 
 
III. The econophysicists’ view point 
 
Econophysicists describe the dynamics of different phenomena through a particular 
statistical pattern that is founded on a specific statistical framework developed in the 
Ising model. Two aspects must be studied in relation to this way of modelling: the 
explanatory nature of the Ising model and the relevance of its analogical extension 
for characterizing a variety of different events. In this section, I will investigate these 
aspects by analyzing, in a first step, the explanatory nature of the Ising model. 
Afterwards, I will discuss the extension of this frame to economics and finance. 
Finally, the third sub-section will conclude by showing how econophysics can 
implicitly be perceived as a Duhemian field (or, more precisely, a field based on a 
Duhemian use of analogy). 
 
III.1. The explanatory nature of the Ising model  
 
The Ising model generated an important body of literature in physics (Taroni, 2015) 
as well as in the philosophy of science (Hughes, 1999). The existing works on this 
model usually consider it to be a particular idealization of reality. Rohwer and Rice 
(2013, p. 338) wrote that “Idealized models aim at accurately representing 
differences makers and use idealization to indicate those causal factors that are 
irrelevant”. As Strevens (2011) explained, such models are evidently false, but their 
function is not to focus on what does make a difference in the characterization of a 
target system. From this perspective, some characteristics of the phenomenon are 
deliberately omitted or changed with the objective of having a more tractable 
analysis. Scientific works are full of such idealizations (“isolated systems”, “infinite 
velocity”, “frictionless movement”, “perfectly competitive markets”, “perfectly rational 
agent”, etc.). The case of a perfect pendulum is a classical example of idealization, 
where some properties of the pendulum are changed or ignored in order to have a 
situation in which the Newton’s force law can be applied. Precisely, physicists 
usually assume the strings have no mass; that the length of the string is inextensible 
and not rigid, etc. Such idealization creates circumstances in which the treatment of 
the pendulum can be represented through the classical Newton’s second law. 
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Wiesberg (2016) explained that idealization is a necessary condition for modelling 
and he identified three kinds of idealization: Galilean idealization, minimalist 
idealization and multiple–models idealization. The first refers to “the practice of 
introducing distortion into models with the goal of simplifying, to make them more 
mathematically or computationally tractable” (Wiesberg, 2016, p. 99)172. The second 
idealization focuses only on the core factors that give rise to a phenomenon, 
whereas the third form of idealization concerns situations in which a model is built by 
using related but incompatible models173. This categorization of idealizations will be 
useful in this chapter since I will later associate economists’ modelling practices with 
a Galilean idealization, whereas econophysicists’ practices will instead be analyzed 
afterward through the lens of a minimalist idealization.  
 
The Ising model proposes a mathematical structure used to represent states (how 
spins are orientated) and relations between states (how spins can move), especially 
transitions (when spins are all orientated in the same direction). Because this model 
captures the key interactions that occur in a ferromagnetic phenomenon, this 
conceptual framework is usually presented as a minimalist idealization (Strevens, 
2011). By suggesting that the only recurrent element that allows us to characterize 
complex economic/financial system is the macro occurrence of a power law, 
econophysicists explicitly identified what does not make a difference in our 
understanding of such systems: the detailed description of micro interactions. A 
minimalist characterization of this micro level (à la the Ising model) is enough to have 
an explanation. The objective of minimal models is to “contain only factors that make 
a difference to the occurrence and essential character of the phenomenon in 
question” (Weisberg, 2016, p. 100). This definition raises an interesting question 
about the explanatory nature of minimal models: are these core factors that are 
evoked by Weisberg (2016) causal? Can the Ising model be associated with a 
classical explanation? Regarding the explanatory nature of the minimalist model, 
Strevens (2011, p. 155) wrote that: 
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 The example of the pendulum mentioned above is good illustration of a Galilean idealization. 
173
 Wiesberg (2016, p. 103) gave the example of the United States National Weather Service (NWS), 
which uses several different models of global circulation patterns to model the weather. Although 




“the content of an idealized model can be divided into two parts. The first part 
contains the difference-makers for the explanatory target and if the model is 
perfect, is identical to the canonical model. The second part of all idealization, 
its overt claims are false but its role is to point to parts of the actual world that 
do not make differences to the explanatory target”. 
 
In the case of the Ising model, these false causal factors refer to the dual 
representations (only up or down) of spins. Even though all physicists acknowledge 
that this assumption is false (too simplistic), another (and more detailed) 
characterization of this movement would not add something to our understanding of 
this ferromagnetic phenomenon. That means that the plurality of directions in the 
characterization of the spins’ orientation make no difference to the phenomenon—
this assumption is a way of asserting that the potential spins’ multi-orientation is 
irrelevant in the description of the phenomenon174. Although minimal explanation is 
presented by Strevens as the most appealing dimension of idealized models, the 
authors also emphasized other aspects that contributed to the use of such models in 
science:  
“Though an idealizing explanation is in certain way inferior to a canonical 
explanation, there are considerations of communicative effectiveness, 
descriptive and computational simplicity, and scientific economy that motivate 
the widespread use of idealization in explanation” (Strevens, 2011, p. 150)175. 
 
Hartmann (1998, p. 118) wrote that these core factors that are at the heart of 
minimalist models offer “partial understanding of the relevant mechanisms for the 
process under study” by providing cognitive tools for characterizing highly 
complicated dynamics. In the same vein, Cartwright (1989, p. 187) emphasized the 
cognitive dimension of these factors since they result from a mental operation in 
which “we strip away—in our imagination—all that is irrelevant to the concerns of the 
moment to focus on some single property or set of properties”.  
 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I explained that although the methodological 
diversification of econophysics into three different approaches all based on the same 
conceptual hard core, they aim at explaining the emergent properties based systems 
by using an asymptotic reasoning. This point is important, because in the literature 
                                                          
174
 There is a body of literature that is trying to solve the Ising model in several dimensions (for further 
information on this technical aspect, see Lundow and Markstrom, 2014).  
175
 By canonical explanation, Strevens (2011, p. 152) means “a causalist account of explanation”.  
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(Hartmann, 1988; Batterman; 2000, 2002; Strevens, 2011; Weisberg, 2016), the use 
of asymptotes in physics is a telling example of minimalist idealization used to study 
the behaviour of systems at the limits of certain physical magnitudes. As a reminder, 
Chapter 3 presented this asymptotic reasoning as a novel (not expected) and robust 
(regularly observed) pattern resulting from the idea that the macro system can be 
perceived as a sequence of micro systems whose parameters can go to infinity. 
More formally, for a complex system where n is the number of observations, we can 
write: 
                      (9) 
 
where T1 is the emerging property and T2 refers to the theory that represents the 
micro interactions. For each methodological approach, I justified the use of an 
asymptotic reasoning. Specifically, for statistical econophysics, I explained that, in 
this relationship, T1 refers to the power law observed at the macro level while T2 
instead characterizes the description of micro interactions. I also noted that the usual 
justification for the use of this limit refers to the necessity of dealing with a collection 
of 1023 micro components, which is infinite from a practical point of view. 
 
Why do I mention the asymptotic reasoning here? Simply because the asymptote 
plays an important role in the extension of the Ising model outside physics. To be 
precise, this conceptual framework is supposed to describe the behaviour of a large 
number of spins so that its extension in a non-physical environment requires a 
necessary condition: this model can be applied in an environment characterized by a 
high number of components. In biology, the human body is composed of a wide 
range of cells, implying that the study of DNA sequences meet this necessary 
condition (the polarization of spins being associated with the orientation of the 
nucleotides in the DNA walks). When the Ising model is imported into social 
sciences, modellers have to justify this methodological jump by showing that their 
reasoning is founded on interactions between a great number of micro components. 
In their article, Stanley et al. (1996) emphasized this necessity by using it as a 
justification for applying the Ising model in economics: “It is difficult to obtain large 
databases on human behaviour unless we turn to economics where not only does a 
wealth of data exist but also the ‘human behavior’ is subject to well-defined rules” 
(Stanley, 1996, p. 316.) In the second chapter, I explained how the computerization 
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of financial/economic reality contributed to the creation of huge databases, which 
facilitate the importing of statistical tools from physics. The role of the asymptote in 
physics has been emphasized by Batterman (2002), who explained that the use of 
this mathematical entity provides information about how complex systems would 
behave when some effects are removed. Specifically, the asymptotic reasoning 
offers “highly idealized minimal models of the universal, repeatable features of a 
system” (Batterman, 2002, p. 36). From this perspective, a model based on an 
asymptotic method aims at exhibiting a universal pattern for which adding more 
details to the minimal idealization would not improve the understanding of the target 
event.  
 
The Ising model can be presented as a minimalist model that is implicitly based on 
what Batterman (2002) called an asymptotic explanation, which assumes that the 
system has an infinite number of micro entities in order to explain and predict the 
behaviour of the real (and therefore finite) systems. Mathematically, this assumption 
of an infinity of components is a non-physical (necessary) condition required to 
explain a physically plausible situation (a transition phase or a sudden alignment of 
all spins). This situation is possible because of the properties of the asymptote 
offering an analytic method for which a system with an infinite number of 
components converges towards a singular behaviour whose characteristics can be 
describe in finite terms. This way of dealing with complex physical systems is quite 
common in contemporary physics, as Morrison (2016, p. 29) explained: 
“A good deal of asymptotic behaviour that is crucial for describing physical 
phenomena relies on exactly these kinds of mathematical abstractions 
[asymptotes]. What we classify as ‘emergent’ phenomena in physics such as 
the crystalline state, superfluidity, and ferromagnetism [Ising model] to name 
a few, are the result of phase transitions whose theoretical representation 
requires singularities; hence their understanding depends on just the kinds of 
mathematical abstractions described above […] our understanding of phase 
transitions is inextricably linked to the mathematics of singular limits”. 
 
Therefore, as a minimal model, the Ising model provides econophysicists with the 
necessary information to describe phenomena by exhibiting “how fundamental 
structural properties of a system generate common patterns among disparate 
phenomena” (Weisberg, 2016, p. 102). In so doing, the Ising model provides a 
mathematical characterization (how the spins behave) of a physical phenomenon 
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(magnetization of an iron specimen) that will help physicists to infer physical 
properties (the dynamics of the magnetization) about the system they are studying. 
An interesting question now is to ask how this physical information about the 
magnetization can be transferred in a non-physical environment. I will investigate this 
aspect in the following sub-section. 
 
III.2. The analogical extension of the Ising model to financial economics 
 
The Ising model is now “part of the common culture of physics, as the simplest 
representation of interacting elements with a finite number of possible states” 
(Sornette176, 2014, p. 17). This popularity of the model results from its mathematical 
structure, which can easily be applied to different contexts. As Taroni177 (2015, p. 
997) wrote, “Ising studied a deceptively simple model that, unknown to him at the 
time, captures the essential physics of an extremely wide category of problems. He 
may have been wrong in his 1925 work, but he tripped over a veritable physics 
goldmine”. This goldmine has been investigated by many physicists in different areas 
of their discipline (see McCoy and Maillard, 2012 for further details on the 
importance of Ising model in physics). By founding econophysics on the use of Ising 
model, Stanley et al. (1996) showed that this goldmine is not only restricted to 
physics. This trend was not new in the 1990s since other scholars had already 
modelled social interactions and organizations through the lens of the Ising model 
(Wiedlich, 1971, 1991, 2000; Callen and Shapiro, 1974; Montroll and Badger, 1974; 
Galam et al., 1982; Orlean, 1995). In these extensions of the model, authors usually 
characterize social phenomena, such as decisions in organizations, opinion polls or 
elections, by associating the formation of decisions with the magnetic orientations of 
spins (this specific literature is labelled “sociophysics”, see Galam, 2008 for a review 
of these works)178.  
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Some extensions of the Ising model also exist in economics 179 , where the 
polarization of the spins can be analogically used to describe the formation of 
decisions of bounded rational agents (Roehner and Sornette, 2000) or to result from 
optimizing agents whose utilities incorporate a social component (Phan et al., 2004). 
Such extensions of the Ising model are mainly focused on the binary choice model of 
socially interacting agents, which allows modellers to obtain an Ising-like system. For 
instance, a spin taking the value +1 can be associated to a buyer, while a “-1 spin” is 
presented as a seller. This way of modelling starts with a particular description of 
micro entities from which a macro behaviour will emerge—this way of modelling can 
be related to agent-based econophysics (see Eckrot et al., 2016 and Chapter 3 for 
an analysis of this methodology). 
 
The extension proposed by Stanley et al. (1996) when they created econophysics is 
quite different. They deal with what I called statistical econophysics. Indeed, the 
authors focused on the statistical evolution of large fluctuations of random variables 
around a normal (average) level of activity. In so doing, they started their analysis 
with specific results that were observed at the macro level of the systems, and they 
proposed an upstream reasoning showing that this macro behaviour can be 
perceived as the result of an Ising-like micro dynamics. Why did they think about this 
way of connecting the micro and the macro level? Simply because the macro 
patterns they observed exhibited specific statistical properties that are common for 
Ising-like systems. The core of this analogical extension is based on two 
components: the observation of a similar statistical structure (power law) and the 
element from which this pattern emerges (the dynamics of large fluctuations). The 
non-Gaussian nature of the evolution of financial prices is well known and called 
“stylized facts” in financial economics—these facts refers to anomalous that are not 
expected in relation to the theoretical mainstream (for which financial prices have a 
Gaussian dynamics) 180  whose large fluctuations are expected to be quasi non-
existent. By having an indeterminate variance, power laws that are at the heart of the 
Ising model violate the Gaussian assumptions (possibility to have a finite variance). 
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In other words, technically, what the Ising model allows the capture of is the 
statistical characterization of the correlation between the large variations. In a 
ferromagnetic environment, the Ising model describes that the length of correlations 
between spins (the process of magnetization) follows a power law, while in a 
financial context, the same model states that the length of correlations between large 
variations (which can be positive or negative) also follows a power law. 
Econophysicists extended the Ising model to the study of financial markets because 
they consider that the two systems or phenomena have something in common. From 
this perspective, the Ising model has been used as an analogical model for 
describing/representing an unfamiliar target system (extreme values in finance) in 
terms of a well-known/familiar framework (Ising model). In this context, it is important 
to understand the analogical reasoning used by econophysicists in their extension of 
the Ising model. This will be the aim of the following section. 
 
III.3. Analogy in econophysics 
 
An important literature exists for distinguishing analogical and metaphorical models 
(Hesse, 1953, 1964; Hutten 1954; Miller, 1996; Bradie, 1998; Bailer-Jones, 2002). 
Metaphorical models refer to a linguistic statement that has been transferred from 
one domain of application, where it commonly understood, to another domain in 
which it is unusual; whereas analogical models instead characterize statements that 
describe relational information through a transfer of a mathematical framework from 
one domain to another. In other words, metaphor is a simple descriptive comparison 
between two relevant domains (Bailer-Jones, 2009), while analogies are more likely 
to be mathematically formulated since they deal with similar dynamics, relations or 
processes observed in different domains—from this perspective, the extension of the 
Ising model by econophysicists in finance can be perceived as an analogical model. 
Roughly speaking, analogies are based on the understanding of something in terms 
of something else that is well understood and familiar. However, as Bailer-Jones 
(2009, p. 117) explained:  
“Being familiar does not equate with being understood, but familiarity can be 
a factor in understanding. This is also not to suggest that understanding can 
be reduce to the use of analogy, but having organized information in one 
domain (source) of exploration satisfactorily can help to make connections to 
and achieve the same in another domain (target). The aim is to apply the 
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same pattern assumptions of structural relationship in both source and the 
target domains”. 
 
In their seminal article, Stanley et al. (1996, p. 316) wrote, “The analogy between 
economics and critical phenomena [described by the Ising model] is sufficiently 
strong that a similar story might evolve.” It is worth emphasizing that the authors 
wrote the word “might”, showing therefore their deflationary perspective on the use of 
power law as a form in which the mind can grasp the complex nature of the 
phenomenon. In this context, the real question is to know if this Ising model (which 
gives physicists the opportunity to understand the process of magnetization very 
well) can really help to understand economic/financial phenomena. As mentioned 
earlier, the Ising model is used by econophysicists as an analogy between the 
source domain (physical systems) and the target domain (economic/financial 
systems). This reasoning can be summarized through a tabular representation found 
in Hesse (1966): 
Physical systems Economic/financial systems 
Known similarities 
Interacting elements Interacting agents 
High number of micro components High number of individual agents 
Complex micro interactions Complex micro behaviours 
Observational similarity 
Dynamics following a power law Dynamics following a power law 
Table 1: Similarities between physical and economic/financial systems. 
Hesse (1966) suggested clarifying the known similarities and observational ones to 
better understand the role of analogy in science. In accordance with this suggestion, 
I propose Table 1 above, where the horizontal relations are the relations of similarity 
in the mapping of the source and target domains, and the vertical relations are those 
between the objects and properties within each domain. What is interesting to 
emphasize here is the way of listing the horizontal similarities, because 
econophysicists and economists might agree on these aspects. However, the kind of 
conclusions one can draw from these characteristics would be totally different: while 
econophysicists consider that the emergence of a power law is an indication of 
complexity (Hughes, 1999); economists who use another statistical lens simply do 
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not see this power law. As Bartha (2013, p. 6) noticed, the “manner in which we list 
similarities and differences, the nature of the correspondences between domains: 
these things are left unspecified [in Hesse’s works]”. In the third part of this chapter, I 
will explain that these aspects are directly related to the modeller’s disciplinary 
matrix. 
 
Extending an earlier discussion on an analogy introduced by Keynes (1921), Hesse 
(1966) distinguished three kinds of analogies: negative, positive and neutral 
analogies. The former refers to relations that we know to be different between the 
two domains; the second one concerns the known (and acceptable) similarities and 
the latter characterizes what we do not know or what was not known before the 
association between the source and the target domains. In this sense, a negative 
analogy between physical systems and economic/financial ones could refer to the 
fact that in opposition with the former, the latter is composed of micro elements in 
economic/financial systems that have a human and social consciousness. The 
horizontal (known) similarities mentioned in the table above illustrate positive 
analogies, and the observational similarities could be seen as a neutral analogy in a 
sense that this similarity was neither assumed nor expected in the analogical 
association of the two domains. On this point, Frigg (2012, p. 14) wrote that “neutral 
analogies play an important role in scientific research because they give rise to 
questions and suggest new hypotheses”. In this occurrence, we can summarize the 









Physical Systems       Economic/financial systems  
Interacting elements      Interacting elements 
High number of micro components   High number of micro components 
Complex micro interactions     Complex micro interactions 
Non-human micro entities      Human agents 
Dynamics following a power law  
         Dynamics following a power law 
In this analogical reasoning, econophysics consider that the statement according to 
which the dynamics of an economic/financial system follows a power law is plausible 
because of certain known similarities in physical systems that generate this kind of 
dynamics. Of course such analogical extension requires a particular interpretation of 
the “plausibility criteria” evoked above. Hesse (1966, p. 87) explained that this 
plausibility must be “acceptable in a scientific sense” and she added that “a tendency 
to co-occurrence” is an essential requirement for a good analogical association. In 
the case of econophysicists, they explicitly associate this plausibility with the 
statistical patterns they observe in economic/financial data. From econophysicists’ 
perspective, the fact that power laws are regularly observed in empirical data and 
that these patterns can be explained mathematically appear to be an acceptable 
scientific reason for considering the plausibility evoked above. In other words, for 
econophysicists, this “co-occurrence” of power law in the source and target domains 
takes the form of a formal analogy.  
Hesse (1966) distinguishes between two categories of analogies: formal ones and 
material ones. When the analogous refers to material entities (material analogy), the 
association between two domains is mainly based on the sameness or resemblance 
of common properties. These similarities being observable, the three levels of 
analogy evoked above are always present, but the negative one appears to be more 
obvious (Mellor, 1968). For instance, Earth and Mars are both stellar bodies, 









these common properties also makes obvious their differences: the absence of 
water/atmosphere on Mars, the distance between these two bodies and the sun, the 
periodicity of their respective circumvolution, etc. When two systems are related by 
formal analogy, they are both interpreted through the same mathematical framework. 
Very often, this kind of analogy concerns a situation in which the dynamics between 
certain ingredients within one domain are perceived as identical (or comparable) to 
the relations between elements of another domain (Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 57). 
According to Mellor (1968) and Falkenhainer et al. (1989), when the analog between 
two domains refers to relations or dynamics, then, although the negative analogy is 
still present, it is less important, since only the formal evolution of the domain is 
taken as a formal analogy that focuses on the interrelationships between elements 
rather than their resemblances. 
The Ising model has been analogically extended from physics to economic/financial 
systems because the formal characterization of its dynamics seems to be applicable 
for describing complex economic/financial dynamics. In other words, the Ising model 
is a formal analogy between a ferromagnetic system and an economic/financial 
system where the neutral analogy takes the form of a mathematical characterization 
(power law) of what was considered a statistical anomaly (occurrence of large 
fluctuations) by the existing financial (mainstream) knowledge. Given that, one could 
legitimately question the explanatory nature of a model that is used to explain 
several diverse phenomena. What do economists think about this extension? Do 
they consider it as scientific?  
 
When Stanley et al. (1996) extended the Ising model in economics they also 
implicitly imported the scientific fabric usually associated with this model. Articles 
dealing with econophysics are mainly published in physics journals and assume that 
readers have a specific disciplinary background for understanding this type of 
research. For instance, the Ising model and the renormalization group theory are 
both well known for all statistical physics; and these two frameworks are often 
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considered as the theoretical foundations econophysics181. For econophysicists, the 
epistemological justification of their works is quite simple: they use a familiar 
theoretical framework to describe complex phenomena that exhibits the same key 
features required to be studied through this frame. In other words, econophysicists 
did not produce their models out of nowhere: given the specific characteristics 
(emergence of extreme values in a particular dynamics) that they observe as 
physicists, they choose what appears for them to be an appropriate model (Ising 
model) to describe this phenomenon. This approach is justified in two ways: by 
scientific foundations of this familiar framework and by the empirical adequacy of 
results (what I previously associated with the co-occurrence of power laws in the 
physical and financial systems). Such extension of physics to another context is 
implicitly based on a justification that is internally (disciplinary) warranted but that can 
be questioned by scholars who are not familiar with physics. To better understand 
the disciplinary differences between financial economists and econophysicists, these 
questions must be analyzed from a different perspective: first from the viewpoint of 
an econophysicist and then from an economist’s perspective. I will deal with these 
questions in the rest of this chapter. In the following subsection, I will initiate this 
analysis by explaining how econophysicists implicitly promote a Duhemian way of 
perceiving scientific research by extending their work into economics. 
 
III.4. Econophysics as a Duhemian field 
 
Econophysics has been developed by physicists who applied their methods to 
economic data. In so doing, they went out of their discipline and they cannot avoid 
facing the judgement of economists willing to protect their “disciplinary territory”. 
Although economists acknowledge the technical knowhow of econophysicists, they 
are reluctant with such kinds of research simply because they consider that these 
works do not meet their scientific standards (as I will detail in the following section). 
These disagreements are rooted in a set of communal cognitive values/tools that 
shape the foundations of scientific justification in both communities. As explained 
next, these foundations are read/understood differently in the two disciplinary 
contexts.  
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The way econophysicists have applied their knowledge to economics and finance is 
in line with a Duhemian use of analogy. Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) was a French 
physicist and philosopher well known for his works on the “Newtonian” (inductive) 
and the “Cartesian” methods (Ariew, 2014). Although the notion of analogy is not 
ubiquitous in Duhem’s works, he referred to this concept when he wrote about how 
physics as a field can evolve. More precisely, he explained that “The history of 
physics shows us that the search for analogies between two distinct categories of 
phenomena has perhaps been the surest and most fruitful method of all the 
procedures put in play in the constructions of physical theories” (Duhem, 1954, p. 
95). The French physicist illustrated his claim with a study on the Maxwell’s analogy 
between electrical flow and heat, where he considered analogies as a final 
relationship between phenomena and theoretical treatment of phenomena. 
Precisely, he wrote: 
“it may happen that the equations in which one of the theories is formulated is 
algebraically identical to the equation expressing the other […] [analogies 
are] intellectual economy, a method of discovery by associating two abstract 
systems; either one of them already known or both being formulated, they 
clarify each other” (Duhem, 1914 [1954], p. 96–97). 
 
This reasoning per analogiam is also presented by Duhem as a way of 
understanding science as a human activity that develops in time and requires 
transgressions across the borders of the domain under investigation (Schafer, 2006); 
the development of econophysics seems to result from such a way of defining 
scientific activity. According to Duhem, scientists are not free in their choice of 
assumptions or models at a given time. Scientific knowledge, experience and even 
scientists’ common sense are always somewhat related to a specific tradition. In this 
sense, theories of the past act as the “nuclei of the victorious theories of the future” 
(Schafer, 2006, p. 80). In other words, the analogical extension of knowledge is 
always constrained by a particular conceptual framework in which what is observed 
and how this thing is observed cannot be totally separated (Duhem, 1914 [1954]). 
Such a perspective is interesting because it offers a mode of transfer for analogies. 
Regarding econophysics, in particular, the previous section showed that thanks to 
Hesse’s works, this kind of analogy (formal one) is the one that econophysicists are 
implementing in their modelling practices. However, the justification of this transfer of 
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this formal analogy from physics to economics/finance requires a Duhemian analysis 
in order to understand what happens in the econophysicists’ minds. By applying the 
Ising model and its statistical characterization (i.e. power law) in economics and 
finance, econophysicists gradually and analogically extended the epistemic domain 
of this well-known model to be in line with Duhemian use of analogy. What is 
specifically Duhemian in the formal analogies proposed by econophysicists is the 
way these scientists conjointly extend the analogical properties and the theoretical 
framework justifying these properties to economics and finance. To propose a formal 
analogy between economic/financial systems and the Ising model is one thing, but to 
simultaneously extend analogues and the theoretical framework into financial 
economics is a Duhemian step further. Analogies (and their consequences), like 
assumptions, cannot be formulated in isolation from the peculiar theoretical frame 
that supports them. Duhem (1914 [1954]) explained that this kind of extension does 
not pop up from nowhere as the result of scholars’ individual arbitrariness, but rather 
that it results from the gradual development of a logic that belongs to a specific 
tradition. Regarding this aspect, Schafer (2006) wrote:  
“Reasoning by analogy has to start with previous knowledge. It has to rely on 
ideas that are familiar and have proved to be useful in a particular field of 
research. These ideas are, then, per analogiam, carried over in a new 
domain. Applying familiar ideas to new domain implies usually modifications 
in the inherited body of knowledge; every genuine development of science 
does not only add new materials to former knowledge but does single out 
certain sections as no longer tenable. New knowledge, if new it is, will negate 
some part of other if the received knowledge” (Schafer, 2006, p. 84). 
 
This Duhemian use of analogy has some epistemological consequences, as 
Schafer, 2006, p. 80) explained: 
“his [Duhem] reconstruction of physics required the strict abolition of 
explanatory ambition […] and restriction to the descriptive function of physical 
theory. According to this, the only appraisal of physical theory that could 
claim to be rational consisted in the check of empirical adequacy which is 
restricted to the purely internal context of justification” (Schafer, 2006, p. 80). 
 
From this perspective, econophysics is not perceived by econophysicists as a simple 
analogy, but rather as a justified new way of dealing with financial/economic 
systems. This situation explains why econophysicists believe that they could replace 
(or they are totally indifferent to) the existing economic knowledge. Such a Duhemian 
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way of dealing with an imported analogy as a replacement182 for existing knowledge 
will allow me to clarify how econophysicists bring their reasoning into economics and 
finance. First of all, Duhem acknowledged that a mathematical structure of a model 
is the core of physics—precisely, he considered that “a physical theory is a system of 
mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles that aim to 
represent as simply as completely and exactly as possible a set of experimental 
laws” (Duhem, 1914 [1954], p. 9). In so doing, Duhem emphasized the dominance of 
the mathematical deductive method in physics. By combining the Duhemian use of 
analogy in the extension of knowledge and the importance of this deductive 
reasoning, we can now summarize the analogical reasoning econophysicists have in 
mind:  
 
Statement 1: Complex phenomena are composed by a high number of 
interacting micro elements that generate a dynamics that can be described 
by a power law. 
Statement 2: Financial markets/economic systems are complex phenomena. 
Conclusion: Financial markets/economic systems exhibit power laws. 
 
Beyond the plausibility of the conclusion, which is often justified through the co-
occurrence of power laws in physical and economic/financial systems, what is 
interesting in this reasoning is the association between the power law and the notion 
of complex phenomenon. This way of associating an observable statement with a 
scientific fact is quite common in science, as Feyerabend wrote: 
“As soon this method [here the association of power law with critical 
phenomena] is generally accepted and has been standardized, it is only a 
question of time until no conscious distinction is drawn between the presence 
of the criterion and the presence of S itself. The presence of the criterion no 
longer comes into consideration on its own, but one immediately says without 
further ado that S itself occurred: S has become directly observable” 
(Feyerabend, 1999, p. 19). 
 
This way of developing physics is in accordance with Duhem’s approach in which 
only abstract and general principles (experimental law) can guide the scholars’ mind 
in unknown situations. The epistemological foundations of this reasoning are 
regularly emphasized by econophysicists (Mantegna, 1991; Stanley et al., 1996; 
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Gabaix, 2009). This “deductive import”183 of statistical physics into economics and 
finance appears to be an extension of physics itself rather than an interdisciplinary 
attempt to develop knowledge in collaboration with another existing field. The fact 
that the majority of articles dealing with econophysics are published in physics 
journals is an indicator of the disciplinary background expected to understand this 
kind of research. As explained above, the theoretical foundations of econophysics 
refer to the Ising model and renormalization group theory, which are well known for 
all statistical physicists. Therefore, for econophysicists, the epistemological 
justification of their works is quite simple: they used a familiar theoretical framework 
to describe complex phenomena that all have key features required to be studied 
through this framework. This approach is then justified in two ways: 1) the 
familiarity/scientific foundations of the imported framework and, 2) the empirical 
adequacy of results (the co-occurrence of statistical patterns in physical and 
economic/financial systems). From a Duhemian perspective, this analogical 
extension of physics is justified for econophysicists only because the internal logics 
of their field are respected.  
 
While the previous section clarified, through Hesse’s work, the kind of analogy 
econophysicists use; this section defended that Duhem’s writings offer an interesting 
framework for understanding how econophysicists justify their analogical extension 
of physics into economics/finance. I claimed here that, from a physicist’s point of 
view, statistical econophysics can be perceived as an analogical and idealized 
extension of the Ising model (and renormalization group theory), which appear to be 
theoretically, empirically and logically justified. This perspective is not shared by 
financial economists, as the following part will detail. 
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Part III: Modelling practices in financial economics 
 
 
IV. Justification of knowledge: Financial economists’ view point 
 
As mentioned earlier, this dissertation deals only with financial economics, which is 
the major area of knowledge where physicists extended their works. Although the 
previous section detailed how econophysicists justify their research, financial 
economists do not perceive this extension of physics in the same way. Financial 
economists and physicists belong to two distinct scientific communities that are 
structured by a different disciplinary fabric. In this context, concepts, methods and 
even standards vary. For instance, I explained in the first chapter why the visual 
tests (used by econophysicists) confirming the existence of power laws are not 
considered as a sufficient test for financial economists184 . In the light of these 
disciplinary considerations, one could wonder about the following questions: to what 
extent is the generation of economic knowledge different from the one produced by 
econophysicists? What kind of justification do economists use? How do financial 
economists perceive econophysics in light of their disciplinary standards? The rest of 
this chapter will deal with these questions. 
 
IV.1. The heritage of econometrics 
 
The Nobel memorial prize laureate, James Heckman (2000, p. 46), explained that 
“Economists are the people of the model”. Although these words witness the 
importance of the notion of model in financial economics, it would be naïve to 
consider that this area of knowledge is based on a unique way of modelling. 
Financial economics is methodologically dominated by a particular mainstream (so 
called neo-classical financial185 and that shape all textbooks of the field), which I plan 
to present here. More precisely, I will discuss how financial economists produce 
knowledge related to the treatment of financial data (since this is the area 
investigated by econophysicists). To illustrate the modelling practices in financial 
economics, it is important to understand the influence of econometrics on the field. In 
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particular, econometrics defined the methodological foundations of modern finance. 
This section aims to provide an overview of the key elements of this influence. This 
analysis will give me the opportunity to show that, surprisingly, financial economists 
and econophysicists have a very different disciplinary fabric, so that the communities 
seem to face an incommensurability of perception and standards. I will detail these 
claims in the following sub-sections (and discuss the incommensurability aspect in 
the last section of this chapter). 
 
In the 1930s, the emergence of econometrics marked the first mathematizing period 
of economic theory that was based on statistical measurement of economic/financial 
facts. In the second chapter, I explained how the scientific imaginary coming from 
physics and physicists themselves played an important role in the emergence of 
econometrics (Mirowski, 1989b; Morgan, 1990; Legall, 1994). Physicists like Ragnar 
Frisch, Harold Davis, Tjalling Koopmans, Henry Schultz, Trygge Haavelmo, Gerhard 
Tintner, Harold Hotelling, Charles Roos and Jacob Marshak contributed to the 
development of new techniques of dealing with economic data (Miroswki, 1989b). 
Their efforts allowed the rise of “econometrics”, which was institutionalized under the 
roof of the Cowles Commission, which was founded in 1932. The commission 
promoted the mathematical formalism (Mirowski, 1989b, 1996; Morgan, 1990) that 
was supposed to reinforce the scientific method in economics. Because this 
Commission legitimated and defined the scope of econometrics, it became 
progressively an important institution that supported by other big foundations (for 
example, the Rockefeller Foundation, see Rutherford, 2011, p. 28 or Rockefeller 
Foundation archives 1903–2013). After the 1940s, the Cowles Commission became 
more and more statistics-orientated and its leading members (Jacob Marshak and 
Tjalling Koopmans) developed their famous estimation methods that were in line 
with the inference approach promoted by Pearson (1924; Neyman and Pearson, 
1928).  
 
Econometrics can be considered as a statistical way of making visible hidden causal 
relationships between economic variables (Hoover, 2013). As explained in the 
second chapter, the identification of these variables requires an a priori formulation 
of potential interactions. In other words, financial economists do not consider that 
data speak for themselves; a particular hypothesis must be assumed to “say 
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something” about the data. As evoked in the first chapter, this a priori statement 
usually comes from economic theory and it is used to set up the initial conditions of 
the formalized systems. In this approach, hypotheses are the first step of the 
modelling process where the “model becomes an a priori hypothesis about real 
phenomena” (Haavelmo, 1944, p. 8). As I will explain in the following section, this a 
priori hypothesis often takes the form of a Galilean idealization (Kuoriskoski et al., 
2007) that comes from economic theory. It is worth mentioning here that the idea of 
“a priori knowledge” used by financial economists does not refer to the same 
concepts in the philosophy of science. Precisely, economists consider that a priori 
knowledge is an idealized assumption that is based on a theoretical framework, 
whereas philosophers instead associate this notion with a statement that one can 
have without any input from the world186. In other words, because econometrics 
analysis requires a particular assumption to be tested, this way of modelling consists 
of applying “statistical methods to economic data to test economic theories," (Sowey, 
1983, p. 257—my italics). This reference to a priori economic theory is often explicitly 
mentioned in the definition of the field, as the following example shows: 
“Econometrics as it is taught in textbooks—and even as it is sometimes 
practiced—focuses on the second use of statistical tests as if we had a priori 
knowledge of the structure of the model to be estimated” (Hoover, 2013, p. 
53—my italics). 
 
In this methodological context, one can notice and wonder with Hoover (2013): 
“That knowledge is not in the observable data. How do we know it? The 
standard answer to this question among economists—going back at least to 
Haavelmo’s seminal ‘Probability approach in econometrics’ (1944)—is that it 
is a priori knowledge based in economic theory. But how did we come to 
have such knowledge? Indeed, this question is hardly ever addressed […] 
We need to have a model with known properties that maps well onto 
properties of the world. Is there a systematic method for obtaining such 
knowledge? The answer must be, no, if econometrics, as it is presented in 
many (perhaps most) textbooks, is limited to the problem of statistical 
estimation of the parameters of structures assumed to be known in advance” 
(Hoover, 2013, p. 49). 
 
The justification of such an a priori method is justified by the fact that economics 
deals with variables that are not observable by themselves. Indeed, variables used 
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by economists result from interactions among these unobservables and, “without 
further information it is, in general, not possible to infer the behaviour of the 
unobservables from the observables” (Hoover, 1994, p. 68).  
Since econophysicists mainly deal with the dynamics of financial markets, I will 
focus my attention here on the a priori knowledge used by financial economists in 
their way of modelling this dynamic. Roughly speaking, this knowledge is composed 
by the combination of two conceptual frameworks: one dealing with the behaviour of 
micro entities (agents are considered as perfectly rational) and another one related 
to the macro behaviours of these elements (macro dynamics of the system is 
assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution). 
The statement according to which economic actors are perfectly rational is today 
well known and it dates back to the early time when economics tried to change itself 
into a more scientific area by mathematizing its foundations. From an abstract value-
orientated theory, economic methodology evolved towards a more mathematized 
formulation in which agents maximize their utility function. This idea is quite simple: 
an economic actor is assumed to act rationally because she/he maximizes her/his 
utility logically consistent with a given set of conditions (i.e. set of goods and their 
prices). Since real economic agents are not perfectly rational as defined by 
economists, such representation can be presented as an idealization. Financial 
economists acknowledge this aspect as mentioned by Hahn and Hollis (1979): 
“The rational man of pure theory is an ideal type in the sense not only of 
being an idealization where the theory holds without qualification but also of 
being a model to copy, a guide to action. In pointing the way to satisfy a given 
set of ordered preferences, the theorist gives reasons for action” (Hahn and 
Hollis, 1979, p. 1,979). 
 
The perfect rationality frame appears as a mathematical idealization that has been 
“designed for interpreting observed consequences of men’s actions” and not for 
interpreting the actions themselves (Machlup, 1978, p. 281). This use of 
mathematics as an idealization echoes what philosophers call a Galilean 
idealization, which is associated with “the practice of introducing distortion into 
models with the goal of simplifying, in order to make them more mathematically or 
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computationally tractable” (Wiesberg, 2016, p. 99). The example of the pendulum is 
a good illustration of such in which modellers subtract all elements that are not 
related to the studied phenomenon in order to focus on “a mathematical formalism in 
the hope that essentials of that situation (from the point of view of the science one is 
pursuing) will lend themselves to mathematical representations” (McMullin, 1985 
cited in Morgan, 2012, p. 148). Galilean idealization is mainly justified pragmatically 
to provide a simplification in order to learn something from a complex situation.  
The use of Galilean idealization as a starting point for an explanation is often 
emphasized in the literature. Batterman (2008) and Weisberg (2016) promoted the 
use of such idealization as a first modelling step in the identification of minimal 
parameters that characterize a particular phenomenon. In economics, Hausman 
(1994) and Kuorikoski et al. (2007) explained that Galilean idealizations played a 
key role in the foundational knowledge (perfect rationality, perfect competition, etc.) 
while Morgan (2015) justifies such idealization through the Ceteris Paribus clause 
according to which “all other things [than components of the idealization] remain 
unchanged”. For Cartwright (1999), the Galilean idealization would be a price worth 
paying for financial economists to have a kind of robustness in their models. In this 
context, financial economists focus on general tendencies as an element of the 
idealization, allowing them to develop an internal validity in their field (I will come 
back to this aspect shortly). Maki (2012) discussed the Galilean idealization in 
economics through the lens of what he called “the method of isolation” (Maki, 2012, 
p. 218) by explaining the methodological reasons for why economic modellers have 
to start with isolations 187 . In this context, one can wonder how a partial 
representation can explain a phenomenon. This question refers to two aspects: the 
modeller’s epistemological objectives and the ability of an idealization to be 
improved or de-idealized. Because it covers the first step of the modelling practices, 
the use of Galilean idealization is also related to the epistemological aims of the 
modellers. On this point, Cartwright (1999) and Kuorikosli et al. (2007) explained 
that idealizations provide financial economists with the perfect conceptual tools to 
build a Babylonian (Euclidian) field (Kuorikosli et al., 2007) based on “an internal 
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 Maki (2012) explicitly associated the concept of isolation with a Galilean idealization (see Maki, 
2012, p. 222). 
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justification” (Cartwright, 1999). In a sense, the Galilean idealization would be an 
appropriate starting point in modelling to guarantee the coherence of the reasoning 
in accordance with an existing theory. 
 
The idea of de-idealization refers to a process of removing distortion and adding 
back details to the representation (Weisberg, 2016). In so doing, models can be 
made more specific by eliminating simplifying assumptions and de-idealization. 
From this perspective, the process of de-idealization can become a basis for a 
continuing research programme (McMullin, 1985). The next section will detail further 
what the major Galilean idealizations are that are used by financial economists and 
how de-idealization makes sense for these scientists. 
 
IV.2. Galilean idealization in financial economics 
 
The frame based on the perfect rationality is at the core of economics and finance 
and many economists (and many textbooks) still use this assumption in their 
modelling tasks. This idealized vision is still strong and it has been presented as a 
pillar of financial economics (Arrow, 1986). The concept of perfect rationality has its 
logical roots in the well known expected utility theory developed by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944). Specifically, these two authors defined a list of axioms 
(comparability, transitivity, continuity, independence, interchangeability and risk 
aversion 188 ) that allow them to characterize the decision-making process of a 
rational economic agent. As Frankfurter (2007, p. 9) detailed, “financial economics 
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 Comparability: the agent prefers A to B, B to A or is indifferent to A and B. 
Transitivity: if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C then A is preferred to C. 
Continuity: if A is preferred to B and B to C, then there is a probability P that the agent would be 
indifferent to the certain outcome of B and an uncertain outcome. 
Independence: if the agent is indifferent to the certain outcomes of A and B; and C is any other certain 
outcome then he/she is also indifferent to the uncertain outcomes. 
Interchangeability: “if the agent is indifferent to two uncorrelated risky incomes then the sequences 
that produce them are interchangeable in any investment strategies” (Frankfurter, 2007, p.9).  
Risk aversion: if A and B produce the same outcome but that there is a probability Pa > Pb of having 




adopted these axioms without much questions or criticisms from the early start of 
Markowitz (1952) and thereafter”. Indeed, while these axioms allowed Markowitz 
(1952) to explicitly refer to Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory to set up the 
theoretical foundations of the emerging financial economics with his portfolio theory 
(Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2013), the other key models of the field (Capital Asset 
Pricing Model; Black-Scholes model, Efficient Market Model, etc.) also assume that 
all investors are perfectly rational. In so doing, financial economists implicitly agreed 
on what the relevant assumptions are to pose to characterize the agents’ 
behaviours. This perfect rationality has been presented in the literature as a Galilean 
idealization (Morgan, 2015), which some economists tried to de-idealize by 
integrating more realistic assumptions while preserving the initial (core) framework. 
The emergence of behavioural finance in the 1980s, for instance, can be presented 
as an attempt at de-idealizing the perfect rationality. The seminal work of this field is 
called the “prospect theory” developed by Kahnemann and Tversky (1978) who 
showed that perfect rationality framework is a specific case of a more generalized 
formulation of human rationality, integrating some psychological biases such as 
over/under-estimation, aversion for losses (instead of risk), etc.189.  
 
The second major component of the a priori knowledge assumed by financial 
economists refers to the way of dealing with the macro dynamics of the financial 
markets where the evolution of prices is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution. 
Although there is a huge body of literature that deals with the technical way of using 
the Gaussian framework in financial economics (see Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017 
for a good review), very few works focus on the epistemological aspects of this a 
priori knowledge. The first two writers to use tools that came out of modern 
probability theory to study financial markets were Harry Markowitz and A. D. Roy in 
1952. Both published an article about portfolio theory by formalizing an old saying 
advising investors: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. Precisely, these two 
authors showed that this adage can mathematically be described by the fact that the 
expected value of a weighted sum is the weighted sum of the expected values, while 
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the variance of a weighted sum is not the weighted sum of the variances (because 
we have to take covariance into account). In financial terms, that means that 
diversification of investments can statistically reduce the variance (risk) of the 
portfolio. These two seminal papers (Markowitz, 1952; Roy, 1952) assumed that 
investors were perfectly rational and they used the Gaussian distribution to describe 
the evolution of financial markets. Markowitz (1952) acknowledged that this 
statistical frame was not the most appropriate for characterizing the evolution of 
financial prices, but he considered the Gaussian distribution to be the most 
convenient. He decided to adopt it for pragmatic reasons, as he explained in his 
book that he published some years later, “Some [other] measures which seem 
reasonable offhand produce completely unsatisfactory portfolio solutions […] The 
standard deviation [Gaussian distribution] is easier to use, more familiar to many 
and perhaps easier to interpret” (Markowitz, 1959, p. 77). This argument is still very 
common in financial textbooks where Gaussian distribution is often presented as an 
idealized approximation of the dynamics of financial prices, as illustrated by the 
words of Fama (1976):  
“Although the evidence also suggests that distributions of monthly returns are 
slightly leptokurtic relative to normal distributions, let us tentatively accept the 
normal model as a working approximation for monthly returns […]. If the 
model does well on this score [on how well it describes observed 
relationships between average returns and risk], we can live with the small 
observed departures from normality in monthly returns, at least until better 
models come along” (Fama, 1976b, p. 38).  
 
The major advantage of this mathematical idealization refers to the fact that the 
Gaussian distribution is the only class of distributions for that the mean and the 
standard deviation are sufficient to describe the whole dynamics. Such a situation 
led some critical authors like Nicolas Taleb190 or George Soros191 to use provocative 
formulation to describe the current importance of the Gaussian distribution in 
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 Nicolas Taleb (born in 1960) is an American (originally from Lebanon) academic and essayist 
working on probability and uncertainty in finance. A statistician and former trader, Taleb is well-known 
for his book “Black Swan”, which criticized the financial mainstream for its inability to characterize rare 
events or fluctuations occurring on the financial markets. 
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 George Soros (born in 1930) is an American (originally from Hungary) investor and business 
magnate. He is recognised worldwide as a philanthropist and essayist. His books (Soros, 1987, 2006, 




finance. Taleb (2006), for instance, wrote that “you need nothing else. The bell curve 
satisfies the reductionism of the deluded” (Taleb, 2006, p. 242). Such a provocative 
statement illustrates the fiery debates generated by the Gaussian distribution. There 
is another aspect that can be mentioned regarding the influence of the terminology 
used to characterize the Gaussian distribution. Although the mathematician Carl 
Frederich Gauss (1777–1855) worked on the mathematical nature of this distribution 
he did not extent it to characterize processes in reality. This extension is mainly due 
to Adolphe Quételet (1796–1894) who popularized the Gaussian distribution by 
using this framework to describe human features (weight, height, etc.). Quételet 
came up with the notion of “average human” whose association with “normal human” 
coined the usual synonymy between “Gaussian law” and “normal law” (Fendler and 
Muzzafar, 2008). This association had an important influence on the terminology 
used to present the statistical characteristics of the Gaussian distribution. This is a 
debatable aspect of this distribution: all deviations from the average (that refers to 
the “normality”) have been called “errors”. Gradually, “divergence from the mean was 
treated precisely as an error” (Taleb, 2006, p. 245). This is exactly what one can 
observe in finance textbooks where financial prices are assumed to follow a normal 
law whose larger variations are presented as “errors” or “anomalies”. Frankfurter and 
McGoun (1999) explained how this terminology tended to marginalize the works 
dealing with large statistical deviations that are associated with the literature of 
“anomalies” in finance. As mentioned in the first chapter, there is an important body 
of literature devoted to the treatment of extreme values192 —actually, this literature 
even become an important part of finance where, although scholars acknowledge 
that the Gaussian distribution is not the best description of the evolution of prices, 
they keep it as a first idealization that they de-idealize through the development of a 
conditional analysis. Precisely, in the first chapter, I explained that the statistical 
description of financial prices can roughly be characterized by the following 
relationship that characterizes the evolution of a particular variable: 
 
                        (10)
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 See Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017 for an extended review of literature of these works. 
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Where μ is the mean, σ² is the variance and Ɛ is the statistical error. This statistical 
equation can also be expressed as: 
 
           (11)  
I discussed these elements earlier in this dissertation. What is interesting for the 
purpose of this chapter is the decomposition of the analysis into two elements: an 
unconditional (Gaussian) ingredient  and a conditional ingredient ( ). 
While the first refers to the idealized part of the explanation (Gaussian description), 
the conditional component refers to the de-idealization of the explanation, since this 
second part has been added to deal with empirical data that cannot be captured by 
the normal distribution.  
This will to keep the Gaussian framework in the financial mainstream is mainly due 
to the fact that all key models193 were developed in a Gaussian world (Bernstein, 
1994). In other words, since the first works in modern finance in the 1960s, 
Gaussian distribution has been considered to be the law ruling any random 
phenomena. Indeed, the authors based their stochastic models on results deduced 
from the central-limit theorem, which led to the systematic use of Gaussian 
distribution. From this perspective, the major objective of these developments was to 
“reveal” the Gaussian distribution in the data or at least to show that we can use this 
distribution to describe the evolution of financial prices. When observations did not fit 
with the normal distribution or showed extreme values, authors commonly used a 
log-linear transformation to obtain the normal distribution 194 . This situation also 
opened a door for several potential improvements that consist of capturing extreme 
variations with an additional (and not necessary Gaussian) distribution—this is the 
idea of the combination exposed above. The conditional distribution characterizing 
the deviances is a “corrective tool” that can be perceived as a de-idealization of the 
main (Gaussian) trend. The former must be kept and assumed for theoretical 
reasons, as Fama (1976) explained clearly: 
“although most of the models of the theory of finance can be developed from 
the assumption of stable non-normal return distributions […] the cost of 
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rejecting normality for securities returns in favour of stable non-normal 
distributions are substantial” (Fama, 1976b, p. 26). 
 
 
Beyond the historical importance of the Gaussian distribution 195 , some authors 
(McGoun and Frankfurter, 1999) have also stressed the ideological dimension of a 
Gaussian random. The economic mainstream is well known to be opposed to all 
kinds of interventionism and, in this context, a normal law would be the best 
statistical justification for the fairness of financial markets simply because it implies 
that actors have the same probability of losing or wining money. Therefore, all forms 
of intervention would make the markets inefficient.  
 
In this part, I identified the major rules for the production of models in financial 
economics where Galilean idealizations play a key role in the starting 
representations of the behaviours of agents and markets. Methodologically 
speaking, the financial mainstream is therefore based on an a priori statement 
(Galilean idealization) that is statistically implemented in financial/economic data. 
The question is now to see how this knowledge can be justified. This will be the topic 
of the next sub-section. 
IV.3. The importance of the statistical significance 
 
This section will investigate the standards by which financial economists justify their 
modelling practices. The objective of the econometric method largely used by 
financial economists is to test statistically admissible models that are used to 
evaluate economic theory (Hendry, 1980). In this sense, the process of validation is 
often presented as a statistical problem. The relationship between economic theory 
and economic data is formalized through a probabilistic framework in which 
econometrics models provide a particular explanation in terms of measurement of 
errors (Morgan, 1990). In other words, these models specify the probabilistic 
conditions under which the (a priori) theory is expected to hold. Such approach is 
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justified by the necessity of measuring the gap between theory and facts. In so 
doing, financial economists became increasingly obsessed with statistical tests in 
order to ensure the significance (validity) of their works. To illustrate this claim, 
Hendry (1980, p. 390) wrote that “Economists have found their Philosophers’ stone: 
transforming data into significant results” before adding:  
“The three golden rules of econometrics are test, test and test; that all three 
rules are broken regularly in empirical applications is fortunately easily 
remedied [by corrective methodology presented in the previous section]. 
Rigorously tested models, which adequately described the available data, 
encompassed previous findings and were derived from well based theories 
would greatly enhance any claim to be scientific” (Hendry, 1980, p. 403). 
 
Economists use and abuse196 statistical tests to give a particular legitimacy to their 
fields. But what kind of legitimacy are we talking about? For the economic 
mainstream, the significance of statistical tests is a required methodological 
condition to be accepted as a justified explanation. In this context, financial 
economists implement a priori knowledge to explain the evolution of financial prices, 
justifying this methodology through a panoply of statistical tests aiming to provide a 
quantitative validation of this a priori knowledge. The idea is therefore to determine 
whether there is enough evidence to reject or accept this initial knowledge. When 
statistical tests are significant, that means that modeller has good statistical reasons 
to “believe” in assumptions suggested in the modelled process. However, as Clauset 
et al. (2009, p. 19) mentioned, “statistical tests can be used to rule out specific 
hypotheses, but it is up to the researcher to decide what a reasonable hypothesis is 
in the first place”. In other words, these tests provide information about the way of 
dealing with knowledge but not about the knowledge itself. If statistical tests estimate 
the degree of belief we can place on the theory, the latter cannot be used as a 
benchmark to define the significance of the former. However, “to interpret an 
estimate of a parameter, we must have a model in which the parameter is 
meaningful” (Hoover, 2013, p. 52). This specific part of modelling refers to what 
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 This reference to a potential abuse of statistical tests echoes a reflexive paper published in 1995 
by Keuzenkamp and Magnus (1995) in which the authors wrote that in some articles, statistical tests 
seem to be the major purpose of the economic research. More precisely, they explained that 
“Sometimes one wonders about the abundance of tests reported in empirical papers, as the purpose 
of many of these tests is not always communicated to the reader. Occasionally, the number of test 
statistics reported in a paper exceeds the number of observations used in calculating them! In many 
cases, the implications, of a positive or negative result are not made clear” (Keuzenkamp and 
Magnus, 1995, p. 6). 
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economists call the “data generation process—DGP” (Keuzenkamp, 2000, p. 5) 
which defines the set of statistical conditions under which empirical data can be 
studied. Statistically speaking, the Gaussian distribution can be perceived as a 
particular set of conditions that define the theoretical benchmark for interpreting 
statistical tests. It is worth mentioning here that, like econophysicists “who see power 
laws everywhere”, economists also expect to see Gaussian distribution in every 
sample of data. This particular situation has been discussed by Keuzenkamp (2000, 
p. 6), who wrote that, “although the DGP is sometimes presented as hypothetical, 
there is a tendency to view the DGP as fact or reality […] The DGP is reality and 
model of reality at the same time”. In this context, all statistical procedures, such as 
correlation, regression, t-tests and analysis of variance, etc., which are usually called 
parametric tests, are based on the assumption that data follow a normal law 
(Ghasein and Zahediasl, 2012). A diversity of statistical tests exists to estimate the 
significance of empirical data: Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Lilliefors test, chi square test, t-
test, shapiro-test, Jarque-Bera test, etc.—all of them developed to capture technical 
aspects (variation, skewness, asymmetry, etc.) of a process described through a 
Gaussian lens. These tests share the hypothesis of normality because the vast 
majority of statistical tests have been based on the properties of the central-limit 
theorem. Financial economists, particularly Fama and Mandelbrot, discussed this 
issue and its consequences in the 1960s197 by acknowledging the lack of statistical 
tools: 
“... there are admittedly difficult problems involved in applying [portfolio 
models with non Gaussian distributions] to practical situations. Most of these 
difficulties are due to the fact that economic models involving stable Paretian 
[non-Gaussian distribution] generating processes have developed more 
rapidly than the statistical theory of stable Paretian distributions [non 
Gaussian distributions]” (Fama, 1965b, p. 418). 
 
Consequently, as explained in the previous section, the community of financial 
economists decided to keep the Gaussian framework as an idealization (the best 
approximation) of the financial dynamics. This embeddedness of statistical tests in 
the Gaussian framework is very important and even “critical [because] when this 
assumption does not hold, it is impossible to draw accurate and reliable 
conclusion[s] about reality” (Ghasein and Zahediasl, 2012, p. 486). This situation is 
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problematic for the elaboration of a dialogue between financial economics and 
econophysics simply because the vast majority of statistical tools have been 
developed in the Gaussian framework, which is not suitable for testing power laws. 
Satisfactory statistical tools and methods for testing power laws simply do not yet 
exist (Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2017). This is a big challenge, and one that very few 
authors have been working on. Moreover, from a financial/economics perspective, 
there are several obstacles (like infinite variance, for instance) to the development of 
statistical tests dedicated to power laws198. 
 
As Chapter 1 explained, the existence of a power law is commonly tested by 
econophysicists through a visual inspection (see Figures 1, 2 and 3 in Chapter 2): 
the authors plot the data in a double logarithmic scale and attempt to fit a line to part 
of it. This procedure dates back to Pareto’s work at the end of the 19th century. 
Unfortunately, this method generates significant systematic errors by wrongly 
attributing power law behaviours to phenomena199 (Clauset, Shalizi and Newman, 
2009; Stumpf and Porter, 2012; Gillespie, 2014). On this point, the conclusion of the 
article written by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) suggested that the 
identification of a power law might result from what modellers want to see: 
“The study of power laws spans many disciplines, including physics, biology, 
engineering, computer science, the earth sciences, economics, political 
science, sociology, and statistics. Unfortunately, well-founded [mainly visual] 
methods for analyzing power-law data have not yet taken root in all, or even 
most, of these areas and in many cases hypothesized distributions are not 
tested rigorously against the data. This leaves open the possibility that 
conjectured power-law behavior is, in some cases at least, the result of 
wishful thinking” (Clauset, Shalizi and Newman, 2009, p. 700). 
 
From a financial/economics viewpoint, such visual tests have two major drawbacks. 
Firstly, they provide no objective criteria for determining what a “good fit” is. 
Secondly, as already explained in this section, financial economists consider only 
statistical tests as scientific. Therefore, empirical investigations from the literature of 
econophysics tend to be regarded with suspicion by financial economists who 
implicitly promote a naïve Popperian justification of their work, as I will detail in the 
following sub-section. 
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IV.4. Financial economics as a naïve Popperian field 
 
“An important reason for the popularity of testing is that it is often thought to be a 
major if not the main ingredient to scientific progress and the best way to move from 
alchemy to science” (Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995, p. 7). This situation results 
from the influence of Karl Popper (1902–1994) on scientific practices: scholars 
cannot prove theories but they must be able to falsify them. In a Popperian 
perspective, there is no way to confirm a theory or an assumption: “even observation 
statements, Popper maintains, are fallible and science in his view is not a quest for 
certain knowledge but an evolutionary process in which hypotheses or conjectures 
are imaginatively proposed and tested in order to explain facts or to solve problems” 
(Thornton, 2016, p. 7). Popper emphasized the importance of the severity of tests to 
which conjectures have to be subjected. A test will never confirm a theory or an 
assumption but it will provide a temporary reason to proceed in a particular research 
direction. Such a way of thinking about knowledge associates scientific progress with 
a regular evolution (improvement) of the standards by which we measure the 
achievements of past accepted theories and conjectures (Robinson, 1971). This 
ability to test theories/hypotheses is often presented, in social sciences, as a naïve 
criterion of scientificity. While he was dealing with this aspect, the famous economist 
Fisher (1973) wrote that “statistical methods are essential to social studies, and it is 
principally by the aid of such methods that these studies may be raised to the rank of 
sciences” (Fisher, 1973, p. 2). An important body of literature exists that deals with 
the Popperian dimension of economics and finance. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to give an overview of these debates between scholars (Hendry, 1980; 
Blaug, 1992) who promote the Popperian character of (financial) economics and 
those (Summers, 1991; Caldwell, 1992, Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995) who 
criticize this aspect.  
 
In this section, I focus on the fact that statistical tests are mainly used as a naïve 
Popperian justification in financial economics. Regarding this point, it is noticeable 
that Popper is the only philosopher of science quoted in the mainstream journals 
such as Econometrica or the Journal of Finance. In line with Popper’s opinion 
according to which “we never argue from facts to theories” (Popper, 1974, p. 68), 
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financial economists start their modelling with a priori statements that must be 
tested. In their modelling practices, this starting frame provides the conditions that 
articulate a well-defined set-up; acting therefore as a “nomological machine” 
(Cartwright, 1989). The role of this a priori statement is to provide the identification 
required to render data economically interpretable. As detailed in the previous 
section, the two conceptual ingredients of this a priori framework are the perfect 
rationality of agents and the Gaussian characterization of the evolution of financial 
prices. These two idealizations define the relevant aspects by specifying what can be 
said about the dynamics of financial markets: the perfect rationality of actors 
ensuring the mechanistic decisions of agents allows researchers to focus on their 
behaviours’ outcome (so on the prices themselves), whereas the Gaussian 
framework defines the statistical meaning (and ideological dimension 200 ) of the 
modelling practices. In this context, the way of producing and justifying financial 
knowledge can roughly be summarized by the following process: 
 
P1  TT   T  EE (  P2) 
 
“All scientific discussions start with a problem (P1) to which we offer some 
sort of tentative solution—a tentative theory (TT); this theory is then criticized 
[and tested T], in an attempt at error elimination (EE); and as in the case of 
dialectic, this process renews itself (P2): the theory and its critical revision 
give rise to new problems” (Popper, 1974, p. 105). 
 
In a financial context, P1 refers to the evolution of financial prices; TT denotes the 
combination of perfect rationality of agents and the Gaussian framework; T 
summarizes the existence of statistical tests implemented in the process, while the 
EE refers to the development of corrective methodology (which I presented as a de-
idealization in the previous section) such as ARCH-type models. Eventually, these 
new models also generate specific empirical contradictions that raise new forms of 
models (GARCH), and so forth. Although the Popperian rhetoric is largely used in 
the mainstream finance, there is a major difference between what financial 
economists do and what Popper proposed they do. Actually economists do not read 
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the process evoked above in the same way that Popper would. For the Austrian 
philosopher, the error elimination (EE) and the evolutionary aspect of the process 
(P2) will generate new standards, and these two steps are required in the progress of 
scientific knowledge. In contrast, financial economists don’t really consider these 
aspects, but rather they focus on the first step of the process (T) regarding the 
possibility of testing their assumptions. In other words, the existence of tests is 
perceived as the key point of the process. However, if the existence of a testing 
methodology can be perceived as a necessary condition to be labelled “Popperian”, 
it is not a sufficient one. In accordance with Popper, such testing methodology 
should evolve by integrating more severe scientific standards. When financial 
economists test their assumptions, they mainly look for the statistical significance as 
a confirmation of their works. This perspective is not really Popperian, since this 
philosopher rejected the idea that we can confirm a theory or an assumption. 
 
 
Although several authors (Caldwell, 1992; Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995) 
emphasized the naïve falsificationism usually promoted by financial economists, this 
way of developing (and justifying) knowledge is very common in mainstream 
economic/financial journals where, “most economists have heard of Popper’s theory 
of falsification, although they have no personal familiarity with his works, and most 
do believe that economic theories can be falsified in the sense of being refuted” 
(Redman, 1994, p. 76). Popper, himself, contributed to the development of such 
naïve falsificationism when he wrote “it must be admitted, however, that the success 
of mathematical economics shows that one social science at least has gone through 
its Newtonian revolution” (Popper, 1957, p. 60). The usual critiques (Redman, 1994; 
Keusenkamp and Magnus, 1995; Keuzenkamp, 2000) against this naïve 
falsificationism considered the panoply of ARCH and GARCH models201 as an ad-
hoc solution for preserving the Gaussian framework despite all empirical 
contradictions observed in data.  
 
Beyond these well-documented critiques of the statistical adjustments, there are two 
other aspects that question the Popperian dimension of financial economics. The 
                                                          
201
 As a reminder, these models are corrective methods for capturing the extreme fluctuations that 
occur in the Gaussian description of financial markets. 
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first point refers to the circularity of the statistical reasoning: economists seek to test 
a Gaussian assumption by using statistical tests that take their meaning only in a 
Gaussian framework, thereby reducing the significance and the interpretability of 
measurements. In so doing, economists seem to avoid non-Gaussian distribution by 
keeping a question opened: what about a non-Gaussian situation? In addition to that, 
there are some technical limitations in using such statistical tests: Leamer (1983) 
shows that the significance level of statistical tests varies with the sample size, but 
this aspect has been largely ignored in practices where a fixed significance level is 
used (Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995). Moreover, some authors (Glymour, 1985; 
McCloskey, 1994) have raised questions about the informative nature of the 
statistical tests that economists use. As Glymour (1985) mentioned, “Statistical tests 
don’t inform us as to whether or not a model is approximately true. They don’t permit 
us to compare false models to determine which is closer to the truth” (Glymour, 
1985, p. 78). The second point that tarnishes the Popperian dimension of financial 
economics refers to the fact that by seeing Gaussian distribution everywhere, 
economists seem to be confused between trends and laws. However, Popper 
distinguished between these two notions: “trends exist, or more precisely, the 
assumption of trends is a useful statistical device. But trends are not laws. A 
statement asserting the existence of a trend is existential, not universal” (Popper, 
1960, p. 15). In line with this quotation, financial economists use the Gaussian 
distribution as a first assumption, but they transformed it into a law through the 
development of corrective ad-hoc statistical methods (ARCH-type models).  
 
Financial economists start their modelling practices with a priori statements that they 
know are unrealistic but that they justify through statistical significance. In so doing 
they don’t really discover something, but instead they propose a particular 
explanatory fiction that justified through a naïve Popperian epistemology based on a 
(statistical) verification of the a priori representation. However, I explained in this 
section that the use of statistical tests is not a sufficient condition to be in line with 
what Popper promoted. In this context, financial economics can be associated with a 





One might wonder why it is that econophysicists are not promoting naïve 
falsificationism by visually testing the existence of power laws in financial/economic 
systems. In this context, the Popperian characterization of such an idea could take 
the following form: 
 
P1  TT   T  EE (  P2) 
 
where P would refer to the evolution of financial prices, TT would denote the 
expectation of having a power law and T would represent the visual test used by 
econophysicists in their works. This characterization is not convincing for two 
reasons. First, the expectation of having a power law does not refer to a theoretical 
explanation (contrasting with what economists do) of the data—this expectation is 
hardly a phenomenological description of these data). Furthermore this expectation 
of having a power law results from another assumption202, which makes sense only 
because physicists find the extension of their knowledge to finance meaningful. In 
other words, the Duhemian analogy, as exposed above, is a necessary condition for 
having such an expectation. The second reason refers to the absence of a real 
testing methodology in econophysics, where the empirical justification for the 
existence of power laws is based on mere observation203.  
  
As detailed in the previous section, financial economists and econophysicists have 
two different epistemologies for justifying their works: while the former refer to a 
Popperian rhetoric to establish the legitimacy of their research, the latter rather found 
their works on a Duhemian way of using analogies. In this context of epistemological 
dissimilarities, which generate an incommensurability of scientific standards between 
the two communities, it is worth investigating further the reasons for this lack of 
dialogue between econophysicists and financial economists. This is the purpose of 
the next part. 
 
  
                                                          
202
 Systems composed of a high-number of interacting components are complex and can be 
described through the self-criticality framework. 
203
 There are still no statistical tests to test the existence of power laws—I will come back on this detail 




V. Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter explained why financial economists and econophysicists do not interact: 
they have different ways of doing science, implying different disciplinary standards. 
From their perspective, economists have good epistemological reasons for doing it. 
On the one hand, given their way of thinking about what is empirically adequate, 
economists have their reasons for rejecting econophysics, which appears to them as 
an inductive export of physics that presents no potential links with the existing 
knowledge and standards used in economics. Economists developed modelling 
practices based on Galilean idealization that was implemented through a naïve 
falsificationism in which statistical tests define the extent to which a model fits to the 
real world. A telling example of the financial economists’ position can be illustrated 
by the work of the economist Blake LeBaron (2001), who showed how a number of 
simple stochastic volatility models (i.e. models describing the occurrence of large 
fluctuations on financial markets) can visually produce power laws and long memory 
effects similar to those that have been reported in econophysics literature. LeBaron 
did not call to reject econophysics’ results; on the contrary: “It does not say that 
power-law results are wrong. It is only that they should be viewed as less conclusive 
than they often are, since there may be many explanations beyond those related to 
critical phenomena” (2001, p. 629). LeBaron added that “The search for reliable 
scaling laws in economics and finance should continue […]. The visual indication of 
a straight line going through some points should not be taken on its own as a ‘test for 
complexity’, or critical behavior […]. It would be best not to abandon these concepts, 
but to improve statistical understanding of both the empirical tests and the theoretical 
models under consideration” (2001, p. 630). 
 
On the other hand, econophysicists implement their scientific methods and 
standards based on a minimalist idealization, which they extend formally and 
analogically to another area of knowledge by adopting a Duhemian epistemology. In 
so doing, they deal with economic/financial data with a set of explanatory demands 
that is quite standard in statistical physics and, therefore, they don’t understand the 
rejection by economists. This feeling clearly emerged from a survey realized by 
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Jovanovic and Schinckus (2013) showing that the major actors of econophysics 
have tried to publish their works in the mainstream economics journals, but with little 
success. Jovanovic and Schinckus (2010) sent a questionnaire to 27 leading 
econophysicists (identified through a bibliometric analysis) about the degree of 
closure of economic journals to econophysicists. To the question “have you 
submitted a paper to a ranked journal in economics”, a large majority of 
econophysicists replied “yes”. However, very few econophysics papers are now 
published in economic journals. Thus, when econophysicists were asked to give the 
main reasons for the rejection of their paper, they replied that referees in economic 
journals often have difficulties with the topic or/and the method used in their paper204. 
Although based on a small sample, these results emphasized the incomprehension 
of econophysicists of the reasons for why economic journals are reluctant to publish 
their papers. To conclude this chapter, I propose the following table, which 
summarizes the major epistemological differences between econophysicists and 
financial economists in terms of modelling practices: 
 
 Econophysics Financial economics 
Justification Duhemian analogy Popperian rhetoric 
Idealization Minimalist Galilean 
Argumentation Asymptotic Additional 
Validation Visual tests Statistical tests 
A priori knowledge Complexity/power law Gaussian distribution 
Table 2: Comparision between modelling practices in econophysics and financial economics. 
 
The epistemological differences summarized above and detailed in this chapter are 
essential for clearly understanding why there is no current conceptual bridge 
between economics and econophysics. These two fields have currently different 
“construals” (i.e. way in which people perceive and interpret the world), making all 
kinds of interaction hardly possible205. Wiesberg (2016) explained that in science, 
                                                          
204
 In the survey, econophysicists had to choose between five reasons for having been rejected and 
were invited to comment on their choices: 1) the topic of the paper; 2) the assumptions used in the 
paper; 3) the method used in the paper; 4) the results of the paper; or 5) another reason. 
205
 I am not claiming that there are no joint works between economists and econophysicists—I am 
myself involved in such projects—I am just mentioning that such existing works are not very common 
in the literature, which is still quite hermetic to interdisciplinary attempts. I will come back to this 
dimension in the following section. 
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“construals provide an interpretation for the model’s structure, they set up relations of 
denotation between the model and real-world targets, and they give criteria for 
evaluating the goodness of fit between a model and a target” (Wiesberg, 2016, p. 
39). For instance, a technical test confirming the statistical significance of a power 
law would be seen as a construal for financial economists, who will take into 
consideration the existence of such law as a fact only when this fact can be viewed 
through the usual lens they use to interpret the world. In the same vein, a linear 
relationship on a log-log graph will evoke the existence of a power law for 
econophysicists whose construals are more based on a visual analysis (as 
mentioned earlier in this work). 
 
Construals are very important because they define the implicit rules of interpretation 
that a community shares about models. Although econophysicists and economists 
agree on the existence of large fluctuations in the evolution of financial prices, they 
disagree on what is empirically adequate. This dissimilarity is due to a different way 
of thinking about the link between the model and the reality.  
 
I used the word construals to define this way of connecting the model with the reality. 
To some extent, this notion of construal echoes the basic background shared by all 
members of a scientific community. Thomas Kuhn (1962) emphasized the 
importance of this tacit knowledge and it is rooted in what he called “examplars”, 
which refer to “the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start 
of their scientific education” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 107). Exemplars characterize these 
logical frameworks that scientists who belong to a specific community accept without 
question simply because these frames are part of their culture, and therefore part of 
their tacit shared knowledge. As explained previously in this chapter, financial 
economists and econophysicists have different examplars, making them use 
different symbolic generalizations. This situation illustrates the fact that scientific 
knowledge is embedded in theory and rules (detailed by Thomas Kuhn in the 
postscript of the second edition of his book). Specifically, Kuhn explained that the 
exemplars contribute to the crystallization of disciplinary intuitions shared by 
members of the same scientific community, which helps them to recognize a given 
situation as like other that has seen before. Scientists belonging to the same groups 
thus share education, experience and a language, leading them to perceive the 
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world in the same way. However, due to their different disciplinary backgrounds, 
financial economists and econophysicists do not see the same things in the same 
empirical data. Regarding this point, Kuhn (1962) explained that two scientific 
communities can have different sensations and react in different ways to the same 
stimuli, implying that, to some extent, these two groups live in different worlds. Such 
dissimilarities can generate situations in which scientists respond to the same 
empirical observation with incompatible descriptions and generalizations (Kuhn, 
1962, p. 201). These circumstances echo two important issues: scientists’ choice of 
theory and the incommensurability of descriptions.  
 
The implicit knowledge (examplars, language, etc.) shared by scientists belonging to 
the same community directly influences the way they perceive the world. In other 
words, scientists have good reasons, from their perspective, to consider stimuli as a 
familiar situation that they can describe through the theoretical framework they know 
(and share). On this aspect, Kuhn (1962, p. 199) wrote that scientists have no good 
reasons for being persuaded that this way of perceiving the world is not 
appropriate—actually, they have no other conceptual access to stimuli observed in 
the world. In this context, the choice of the theoretical lenses through which 
scientists study phenomena is not a matter of algorithm or rational choice but it 
instead results from the way scientists share value, education, language and culture 
in a common community. Kuhn (1962, p. 199) added to this point that “debates over 
theory choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or mathematical 
proof”. Science is diversified and dissimilar disciplinary contexts offer different 
descriptions of the world. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that scientists, as practitioners of a common large 
community, may share some common values, such as: that quantitative analysis is 
preferable to qualitative analysis; that results must be consistently justified; that 
results must be compatible with existing theories; etc. On these aspects for instance, 
financial economists and econophysicists agree. However, these common values 
often take different forms, depending on the disciplinary context within which they 
are implemented. Judgement, simplicity, consistency, plausibility, etc. often vary 
greatly from community to community (Kuhn, 1962). This chapter illustrated this 
variety of perceptions between econophysicists and financial economists: while the 
228 
 
former experience their value by justifying their works through a Duhemian use of 
analogy, the latter, despite claiming the use of the same values, instead found their 
modelling practices on a naïve Popperian rhetoric. Philosophers of science do not 
escape this influence of language and education on the way of analyzing their topic. 
From this perspective, because there is no neutral or deliberative process without 
influence of a particular background (I have a background in economics), I am not 
convinced that makes sense to seek criteria that demarcate which community has 
“the best tools” for characterizing the evolution of economic/financial data. Given the 
fact that econophysicists and economists do not define the term “characterize” or 
“explain” in the same way (I illustrated this point in detail in this chapter), all kinds of 
judgements on this point would appear as a personal (and disciplinary) opinion. In 
this chapter, and more generally in this dissertation, I used a perspectivist attitude206 
to try to understand what the “internal reasons” are for why econophysicists and 
financial economists do not really have a dialogue. A particular familiarity with 
physics (I have a background in engineering) combined with my role as a financial 
economist doubtless helped me (or influenced me badly) in this perspectivist 
investigation. Furthermore, as a member of the economists’ community, I tried in this 
chapter to acknowledge conceptual differences in order to initiate a potential 
dialogue between the two communities. In a sense, this chapter is an illustration of 
what Thomas Kuhn (1962, p. 201) suggested: “what the participants in a community 
breakdown can do is to recognize each other as members of different language 
communities and then become translators”. I will comment and illustrate this further 
translation process in the final conclusion of this dissertation.  
  
                                                          
206
 This perspectivist attitude is in line with Giere’s position that acknowledges that models and 
science are social and historical constructions created to serve human ends. However, Giere also 
acknowledges that such constructions correspond to a part of the world in a way that can legitimately 
be labelled objective. In other words, econophysicists and economists have their own “objective 
reasons” for implementing their different ways of doing science.  For further information on this 
perspectivism, see Giere (2006).  
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This dissertation investigated the emergence and the methodologies of 
econophysics. The first chapter presented the current disciplinary situation of 
econophysics through a bibliometric study, showing how it can be considered 
institutionally as a new sub-field of physics. However, the bibliometric evidence does 
not sit comfortably with the fact that the very debates that gave birth to econophysics 
locate it firmly in the field of financial economics. This, I argued, exposes the dual 
nature of econophysics: substantively a branch of economics but sociologically a 
branch of physics. 
 
The second chapter examined the historical environment that favoured the advent of 
econophysics. This analysis rooted econophysicists’ practices in the computational 
techniques (statistical pattern analysis and agent-based modelling) initiated in the 
Santa Fe Institute in the 1980s. Accordingly, I clarified the role played by this 
institution in the exporting of physics outside its borders. The major contribution of 
chapter 2 was to propose historical analysis of econophysics by clarifying the 
scientific context that linked this field with complexity studies.  
 
The third chapter showed how the development of these studies progressively 
shaped the literature in econophysics. Precisely, while the SFI focused more and 
more on studies dealing with agent-based modelling, the works on statistical (macro) 
patterns gradually in the 1990s became an area of knowledge on its own that I called 
statistical econophysics. A decade or so later, when this new field faced the first 
critiques regarding the lack of micro-foundations, econophysicists began to integrate 
the agent-based techniques into their research. The contribution of this third chapter 
was to show that this methodological diversification of econophysics preserved the 
same conceptual hard core built on the importance of asymptotic reasoning.  
 
The fourth and last chapter of this dissertation mainly focused on the original 
(statistical) econophysics to investigate the way in which its practitioners produce 
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knowledge. In parallel, I studied the financial economists’ modelling practices to 
compare the eventual differences with econophysics. This analysis led me to explain 
in detail the seminal paper (Stanley et al., 1996) that coined the term econophysics. 
Because this article laid down the conceptual foundations of the field, it is one (if not 
the most) quoted article in the current econophysics literature. My study showed how 
econophysicists used minimalist idealization and extended it to financial economics 
by implementing a Duhemian way of using analogies. In contrast, financial 
economists founded their works on Galilean idealizations presented through a 
Popperian rhetoric. These dissimilarities suggested that economists do not simply 
reject econophysics but that they have their epistemological reasons for acting in 
such a way. If the lack of dialogue between economists and econophysicists is due 
to different disciplinary construals, one can wonder whether an emergent dialogue 
could be initiated. I hope to have contributed to a better understanding of the reason 
for this field not really being accepted by economists. Being an economist myself, 
this question is meaningful, and I will conclude this dissertation with a discussion on 
this point. 
 
I. Is a dialogue between econophysics and financial economics possible?  
 
Although econophysicists and financial economists try to describe the evolution of 
financial prices statistically using idealizations in their modelling practices, they do 
not perceive and justify their works in the same way. What are the major reasons for 
such a gap between the two communities? What about the possibility of creating 
some bridging principles between the two fields? These questions will be discussed 
here by structuring my argument on the claims recently made by James Weatherall. 
Precisely, he asked the same kind of questions in two presentations about 
econophysics that he gave at the LMU Munich (July 2016) and at CAMPOS 
(November 2016) at the University of Cambridge. These two presentations echoed 
his book, entitled Physics of Wall Street, in which he provided a 
historical/biographical perspective on the key physicists who imported their 
knowledge to finance. In a sense, these presentations can be seen as a continuation 
of his book, because, unlike in the latter, the author investigated the reasons for 
economists’ continuing reluctance to engage with the development of econophysics. 
As Weatherall (2016) explained it, “econophysicists are motivated by questions that 
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they think they have the resources to answer, and yet, economists have (generally) 
rejected these answers – and perhaps the questions”. I agree with him on this point, 
which is clearly supported by the bibliometric analysis performed in the economic 
literature (presented in chapter 2). Financial economists do not accept/publish 
econophysical papers in their major journals. Why do financial economists reject 
econophysics? I will answer this question in two steps. I will first deal with what 
James Weatherall (2016) called “cheap explanations” by reminding readers of the 
existence of two different disciplinary cultures that complicate all forms of 
interactions between communities. Afterwards I will investigate the nuances of the 
two “deeper reasons” proposed by Weatherall (2016) to explain the gap between 
economists and econophysicists. Weatherall did not really detail what he meant by 
“cheap” and “deeper” reasons but he implicitly associated the former with cultural 
differences and the later with methodological dissimilarities. While I generally agree 
with Weatherall that the situation must be studied through different lenses, I disagree 
with him regarding the importance that he gave to these lenses. Precisely, I will 
explain how some elements of his “cheap explanations” are actually crucial to the 
understanding of the current lack of dialogue between econophysicists and 
economists. In the same vein, I will suggest some nuances regarding what he called 
deeper reasons that, from an economist’s viewpoint, must be reinterpreted. 
 
I.1. “Cheap reasons” for this epistemological gap 
 
At first sight the rejection of econophysics by financial economists might seem 
strange, because both these communities are familiar with the statistical analysis of 
empirical data. Why do they not interact with each other? This question is all the 
more meaningful regarding the influence of physics on finance, since several 
physicists (Osborne, 1962; Black, 1971) have contributed to the foundations of 
financial economics (Bernstein, 1994). Referring to the key disciplinary aspects, 
Weatherall (2016) listed four cheap reasons purported to explain why economists 
reject econophysics.  
 
The first reason refers to the ideological dimension of financial economics (i.e. 
economists commonly believe they contribute to society through the development of 
markets) that contrasts with the descriptive nature of (econo)physics. I agree with 
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Weatherall on this point, which is a classical opposition between social and hard 
sciences. Economic institutions (including financial markets) are created and 
organized in accordance with a specific way of thinking about/defining them. In other 
words, the organization of financial markets is explicitly based on the way in which 
financial (mainstream) economists describe these markets. Related to this, Millo and 
Schinckus (2016) showed how the assumptions of the Black and Scholes model 
shaped the structure of the early derivatives markets. In the same vein, Frankfurter 
and McGoun (1999) and more recently Schinckus (2017) emphasized the ideological 
reasons for financial authorities’ explicit promotion of a Gaussian description (with a 
few large fluctuations) of financial markets after the recent flash crashes (quick and 
large variations in financial markets due to a “loop effect” in the automatic trading 
algorithms). 207  In this context the financial authorities try to justify the non-
intervention attitude on the market through the “Gaussianity” of financial returns that 
(would) show that investors have the same probability of winning or losing money: 
the market being fair in this context, no intervention is required. This interconnection 
between financial knowledge and financial institutions makes financial economists 
more reluctant to accept a new theoretical framework that has the potential to 
shake/change the political recommendations promoted by financial authorities. 
 
The second reason evoked by Weatherall refers to the importance of the “rational 
expectations assumption” in economics that would be rejected by physicists. I partly 
agree with him on this matter. If it is indisputable that (financial) economics is based 
on the hypothesis that agents have perfect rationality and therefore rational 
expectations, the idea that this dogma is challenged by econophysicists is not so 
obvious. Indeed, it is even common to find econophysical works (Bouchaud and 
Potters, 2003; McCauley 2006; Sornette, 2009) 208  that assume that actors are 
perfectly rational. Although econophysicists, in their critiques of economics, refer 
rhetorically to the unrealism of the perfect rationality assumption (Mantegna and 
Stanley, 1999; McCauley, 2006), they rather seem to be methodologically indifferent 
towards this assumption, which is not a particular requirement (or a challenged 
notion) in their works. Moreover, by ignoring what is happening at the micro-level, it 
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 See Schinckus (2017) for further information on these events. 
208
 See Schinckus (2013) for an overview of these works.  
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cannot be said that econophysicists would propose a more realistic hypothesis 
regarding individuals’ behaviour (Schinckus, 2012). In other terms, this cheap reason 
(as labelled by Weatherall) is not an explanation.  
 
The third reason that would explain the rejection of econophysics by economists 
refers to a corollary implication of the previous reason: the lack of respect for the 
principle of utility maximization that is sacred to economists. This methodological 
aspect can indeed contribute to the lack of dialogue between the two communities. 
In contrast to all mainstream financial economists, econophysicists do not assume 
an individual utility function that should be maximized or optimized in relation to an 
existing set of initial conditions (McCauley, 2006). It is worth distinguishing the use of 
rational expectations assumptions and the principle of utility maximization. The 
former refers to the abilities of agents to deal with all the available information, but 
that does not necessarily require the formulation of a particular utility function. The 
principle of utility maximization means that rational agents will optimize a specific 
function to maximize their satisfaction. While some econophysicists assume in their 
works that agents can deal rationally with all the available information, none of them 
use the principle of utility maximization in their way of modelling the agents’ 
behaviour - that does not comply with economists disciplinary expectations. 
  
Last but not least, the final reason leading to the rejection of econophysics is the fact 
that econophysicists challenge what Weaterall (2016) called the “Gaussianities” of 
economics. Gaussianities refer here to economists’ tendency to see Gaussian 
distribution in many of the phenomena that they study. I agree with Weaterall on the 
importance of “Gaussianities” in (financial) economics; however, unlike him, I do not 
consider it to be a cheap reason for the absence of dialogue with econophysicists. 
Chapter 4 showed that Gaussian distribution is an important element of the Galilean 
idealization used by financial economists, who have a different “way of doing 
science”, implying that they have different standards in terms of explanation. 
Regarding this point, Feyerabend explained, “taking the demand for explanation for 
granted, only such theories are admissible (for explanation and prediction) in a given 
domain which either contain the theories already used in this domain, or are at least 
consistent with them” (Feyerabend, 1995, p.55). Even if econophysicists and 
financial economists agree on the existence of large fluctuations in the dynamics of 
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financial prices, they do not “see the same thing”, simply because the same set of 
observational data is compatible with different and mutually inconsistent theories. In 
this context I think Weatherall underestimated the importance of this reason. The 
theoretical and technical importance of the Gaussian framework is actually the major 
obstacle between econophysics and (financial) economics – I will provide details of it 
in the following subsection. 
 
I.2. Deeper reasons for this epistemological gap  
 
According to Weaterhall (2016), the deeper reasons for this opposition between the 
two fields can be summarized as follows: 
First, econophysicists are motivated by a set of explanatory demands that are 
natural in physics, but which economists reject […] Second, econophysicists 
have a different understanding of the relationship between their models and 
the data than do economists. (Weaterhall, 2016, slide 31) 
 
Although Weaterall (2016) did not clarify the kind of explanation that he referred to, I 
generally agree with these two reasons, especially the first one, regarding the 
explanatory demands in which “econophysicists seek to explain (and predict) large-
scale (macro/market level) phenomena by appeal to the dynamical and statistical 
properties of micro-level descriptions” (Weaterhall, 2016, slide 32). This claim is 
supported by the first part of chapter 4, explaining that the theoretical foundations of 
this explanatory framework are based on minimalist idealization (the Ising model and 
the renormalization group theory) and that econophysicists extended their work 
outside their original field through a Duhemian use of analogy. The rejection of this 
set of explanatory demands by economists is due to the fact that they implement 
other modelling practices based on Galilean idealizations and justified by a 
Popperian rhetoric (as explained in chapter 4). Such an epistemological gap means 
that what counts as an explanation differs in the two fields. 
 
However, at first sight this rejection might seem surprising. As mentioned above, 
several physicists contributed to the statistical development of financial economics, 
and many economic/financial models are micro-founded. Therefore, Weaterhall 
(2016) wondered rightly why economists reject the set of explanatory demands used 
by econophysicists. According to him, economists “reject the expectation that large-
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scale phenomena should/can be explained via micro-scale dynamics”, and this 
observation would lead to the idea that “economists do not like agent-based 
modelling” (Weaterall, 2016, slide 37). It is worth remembering that agent-based 
modelling is neither an economic computational technique nor one based on 
physics. Economists might not like this approach, but many of them are familiar with 
it and use it in their works. Although agent-based modelling indeed challenged the 
foundational idea that no interactive agents are described by a fixed utility function, 
there is an important literature showing that this way of modelling is logically 
compatible with the neoclassical framework (Arthur, 2014). Hamill and Gilbert (2016) 
offered a very good review of this growing literature. A quick look at the list of the 
recent winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences also gives an 
indication about the acceptance of agent-based modelling in economics. Three 
people have won this award for their contributions to the development of agent-
based economics: Thomas Schelling was the laureate of this prize in 2005 for his 
contributions to game theory209; Elinor Ostrom won this prize in 2009 for her work on 
the agent-based governance of complex economic systems; and Angus Deaton was 
awarded in 2015 for his contributions to the micro-foundations (agent-based 
modelling) of consumption, welfare and poverty. The growing importance of agent-
based modelling can also be observed in finance, in which Lengwiler (2006) and 
more specifically Meyers (2009) showed how agent-based modelling also 
contributes to the financial mainstream.  
 
Contrary to Weatherall’s opinion, economists do not reject the idea that macro-
phenomena can be explained in terms of micro-dynamics. The importance of the 
economic literature dedicated to the so-called micro-foundations of macroeconomics 
illustrates the key role played by this aspect in economists’ mind. In 1979 the 
economist Weintraub published a book entitled Microfoundations: The Compatibility 
of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, urging that economic macro-dynamics 
must be explained in terms of micro-dynamics. Afterwards, “during the last quarter 
century, the micro-foundations approach to macroeconomic theory has become 
dominant” (Van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003, p.65). Today, one can find dozens of 
books and articles (Weintraub, 1977; Weintraub, 1979; Boumans and Davis, 2010) 
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 Game theory is a mathematical framework that can be tested or implemented through the 
methodology of agent-based modelling (Bonabeau, 2002). 
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presenting or debating the pertinence of the micro-foundations of macroeconomics 
that “the majority of (influential) economists take for granted” (Gowdy, 2004, p.78). In 
2006 Edmund Phelps won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his 
work on the micro-foundations of a macroeconomic theory of employment. Today, it 
is impossible for a contemporary economist to avoid this specific theme, since the 
vast majority of textbooks deal with the micro-foundations of macroeconomics 
(Hoover, 2010). Given this context, where is the problem evoked by Weaterall 
(2016)? If econophysicists and (financial) economists both offer models to explain 
macro-dynamics in terms of micro-dynamics, why cannot they interact? As detailed 
in chapter 4, financial economists and econophysicists have different scientific 
methods, implying different standards. In this sense, the reason proposed by 
Weaterall (2016) must be read differently depending on the disciplinary lens used. 
From economists’ point of view, they do not reject the idea that a large scale can be 
explained via micro-scale dynamics, but they certainly reject physicists’ method. In 
other words, the major difference is in the way in which econophysicists and financial 
economists make the link between the micro- and the macro-level. While 
econophysicists accept that the macro-level can be “more than the sum of the micro-
entities” (see the link of the renormalization group theory detailed in chapter 3), 
economists usually consider the macro-level in a different way, in which the most 
important aspect is not the process of aggregation but rather the compatibility 
between the macro-dynamics and the rational individual choice of micro-agents.  
 
In a sense, this common use of agent-based modelling and this assumption to begin 
all reasoning with micro-foundations could be perceived as a potential conceptual 
bridge between econophysicists and economists, since these two communities seem 
to be familiar with these themes (Schinckus, 2010a, 2010b; Walstad, 2010). 
However, this is not the case. As Weatherall (2016) argues, this is due to two points: 
1) the fact that economists strongly reject the kind of explanation provided by 
econophysicists; and 2) the fact that the former and the latter conceive their 
modelling practices fundamentally differently. Although I agree with this general 
formulation of these points, I explained in this section why I disagree with Weatherall 
in the detailing of these points. Precisely, economists reject econophysicists’ 
explanation not because they reject the importance of the micro-scale (as argued by 
Weatherall) but rather because they consider that the macro-scale must be 
237 
 
compatible with the rational individual choice of micro-agents to maximize the utility 
function. Economists and econophysicists indeed conceive their modelling practices 
differently. However, such a situation is directly related to the importance of what 
Weatherall called the Gaussianities of financial economics. In contrast to his claim, I 
would not associate this aspect with a cheap reason for the lack of dialogue between 
the two communities. Chapter 4 of this thesis showed how Gaussianities play a key 
role in the definition of what is empirically adequate for economists (while power laws 
define this aspect for econophysicists). Interestingly, the Gaussian framework can be 
presented as a specific case of power laws implying that there is a potential common 
path for future research between the two fields. I conclude this dissertation on by 
discussing this point in the following section. 
 
II. Implications for the future of econophysics 
 
In this context of difficult dialogue between the two communities, there is now a 
pressing question about the future of econophysics: what are the implications of my 
research for econophysics? Is a profitable dialogue between econophysics and 
financial economics possible? In this conclusion I would like to discuss these two 
questions by suggesting some future research paths that could create a conceptual 
bridge between the two communities. 
 
This thesis showed that, despite some historical similarities, econophysics and 
financial economics have different ways of conducting science. Indeed, by dealing 
with different aspects of complex economic phenomena, these two fields are not in 
themselves enemies. They play their part in our understanding of such phenomena. 
The question in this context concerns the identification of potential future research 
paths that could be investigated for the development of a more integrative 
understanding of financial phenomena. Chapter 4 detailed how economists and 
econophysicists have different disciplinary construals that implicitly influence their 
modelling practices. Construals “are often not made explicit in discussions of 
models. This is because communities of modelers have standard conventions for 
reading model descriptions” (Weisberg, 2016, p.40). These implicit conventions 
shared by each community are probably the first obstacle to the initiation of a 
dialogue between the two fields. In other words, the first step towards this dialogue 
238 
 
therefore refers to the clarification of these construals, which must be made explicit 
for all to study the extent to which these conventions can evolve towards a more 
transdisciplinary perspective. As Weisberg (2016, p.79) argued, “The construals can 
change through time, or with the application of the same structure to a different 
modelling domain”. The very few works (Jovanovic and Schinckus, 2016; McCauley, 
Roehner, Stanley and Schinckus, 2016) existing on this difficult task “to open black 
boxes” have focused on what must be undertaken to make econophysics meaningful 
for economists and reciprocally to make financial economics meaningful for 
econophysicists. This difficulty for the two communities to understand each other is 
well illustrated by the following quotation made by the economist Steven Durlauf210 
(2005): 
… the implications of this new literature [econophysics] for economic 
complexity are still very unclear […] Within the physics community, there has 
emerged a subfield known as “econophysics” in which major research activity 
is represented by efforts to find power and scaling laws in different 
socioeconomic data sets … [however, these] findings in the econophysics 
literature are unlikely to persuade economists that scaling laws are 
empirically important. (Durlauf, 2005, p.231) 
 
Very often the two communities stay behind their disciplinary frontiers by presenting 
their methodological approach as completely new when it is not, as Lux (2009b) 
explained: 
 
One often finds [in the literature of econophysics] a scolding of the carefully 
maintained straw man image of traditional finance. In particular, ignoring 
decades of work in dozens of finance journals, it is often claimed that 
“economists believe that the probability distribution of stock returns is 
Gaussian,” a claim that can easily be refuted by a random consultation of any 
of the learned journals of this field. In fact, while the (erroneous) juxtaposition 
of scaling (physics!) via Normality (economics!) might be interpreted as an 
exaggeration for marketing purposes, some of the early econophysics papers 
even gave the impression that what they attempted was a first quantitative 
analysis of financial time series ever. If this was, then, performed on a level of 
rigor way below established standards in economics (a revealing example is 
the analysis of supposed day-of-the-week effects in high-frequency returns in 
Zhang, 1999) it clearly undermined the standing of econophysicists in the 
economics community. (Lux, 2009b) 
 
Until now, the models developed by econophysicists have mainly stayed within the 
boundaries of statistical physics. In a sense, the aforementioned quotations are more 
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 Durlauf (who was an economist involved in the Santa Fe Institute) set out his position more clearly 
in a later paper (2012, p.14). 
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a call for collaboration than a criticism of econophysicists. The problem is not the 
econophysics concepts per se but rather the lack of links with the existing financial 
economics knowledge. Indeed, the majority of econophysicists apply the concepts 
and models of physics as they exist today, ignoring the features of financial 
economics, particularly the need for quantitative tests validating the power laws and 
the necessity to have generative models explaining the emergence of such as 
patterns. 
 
One must admit that, for a long time, research into power laws has suffered from 
these two major problems. On the one hand, there were no statistical tests, the only 
tests being based on a visual comparison method. On the other hand, no generative 
models existed for explaining the emergence of power laws. These two absences 
are crucial for financial economists, because, from their Popperian perspective, 
statistical tests on the use of a theoretical statement are the foundations of their 
discipline. Indeed, from the most common financial-economics viewpoint, a scientific 
model must not only reproduce reality but must also be validated by 
econometric/statistical tests of assumptions that are compatible with the recognized 
theoretical framework. Some econophysicists do not feel especially concerned about 
these aspects, because, from their scientific perspective, they do not need to meet 
these conditions to propose a model. By contrast, these two conditions have largely 
contributed to the maintenance of the Gaussian framework by financial economists 
even when they describe the occurrence of extreme variations. Consequently, this 
epistemological gap has strongly supported the misgivings of financial economists 
about the potential contribution of econophysics to their field. Currently these 
contributions are still difficult to value in the light of the theoretical mainstream used 
by financial economists. 
 
Interestingly, the gap evoked above is not only due to the methodological 
dissimilarities between the econophysicists and financial economists. It also results 
from the current lack of knowledge about the statistical treatment of power laws. In a 
seminal paper on power laws, Michael Mitzenmacher (2005) asserted that the 
characterization of empirical distributions by power laws is only a part of the 
challenge that faces researchers involved in explaining the causes and roles of these 
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laws. Precisely, he pointed out the need for theoretical models that could explain 
them: 
While numerous models that yield power law behavior have been suggested 
and, in fact, the number of such models continues to grow rapidly, no general 
mechanisms or approaches have been suggested that allow one to validate 
that a suggested model is appropriate. [W]e have beautiful frameworks, 
theory, and models – indeed, we have perhaps far too many models – but we 
have been hesitant in moving to the next steps, which could transform this 
promising beginning into a truly remarkable new area of science. 
(Mitzenmacher, 2005, p.526) 
 
 
In other words, the lack of dialogue between econophysics and financial economics 
not only results from different disciplinary contexts but also emphasizes a peculiar 
lack of knowledge (research) on a specific aspect (i.e. the lack of statistical tests) 
related to the use of power laws. The most interesting point is that, given their 
disciplinary construals, econophysicists and financial economists do not need to 
initiate such research. However, the diffusion of econophysics works into financial 
economics could favour the potential future development of such research. 
 
For a philosopher of science, there is an interesting point here: the lack of dialogue 
between two scientific fields illustrates the disunity of scientific practices. Economists 
and econophysicists certainly have different construals and modelling practices, but 
the lack of dialogue between them also echoes another problem: the validation of the 
use of statistics. While economists work with a specific statistical (Gaussian) frame 
to ensure the existence of statistical tests, econophysicists rather use an analogical 
extension of their statistics that is conceptually justified by their disciplinary beliefs. 
Such a difference (detailed in chapter 4) shows the disunity of science in the method 
of validating the use of statistics. Although power laws are nothing new in science, 
there is still a lack of tools to testify to their validity. The following schema illustrates 





























Figure 1: Schema illustrating the current situation of econophysics in relation to financial economics. 
 
Economists and econophysicists aim to characterize the increasing complexity of 
economic/financial phenomena. Although these two communities use statistics to 
describe these phenomena, the key difference between them refers to the way in 
which they justify/validate their use of statistics. Economists mainly work with a 
statistical frame that allows them to justify their approach using statistical tests (well-
defined in the domain of statistics). In contrast, in the absence of statistical tests for 
power laws, econophysicists justify their approach through an analogical extension 
of their disciplinary construals. Because such validation is outside the domain of 
statistics, their statistical approach is perceived by economists as a circular (ad hoc) 
justification that only physicists can understand. Discussing the current statistical 



















knowledge about power laws, Mitzenmacher (2005, p.526) suggested a taxonomy in 
five steps for studies on power laws: 
 
(1) Observe: gather data on the behaviour of a system and demonstrate that a 
power law distribution appears to fit the relevant data.  
(2) Interpret: explain the significance of the power law behaviour to the system.  
(3) Model: propose an underlying model that explains the power law behaviour.  
(4) Validate: find data to validate, and if necessary specialize or modify, the model.  
(5) Control: use the understanding from the model to control, modify and improve 
the system’s behaviour.  
 
Mitzenmacher’s analysis was particularly relevant to econophysics. Like other fields 
(geography, biology, etc.) that use power laws in their research, econophysics had 
not really been able to move beyond the third step when Mitzenmacher published his 
article in 2005. Mitzenmacher’s argument is very important, because, on the one 
hand, it underlines that the claims made by economists have an echo in other fields 
dealing with the use of power laws; and, on the other hand, it paves the way for a 
potential research agenda that would ease the collaboration between econophysics 
and financial economists. 
 
The development of statistical tests for power laws combined with the adjustment of 
economists’ Popperian rhetoric could contribute directly to the development of an 
integrative approach between econophysicists and financial economists. Precisely, 
this kind of test would even be in line with a more restrictive Popperian approach 
based on an improvement of standards through which the theories and results of the 
past must be evaluated. It is worth mentioning that such statistical research has 
been conducted very recently and has not been disseminated 211  widely among 
econophysicists. Moreover, to date, the very few works dealing with statistical tests 
of power laws have not yet been used with financial data (they have been used with 
wealth, income, city sizes and firm sizes). Despite their drawbacks and the fact that 
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further investigation is needed, we can consider that these tests have opened the 
door to some research on statistical tests. Although one can observe the emergence 
of common works between economists and econophysists, the bridge between the 
two fields is still to be written. Up to now, the story still generally appears a failed 
takeover by one discipline famous for being imperialist (physics). This failed takeover 
is also due to the resistance of economics (also famous for being imperialist) that 
creates a situation in which the two empires are still standing, staring at one another 
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